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A Note from the Editors
In fall 2018, after forty-five years of tireless service to Hungarian 
 Studies Review, Nándor F. Dreisziger retired as editor of our journal. 
Attempting to fill his shoes has proven to be a humbling, though excit-
ing, project, one that has been made all the more challenging by the 
global pandemic that struck in spring 2020, and by the growing uncer-
tainty around the future of the humanities and social sciences within the 
academy, and in society more generally. Beyond working to assemble 
this present transitional issue under sometimes trying conditions, one 
of our main tasks—and challenges—since assuming the editorship of 
HSR was to find a university press we could partner with in order to 
ensure that the journal would remain viable and sustainable for years to 
come. After following up on a few promising leads, our editorial team 
decided unanimously on Pennsylvania State University Press, and we 
are glad we did. Though our contract with them does not officially start 
until January 2021, PSU Press has already demonstrated a clear com-
mitment to HSR, and we are very much looking forward to our partner-
ship with them.
 For almost five decades, HSR has been a non-partisan, inde-
pendent academic journal that has published high-quality articles, book 
reviews, and special issues on a wide variety of topics and themes. As 
editors, we remain devoted to the journal’s scholarly traditions, and 
are especially committed to its interdisciplinary approach. We also be-
lieve firmly that a journal dedicated to Hungarian studies is as impor-
tant now as ever. In the last few decades, the situation of Hungary, a 
democratic country since 1989, and a member of NATO and the Euro-
pean Union, has changed profoundly. So have the lives of Hungarians 
and communities of Hungarian descent in the region, and around the 
world. But the mission of the Hungarian Studies Review remains the 
same: to raise interest in and support the pursuit of Hungarian stud-
ies. Working in close cooperation with both the Hungarian Studies As-
sociation of Canada and the US-based Hungarian Studies  Association, 
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HSR will continue to solicit original scholarship and facilitate provoca-
tive  dialogue. As editors, we especially welcome new perspectives 
and  critical, innovative approaches to a wide range of social, political, 
cultural, historical, and transnational topics related to Hungary and the 
region formerly encompassed by the Habsburg Empire, as well as the 
global  Hungarian diaspora.
 This current issue has been a true team effort, and we could not 
have achieved what we have without the encouragement of our edito-
rial advisers and other scholars in the field, or without the support of 
our two sponsoring associations. We also would have been lost entirely 
without the commitment, counsel, and contributions of our associate ed-
itors, Emily Gioielli and Leslie Waters, or without the diligent work of 
Richard S. Esbenshade, our book review editor and eagle-eyed technical 
editor. This team made our transitional issue possible, and will provide 
solid editorial leadership as we move forward. Finally, we would like to 
express our gratitude to our founding editor, Nándor. We appreciate the 
faith you have put in us, and can only hope you are satisfied with what 
we have produced here. We promise to keep your project alive, and to 
help nurture it into the future.
Steven Jobbitt and Árpád von Klimó
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HSR: A History of New Beginnings  
and a Tribute to Founding Editor 
Nándor F. Dreisziger
Steven Jobbitt and Árpád von Klimó
The publication of this combined 2019–20 issue marks the beginning of 
a new chapter for Hungarian Studies Review (HSR). Founded in 1974 
as the Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies (CARHS), the 
journal has had its share of challenges and triumphs over the last five 
decades, and not a few “new beginnings” along the way. What makes 
this particular new beginning markedly different, however, is that for the 
first time in its history, HSR will be moving forward without Nándor F. 
Dreisziger at its helm. To say that HSR has been a lifelong labour of love 
for Nándor would be an understatement. Recruited by the journal’s co-
founder, Ferenc Harcsár, in the early 1970s, Nándor has been the heart 
and soul of HSR from the outset, and can be credited not only for the 
journal’s many successes, but also its longevity. Nándor helped steer the 
journal to new heights in the 1980s, when HSR became attached to the 
newly-founded Hungarian Chair at the University of Toronto, and was 
key to finding new and often innovative ways to continue publishing 
the journal after support from the University of Toronto diminished 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From the traditional typesetting of 
the 1970s, to the advent of desktop editing in the 1990s, to the current 
digital age, Nándor did more than simply roll with the punches over 
the years. He adapted the journal in response to often abrupt financial, 
political, and technological changes, and built a solid foundation for a 
future  generation of editors to build upon. It is an impressive achieve-
ment, and as the new editors of HSR, we hope we can live up to—and 
continue—the legacy that Nándor has left to us.
 Nándor’s story as editor is in many ways remarkable. Few edi-
tors of academic journals can say they have served in the position for 
forty-five years, and even fewer have been bold enough to assume their 
editorial duties at the very beginning of their careers. But this is pre-
cisely what Nándor did, though as he noted in an email interview in 
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October 2019, his role as editor of HSR was not something he had ever 
dreamed would be permanent, let alone career-defining. As Nándor told 
us, he was first approached by the Hungarian-Canadian émigré leader 
Harcsár at the beginning of the 1970s.
1
 Harcsár had read a prize-win-
ning essay that Nándor had written as a graduate student at the Univer-
sity of  Toronto, and felt that the up-and-coming scholar would make 
a fine  editor for the serious academic journal he envisioned. Though 
Nándor had only just started his career as Assistant Professor of His-
tory at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, he 
agreed to  accept the editorial position, albeit not without some under-
standable hesitation. Reflecting on his early interaction with Harcsár, 
Nándor wrote, “When Harcsar asked me to become the editor I recall 
telling him that I would edit the journal until he found an experienced 
editor. He never did.”
2
 Given Nándor’s dedication to HSR and his tire-
less work for the journal, it is perhaps fortunate that Harcsár was unable 
to find someone to replace him as promised.
 As co-founder of CARHS, Nándor worked closely with  Harcsár, 
whose Ottawa-based organization, the Hungarian Readers’ Service, was 
the original publisher of the journal. Harcsár’s death in 1979 posed a 
significant challenge for the new journal. As Nándor  indicated, the 
journal had close to five hundred subscribers by the end of the 1970s. 
Most of these were Harcsár’s friends, however, and according to Nán-
dor, this early support for the journal gradually evaporated after Harcsár 
died.
3
 Declining subscriptions were not the only challenge.  Reflecting 
on the first few years of the journal’s existence in its original incar-
nation as CARHS, Nándor recalled how difficult it was to attract the 
attention of senior scholars in the field. Most of his early letters to lead-
ing  Hungarianists in the diaspora went “unanswered,” and even the 
most prolific scholars working in Hungarian studies in North  America 
declined to submit their work, or else promised to do so, but never 
 delivered on that promise. Though the circle of contributors “expanded 
slowly,” and though some scholars like Stephen Béla Várdy became 
regular  contributors, according to Nándor, the journal’s early reception 
in  Canada and the United States “might best be described as mixed.”
4
At the beginning of the 1980s the journal received a new lease 
on life when it found a home at the University of Toronto, where it 
was supported by funding from the university, and by the newly-created 
Hungarian Chair. Relaunched as Hungarian Studies Review in 1981,
5
 
the journal flourished throughout the 1980s, publishing two issues a 
year
6
 with the University of Toronto Press under the joint editorial 
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leadership of Nándor and George Bisztray, Hungarian Chair and co-
editor of the journal from 1981 to 2003. With the journal’s editorial 
office under the umbrella of the Hungarian Chair, HSR was able to as-
semble a small but impressive editorial team, and at the beginning of 
the 1980s could list no fewer than twenty-five scholars and community 
members on its editorial advisory board. Moreover, in addition to the 
two co-editors, Michael F. Böröczki, who was based in Ottawa with the 
Hungarian Readers’ Service, continued to serve as Executive Manager 
from 1981 to 1983, while between 1981 and 1985 Susan M. Papp served 
as Assistant Editor, a position that was paid for by the Hungarian Chair.
7
The results of HSR’s transition to the University of Toronto and 
its press were substantial, and did not go unnoticed within scholarly 
communities on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Nándor, HSR 
was surprisingly well received “in some circles in Communist  Hungary,” 
for example.
8
 The journal even attracted the attention of Hungary’s 
 National Széchényi Library, which would prove to be vital to HSR’s 
survival in the 1990s and early 2000s. In North America, HSR’s repu-
tation began to grow as well. Reviewing the journal in 1987 for the 
periodical Hungarian Studies (which had been established at Indiana 
University by Denis Sinor), Richard L. Aczel wrote, “over the . . . years 
of its existence [HSR] has produced a highly impressive body of schol-
arly work unparalleled in range, depth, and consistency by any other 
contemporary venture of its kind in the Anglophone world . . . The most 
impressive achievement of the Review . . . [has] been its publication 
of five special issues on themes of considerable importance . . . To all 
those with an interest in Hungarian studies in the Anglophone world . . . 
[HSR] continues to provide a rare and invaluable service.”
9
For a Canadian-based scholarly journal with comparably 
 modest resources, this praise was significant, and certainly left a mark 
on Nándor, who made a point of highlighting Aczel’s positive review in 
our email interview with him.
10
 However, despite the journal’s growing 
reputation, the University of Toronto unexpectedly stopped contributing 
to HSR’s editorial expenses in 1988, and by 1990 the journal itself had 
been dropped by University of Toronto Press (the last issue printed by 
the press was volume 17, number 2 in Fall 1990). In light of the univer-
sity’s waning support, Éva Tömöry took on the newly-created Subscrip-
tions Manager position in 1990 (a role she would  continue to play with 
HSR until 2003–04
11
), while the Hungarian Studies  Association of Can-
ada (HSAC), which had been founded in 1985, began co-sponsoring 
the journal in 1991. The other vital co-sponsor of HSR was the National 
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Széchényi Library (NSL) in Hungary. Like HSAC, the library began 
supporting HSR in 1991, but whereas HSAC’s role was primarily to of-
fer financial and editorial support, NSL was responsible for the printing 
and distribution of the journal.
The partnership with HSAC and NSL marked the beginning of a 
new chapter for HSR, and for Nándor in particular. The loss of  editorial 
support from the University of Toronto had a profound impact on Nán-
dor’s editorial workload, especially after the university’s  Humanities 
Publishing Services (HPS) came “to an abrupt end” in 1993.
12
 Estab-
lished in the 1980s by the Centre for Computing in the Humanities, 
HPS had provided an affordable typesetting service to journals affili-
ated with the University of Toronto. Because HSR was still attached 
to the Hungarian Chair, its editors could make use of these cost-effec-
tive  services. The closure of HPS posed a significant problem for the 
journal, as HSR could not afford the prohibitive typesetting rates being 
charged by commercial presses. Recognizing that they had “no alterna-
tive but to try accomplishing this task on their own,” the  editors began 
 exploring the possibility of personal computer-based desktop publish-
ing. The  transition proved successful, though the learning curve was 
steep. As the co-editors lamented in a 1993 editorial note, “advances 
in computer electronics—in particular, in desktop publishing—have 
made our task easier. Nevertheless, the switch required that the member 
of the editorial team in charge of production (Dreisziger) learn a new 
word-processing program and purchase a suitable laserjet printer.”
13
Though the switch to desktop publishing in 1993 may have ren-
dered the journal’s operation “less expensive,” it ended up imposing 
“even more work on one of [the] editors,” and did not solve a host of 
other problems HSR was facing. These issues included “the shrinking 
of [HSR’s] subscription base, the unpredictable flow of articles, and the 
lack of help with the translation of good manuscripts from Hungarian 
to English.”
14
 Daunting as they may have been, these challenges did 
not prove insurmountable. Bolstered by the new collaboration with 
both NSL and HSAC, Nándor was also able to count on the support of 
HSR’s editorial advisers, a number of whom remain active members of 
the journal’s editorial board today. In 1994, for example, Oliver Botar 
( University of Manitoba) guest-edited a special issue on Hungarian 
 artists in the Americas.
15
 Botar had already served as guest editor for 
the Spring issue in 1988,
16
 and would guest-edit a third issue in 2004, 
and a fourth in 2010 together with Hattula Moholy-Nagy.
17
 In addi-
tion to a special issue titled “Thousand Years of Hungarian Thought,” 
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edited by Bisztray in 2000,
18
 HSR also saw special guest-edited vol-
umes by  Agatha Schwartz (University of Ottawa), who teamed up with 
Marlene Kadar (York University) in 1999 to publish the first of two 
thematic  issues on Women and Hungary (Part Two was guest-edited 
by Schwartz in 2002).
19
 In 2014, Judith Szapor (McGill University) 
 co-edited the  special issue “Gender and Nation in Hungary since 1919” 
with Schwartz.
20
 This was the last special issue published by HSR  under 
Nándor’s  leadership as editor. Nándor was clearly grateful for these 
contributions, and noted that the guest-edited volumes were crucial to 
the continuation of HSR’s tradition of publishing special issues on top-
ics of interest and importance to scholars working both within and out-
side the field of  Hungarian studies.
21
After Bisztray’s retirement as Hungarian Chair, Nándor  became 
the sole editor of HSR in 2004. This editorial shift was followed by 
Nándor’s own retirement from the Royal Military College of Canada in 
2005, and also by new developments in the way that HSR was supported, 
printed, and distributed. Beginning with the publication of  volume 32 
in 2005, the United States-based Hungarian Studies Association (HSA) 
became a co-sponsor alongside NSL and HSAC. Formed in 1970 as The 
American Association for the Study of Hungarian History, HSA adopted 
its current name in 2004, and continues to be an important supporter of 
HSR. HSA’s involvement with HSR came at a crucial  moment, as sup-
port from NSL began to drop off by the end of the  decade. The last 
issue of HSR printed by NSL came out in 2008 (volume 35, numbers 
1–2), and though NSL officially continued to distribute the journal, this 
service in actuality also ceased after 2011. Starting in 2009, HSR was 
printed by Allan Graphics in Kingston, Ontario, though all  issues of 
HSR from 1981 to 2018 are also currently available in electronic format 
on the NSL website.
In autumn 2018, Nándor retired fully as editor of HSR. As 
he wrote in an editorial note in the 2018 volume, “after editing this 
journal for four and a half decades, advanced age and the diagnosis of 
a progressive neurological disease prompt me to resign as editor and 
producer of this journal.”
22
 As presidents of HSA and HSAC respec-
tively, Árpád and I agreed in November 2018 to serve as co-editors 
for this transitional 2019–20 issue, and to help negotiate a shift to a 
new publisher, one that would provide professional editorial support, 
and that would help us establish a presence in online databases like 
JSTOR and Project MUSE. In this task we have been assisted by Em-
ily Gioielli (Pasts, Inc.  Center for Historical Studies, Central European 
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University), Leslie  Waters (University of Texas at El Paso), and Richard 
S.  Esbenshade ( University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign). As a team 
of five, it has taken us over a year to assemble this current issue. Even 
though each of us has  previous editorial experience, it proved to be a 
significant undertaking. Our collective respect for Nándor’s achieve-
ments has only grown since we took up the editorial reins, and I think 
the two of us speak for the entire editorial team when we say we are 
in awe of what Nándor was able to accomplish in four and a half de-
cades. His  dedication to HSR is  admirable, and his accomplishments 
humbling. As  already noted, we can only hope that we will be worthy of 
the legacy he has left to us, and to generations of scholars yet to come.
Inspired by the journal’s nearly half-century history, we look 
forward to HSR’s next “new beginning,” and are excited about our new 
partnership with Pennsylvania State University Press, which officially 
begins in January 2021. Our colleagues at PSU Press have been very 
supportive and helpful with our transition, and have been instrumental 
in the publication of this transitional issue. Based on our interactions 
and experiences so far, we are confident that we made the right choice 
to partner with them for the journal’s next chapter. Though much has 
obviously changed in terms of editorial structure and the production of 
the journal, we remain committed as an editorial team to HSR’s tradi-
tions, and are thankful for the continued support of HSAC and HSA, as 
well as the guidance of our editorial advisers. As editors we have much 
to learn, but as we hope this issue illustrates, we are firm in our com-
mitment to an interdisciplinary approach to Hungarian studies, and will 
continue to offer a rigorous, non-partisan forum for scholarly discussion 
and debate. We also hope to introduce new features to HSR, and are 
looking forward to working with our editorial board, contributors, sup-
porting associations, and readers to develop and further refine the proj-
ect Nándor has handed over to us, and to continue to create  dynamic, 
relevant, and critical content well into the twenty-first century.
NOTES
 1.   Nándor F. Dreisziger, email interview with the authors, October 18, 2019. 
As R. L. Aczel wrote in his 1987 review of HSR, early discussions for 
the establishment of a North American periodical dedicated entirely to 
Hungarian studies began in earnest in 1971. See R. L. Aczel’s review of 
HSR in Hungarian Studies 3 (1987): 260. On the role played by Ferenc 
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Harcsár, see Nándor F. Dreisziger, “Contributions to Ontario’s Culture,” 
Hungarian Studies Review 12, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 68–69. Dreisziger notes 
that Harcsár began his campaign to launch a serious journal “in tune with 
the aspirations of the Hungarian community” in 1970. He adds that, at the 
time, ideas like Harcsár’s “were gaining popularity with many Hungarian 
émigré leaders both in Canada and the United States.”
 2.   Dreisziger, email interview, October 18, 2019.
 3.   Dreisziger, email interview, October 28, 2019.
 4.   Dreisziger, email interview, October 28, 2019.
 5.   As Dreisziger and Bisztray wrote in their first-ever editorial note in 
Hungarian Studies Review, the new title was “meant to eliminate the 
awkwardness of our original masthead. It also signifies our belief that we 
are now ready to shed our geographic limitations and assume the task of 
serving the interest of Hungarian studies wherever English is a recognized 
language of scholarly communication.” George Bisztray and Nándor F. 
Dreisziger, “Preface,” Hungarian Studies Review 8, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 5.
 6.   1989 was the only exception to this, when one 151-page double issue 
was published, instead of two separate issues. The publication of lengthy 
double issues would continue into the 1990s and 2000s. The special issue 
 co-edited by Oliver A. I. Botar and Hattula Moholy-Nagy in 2010, for 
example, was 221 pages in length. See note 17 below.
 7.   See George Bisztray and Nándor F. Dreisziger, “Preface,” Hungarian 
Studies Review 8, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 6.
 8.   Dreisziger, email interview, October 28, 2019.
 9.   R. L. Aczel’s review of HSR, quoted in George Bisztray, “Hungarian Chair 
at the University of Toronto: A Decennial Report,” Hungarian Studies 
Review 17, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 28.
10.  Nándor F. Dreisziger, email interview, October 30, 2019.
11.  The Budapest-based Timea Király took over this position in 2004, and 
served as the subscriptions manager until 2008, when the position was 
phased out.
12.  Nándor Dresiziger and George Bisztray, “A Brief Note from the Editors,” 
Hungarian Studies Review 20, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 1993): 127.
13.  Ibid. As Nándor indicated, the very first paper submitted to HSR in 
electronic form came from Hungary. It was submitted by Géza Jeszenszky, 
professor at Corvinus University, and still an active member of HSR’s 
editorial board. Dreisziger, email interview, October 28, 2019.
14.  Nándor Dresiziger and George Bisztray, “A Brief Note from the Editors,” 
Hungarian Studies Review 20, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 1993): 128.
02_Editorial.indd   7 07/10/20   1:22 PM
8 Hungarian Studies Review
15.  Oliver A. I. Botar, ed., “Hungarian Artists in the Americas,” special issue, 
Hungarian Studies Review 21, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 1994).
16.  Oliver A. I. Botar, ed., “The Early Twentieth-Century Avant-Garde,” 
special issue, Hungarian Studies Review 15, no. 1 (Spring 1988).
17.  Oliver A. I. Botar, ed., “Twentieth-Century Hungarian Art at Home 
and Abroad,” special issue, Hungarian Studies Review 31, nos. 1–2 
(Spring–Fall 2004); and Oliver A. I. Botar and Hattula Moholy-Nagy, 
eds., “Proceedings of the Symposium ‘László Moholy-Nagy: Translating 
Utopia into Action’,” special issue, Hungarian Studies Review 37, nos. 1–2 
(Spring–Fall 2010).
18.  George Bisztray, ed., “Thousand Years of Hungarian Thought,” special 
issue, Hungarian Studies Review 27, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 2000).
19.  Marlene Kadar and Agatha Schwartz, eds., “Women and Hungary: 
Reclaiming Images and Histories,” special issue, Hungarian Studies 
Review 26, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 1999); Agatha Schwartz, ed., “Women 
and Hungary, Part II: Studies in Twentieth-Century Politics, Education, 
History, and Literature,” special issue, Hungarian Studies Review 29, nos. 
1–2 (Spring–Fall 2002).
20.  Judith Szapor and Agatha Schwartz, eds., “Gender and Nation in Hungary 
since 1919,” special issue, Hungarian Studies Review 41, nos. 1–2 (Spring–
Fall 2014).
21.  Dreisziger, email interview, October 30, 2019.
22.  Nándor F. Dreisziger, “A Note from the Editor,” Hungarian Studies Review 
45, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 2018): 2.
02_Editorial.indd   8 07/10/20   1:22 PM
Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XLVI–XLVII
Conditions of Democracy in German 
Austria and Hungary, 1918–1919
Ibolya Murber
With the end of the First World War, the longstanding and  apparently 
God-given Habsburg order broke apart. The war-weary population 
was angry and mobilized, and longed for stability and prosperity.
1
 
The long-lasting war with its devastating consequences functioned as 
a  catalyst for democratization. The political and socioeconomic crises 
at the end of the war posed the utmost challenge for the new political 
elites, especially those on the losing side. No government considering 
itself civilized could deny the right to vote to the returning soldiers, 
who had risked their lives for the nation. Nor could it be denied to the 
many women who had replaced the men in the workplace. The democ-
ratization of political life promised a certain easing of the postwar crisis 
and inserted itself into the transnational democratization trend. Out of 
the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy arose the first democratic 
experiments in Central Europe, which had however to struggle with 
 politically and socioeconomically unfavorable conditions and a lack of 
democratic experience. At the end of the lost war a rapid democratiza-
tion of political life was proclaimed in both successor states. But its out-
come and duration were completely divergent in Austria and  Hungary. 
The democratic experiment survived in Austria until 1933,
2
 while its 
counterpart had already failed in Hungary by 1919,
3
 although both pro-
visional governments equally committed themselves in the late fall of 
1918 explicitly to the construction of a democratic republic.
This study will analyze the Austrian and Hungarian transitions 
to increased democratization in the postwar years. Democratization is 
understood in terms of the contemporary democratic praxis, not a fixed 
model of democracy. The focus will be on the diversity and variety of 
forms of these democratic experiments, which were strongly dependent 
on structural and procedural conditions as well as the respective politi-
cal cultures of both countries. My analysis is based mainly on a review 
of contemporary Austrian and Hungarian legislation, the protocols of 
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the Austrian and Hungarian Councils of Ministers, archival documents, 
and contemporary press reports.
Concepts of More Democracy
The history of democracy has established itself as a concept in the 
 contexts of academic study and memory politics. The earlier approaches 
based on modernization theory assumed that states with a democratic 
deficit would see the so-called Western model of democracy (consti-
tutional and liberal democracy) as desirable.
4
 The concept of “Western 
liberal democracy” was a product of the First World War. “It was the 
period after the First World War, in which democracy took on a mass 
democratic image, synchronized different speeds of development and 
experimented with new formulas for the procurement of freedom and 
equality, and in which was constituted what we came to recognize as 
Western, liberal, social democracy.”
5
 The concept of Western democracy 
at war’s end was, however, nothing more than a hope for a comprehen-
sive democratization in Europe.
6
 But this democracy was in 1918 more 
an expectation than a real experience of democratic practice. In Central 
Europe after 1918, on the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy, democracy 
was something in the process of formation; it was a transition to a dem-
ocratic order. This period fell between the symbolic proclamation of a 
democratic form of government and the moment
7
 when citizens could 
for the first time elect their executive and legislative bodies in a free 
and fair vote. In this period the structures and institutions of democratic 
government were being constructed, and confirmed by the population 
by means of the elections to a constitutive National Assembly.
The successful transition from the authoritarian monarchy to 
a democratic republic lasted in the case of Austria from November 12, 
1918, when the democratic republic was anchored in law, until spring 
of 1919, as on February 16 the voting for the constitutive National 
 Assembly took place and on March 12 the constitutive National Assem-
bly ratified the Law of November 12, 1918 regarding the organization 
of state and government. For Hungary, the determination of the time 
 period of the transition to democratic governance is no easy undertak-
ing, which itself points to the failure of the establishment of democracy. 
In public  discourse, by the end of October/beginning of November 1918 
the adjective “democratic” in the context of the change of government 
was in fact  on everyone’s lips. During these autumn days the Social 
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Democratic Party newspaper, Népszava [Voice of the People] empha-
sized day in and day out that Hungary was experiencing a democratic 
new beginning. However, Count Mihály Károlyi, provisional prime 
minister, spoke of the “young republic with a democratic foundation” 
only on November 16, the day of the proclamation of the republic.
8
 At 
the end of 1918, the Hungarian Council of Ministers did not define why 
it regarded its own policy as democratic.
In spite of all of this, in no legal act—using contemporary 
 terminology, in no néphatározat [people’s decision] or néptörvény 
[ people’s law]—was it established that Hungary was a democratic 
 republic. The written declaration of a democratic structure in Hungary 
was missing. In public discourse, democracy was packed in elegant 
phrases and promises and constantly theorized. Since up to the point 
of the establishment of the Hungarian Council Republic in March 1919 
as a matter of fact no elections to a constitutive National Assembly 
 actually took place, one can also establish no endpoint for the abortive 
 democratic transition.
Democracy is a fundamentally controversial concept; it is a 
“concept of expectation.”
9
 At the end of World War I, democracy was 
shaped by expectations and hopes, and subsequently also by experi-
ences. The concept of “democracy” is contested, which also has to do 
with the variety of democratic models. Basically, it is concerned with 
a political form of government, which presupposes a sovereign state. 
Until the end of 1921, with the allocation of Burgenland to Austria, full 
state sovereignty in Austria and Hungary did not exist.
10
 The partial 
foreign occupation burdened and even obstructed the population’s dem-
ocratic expression of opinion. The residents of the Italian-controlled 
South  Tirol and the Sudeten Germans of the Bohemian and Moravian 
areas did not take part in the Austrian elections held on February 14, 
1919. Because of South Slavic occupation, the vote in southern Styria 
and southern Carinthia also took place only partially. As compensation 
for this, 50 seats in the constitutive National Assembly were retroac-
tively assigned.
11
 In the first Public Law of November 23,
12
 the pro-
visional government of Hungary in fact adopted the general and equal 
right to vote, but up to the end of February 1919 announced no elections 
for a constitutive National Assembly. The provisional government jus-
tified the postponement of the elections by the foreign occupation of 
 Hungarian territory. Interior Minister Vince Nagy explained this rea-
soning in mid-January 1919 in Budapest to Archibald Cary Coolidge, 
leader of the US political  mission, as follows: holding the vote would de 
jure confirm the surrender of the occupied territories.
13
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In assessing the democratic composition of a government after 
World War I, we must keep in mind the wide gap between contemporary 
attributions and objective political science criteria. The discrepancy 
 between self-perception and the perception of others rested on several 
factors. It was not possible in Central Europe to import a consummate 
democratic model from the West. At war’s end there was no catalogue 
of criteria, no sanctioned system of rules for an effectively functional 
Western democracy. “Democracy in the early twentieth century was 
far from becoming a reality, as little in Great Britain as elsewhere.”
14
 
 Democratic structures and institutions between the world wars were 
characterized by diversity and a richness of forms.
Modernity and Political Participation in the Fin de Siècle15 
Habsburg Monarchy
The effort for more political participation was at the end of the nineteenth 
century a transnational and long-term process. Samuel P.  Huntington 
 described the democratization drives across the history of democracy as 
waves.
16
 According to the American political scientist, the first wave of 
 democratization took place between 1828 and 1926. In this wave, a  series 
of states overcame the hurdles to democracy,
17
 if with great  variations in 
 democracy and its institutions and structures. These extranational demo-
cratic impulses awoke the appearance that the extension of voting rights and 
political participation were signs of modernization. Thus, the democratic 
expectations, also in the Danubian Monarchy at the end of the  nineteenth 
century, became projection screens for  progress, which resonated with the 
optimism about progress of the then still-prevailing liberalism.
The endogenous democratic traditions in the Habsburg 
 Monarchy went back decades. The revolutions of 1848 served as a 
starting point, which in collective memory accompanied the ideas of 
nationalism and democratization under the sign of liberalism. In late fall 
of 1918, the Social Democrats of German Austria
18
 and Hungary also 
 appealed to the liberal democratic traditions of 1848. The traditions of 
1848
19
  symbolized for the Hungarian Social Democrats their demands 
for a republic, national independence and social emancipation.
20
 In the 
fin-de-siècle period, however, nationalism in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire increasingly detached itself from the liberal and democratic 
traditions of 1848. Particularly in the Hungarian half of the realm, 
an  aggressive majority nationalism crystallized vis-à-vis minorities, 
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 seeking to protect the alleged dominance of the Hungarian nation, the 
“supremacy” of the Hungarians. This “supremacy,” the superiority of 
the Hungarian-speaking population, was based not just on the growth 
in the number of citizens declaring themselves as Hungarians, but also 
their supposed higher level of culture as well as their political and finan-
cial dominance over the ethnic minorities.
21
 The 1897 Badeni Crisis,
22
 
however, made it clear in the Austrian half of the Empire that the ethnic 
German representatives to the Imperial Council were not prepared to let 
go of the linguistic dominance of the German over the Czech language.
The expansion or rejection of the right to vote was in the 
Habsburg Monarchy closely bound up with the nationality question. 
The political elite of the Dual Monarchy considered the ethnic-linguistic 
 endeavors in the second half of the nineteenth century, in light of 
the  traditional German-speaking and Hungarian dominance as well 
as the unity of the empire, as a threat. The example of voting rights 
shows that the governments in Vienna and Budapest followed differ-
ent concepts regarding their defense against ethnic minority demands. 
The expansion or rejection of the right to vote reflected the persistence 
of the  traditional political elite as well as the political influence of the 
proponents of democracy. In Europe at the beginning of the twentieth 
century the majority of the socialist and liberal Left agitated for more 
democracy.
23
 In the Habsburg Monarchy, the political supporters of de-
mocracy were otherwise engaged. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it 
was the Social Democrats who decidedly engaged in the struggle for the 
general right to vote and for more democracy. The establishment of a 
democratic state and the introduction of the general, direct right to vote 
had been part of the political agenda of the party since the fifth Day of 
the Worker in 1868.
24
 The Christian Social Party stood for the idea of 
universal voting rights for men from 1896.
25
 With the 1907 expansion 
of voting rights in the Austrian half of the empire, the highest deci-
sion makers had in mind the preservation of their own power as well 
as the forestallment of the breakup of the Empire,
26
 and not the democ-
ratization of the country. This moderate and evolutionary path to more 
democracy stood under the sign of saving the empire, and served the 
consolidation of the imperial power structure. Direct elections, the se-
cret ballot, and the general right to vote for men,
27
 however, also made 
possible the formation of two mass parties: the Social Democrats and 
the Christian Social Party. With that began the development of a mass 
society and the political integration of the worker and the rural popula-
tion into state and society. In the wake of the Imperial Council elections 
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of 1911, both mass parties rose to be significant political and democratic 
forces in their half of the empire, which made possible their participa-
tion in the consolidation of state power after the end of the lost war.
28
The nobility of the Hungarian kingdom, whose grip on the reins 
of political leadership stood unaltered at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, on the other hand, protected its traditional privileges and not 
only resisted all centralizing tendencies from Vienna, but also blocked 
all attempts at the expansion of voting rights with the justification that 
this would endanger the national predominance of the Hungarians. 
 Furthermore, the aristocratic political elite protected its supremacy 
over rising social classes, such as the politically organized workers and 
the still rather apolitical peasantry. This persistence and political lead-
ing role on the part of the nobility hindered the evolutionary and not 
war-dependent development of a political mass society. Because of the 
prevention of the introduction of universal suffrage, only parties made 
up of dignitaries, which to be sure intended no political representation 
of the new rising social classes, served in the Hungarian Parliament; 
thus, no mass parties could establish themselves. The Hungarian So-
cial Democratic Party, founded in 1890, following the German and 
Austrian model,  indeed stood for the democratization of political life, 
which for its part was also seen as a solution to the recognized threat 
of  nationality  problems. The greatest weakness of the party was how-
ever that, as a  result of the restricted voting rights, it developed as an 
 extraparliamentary opposition, and could not build up the strict and dis-
ciplined party and trade union structure of a mass party, as was the case 
in the Austrian half of the empire and in Germany. There did exist in 
Hungary on the cusp of the First World War further parties that took up 
democratization in their party platforms. The National Christian Social-
ist Party [Országos Keresztényszocialista Párt], founded in 1907, re-
mained an oppositional minority in Parliament until the end of the war. 
The National Civic Radical Party [Országos Polgári Radikális Párt], 
founded in June 1914, represented the urban, democratically oriented 
intelligentsia, and demanded the introduction of universal suffrage and 
the secret ballot. But these measures found an extremely limited level 
of support among the Hungarian population. In the Hungarian half of 
the empire, the process of governmental and social integration of work-
ers—not to mention the agrarian population, divorced from politics, 
which made up the overwhelming majority (over 60%) of the popu-
lation—had not even begun. Democratic traditions in the Hungarian 
half of the empire before 1914 were anchored neither in the political 
03_Murber.indd   14 07/10/20   5:12 PM
15Conditions of Democracy in German Austria and Hungary
leadership nor in the population; thus here the chances for a successful 
development of a democratic state after the crisis-filled war years were 
far worse than in the Austrian half.
29
The First World War and Democratization
The development of a mass society began in the Danube Monarchy 
around the turn of the century. The first portents and trends appeared in 
the rapidly growing big cities of Austria-Hungary (Vienna, Budapest, 
and Prague). This period of social change threw into question the sur-
vival chances of the monarchy as a form of government and the posi-
tion of the nobility, already before the war. Neither the Habsburg royal 
family nor the nobility in general was willing however to abdicate its 
longstanding positions of power. The First World War was waged in the 
name of national and imperial interests. The liberal narrative regarding 
the outbreak of the war sees it as the defensive reaction of a regime 
which had resisted the socioeconomic modernization and democratiza-
tion of the turn of the century. Thereafter it saw no other choice but to 
fight a war for the retention of its positions of power.
30
On the one hand, the world war made possible the concen-
tration of power in the executive branch and a restriction of citizens’ 
rights and freedoms in all of the war-fighting states. Thus the war, 
especially in its first years, had an autocracy-producing rather than a 
democracy-producing effect. On the other hand, the “democratization 
of war,” to use Eric Hobsbawm’s phrase, points to the fact that wide 
swaths of the population were directly affected by the consequences of 
war, either on the military or the home front.
31
 The Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy indeed declared war in the summer of 1914 with ambitious 
war aims; it however suffered one defeat after another on all fronts. It 
gained temporary control of territory starting in 1915, but only due to 
the economic and military support of its German allies, which neces-
sarily led to power asymmetry in the German-Austrian alliance.
32
 The 
war began with a completely self-imposed domestic “castle truce,” with 
the closing of ranks on the part of the state, the political parties, and 
the population in the entire Habsburg Monarchy. The war aims were the 
common denominator, which was meant to temporarily paper over the 
already existing chasm between the two halves of the empire, as well 
as the constantly increasing social tensions arising from modernization 
and industrialization. The declaration of war and of an expected quick 
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victory before the end of 1914 veiled only for a short time the many-
sided and complex problems within the Habsburg Monarchy. The eco-
nomic capacity of the monarchy was not sufficient over the course of 
the war for the simultaneous waging of war and the adequate feeding of 
the population. Thus the governments in Vienna and Budapest, like all 
of the warring states,
33
 were forced to give in and to centrally direct the 
supply and demand of the civil population.
The socioeconomic burden of the world war intensified the 
 political, economic, and social transformations of modern society,
34
 the 
majority of which resulted from the structural change from an agrarian 
into an industrial society. This transformation of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire in addition burdened the multiethnic composition of the empire. 
Just like the Tsarist Empire of the Romanovs, the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy of the Habsburgs was a multinational imperium, shaped dur-
ing the First World War by widespread war weariness as well as socio-
economic strain.
The material and human resources for waging war became ever 
more exhausted during the second half of the war. Up until 1917, the de-
mands of the front could be “satisfactorily” addressed; as of 1918, how-
ever, the provisioning of the troops threatened to collapse.  Hungary had 
always served as the “breadbasket” of the monarchy, but in the last years 
of the war strict state rationing of foodstuffs had to be instituted even 
there. Nevertheless, in the Hungarian half of the realm adequate state 
provisioning could be guaranteed up until the end of the war, even if at 
the cost of starving the urban population of the Austrian half. This sup-
ply discrepancy deepened the gulf between Austria and Hungary, both 
on the governmental-political side and at the level of the  population.
35
 
State provision of foodstuffs was highly relevant to the rising discontent 
on the part of the population. The failure of state provisioning in the last 
two years of the war undermined citizens’ trust in their government. 
This loss of trust weakened the population’s internal  acceptance of the 
state, the bureaucracy, and the ruling dynasty, as well as exhausting the 
integrational capabilities of the Dual Monarchy.
In spring of 1917, after the February revolution in Russia and 
the entrance of the US into the war, democracy came into fashion, 
 leading to the increasing participation of the masses in politics, espe-
cially in the defeated states. The declaration of a democracy-professing 
 republic in Russia in February 1917 took on a central role in the course 
of the war. This Russian announcement of a democracy deprived the 
 Central Powers of their argument that they were fighting a defensive 
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war. The Bolsheviks’ peace offering shook up the military chances of 
the Central Powers. The events in Russia pushed the Left in the Danube 
Monarchy and the German Empire unavoidably into an intensive dem-
ocratic platform. “The democratic ‘zeitgeist’ was vehemently reflected 
in international debates.”
36
 But it consisted of two completely differ-
ent understandings of a new social order, which from 1917 condensed 
into a propaganda war. With the entry of the US into the war began the 
crystallization of the idea of a “Western” democracy. This was based 
on a contemporary assumption: that democratization, the spread of the 
Western democratic model, was an inevitable function of modernity.
37
 
But in 1918 democracy was in practice only an expectation, rather than 
an experience. “War was supposed to bring democracy, and democ-
racy would in the future make war impossible.”
38
 On the one hand, 
the idea of a liberal and social democracy was legally anchored and 
internationally institutionalized in the peace treaties of 1919–1920. On 
the other, the idea of the Bolshevik “total democracy”
39
 began its tri-
umphant progress after the Communists’ accession to power in  Russia 
in November 1917. This new type of regime strove from 1919 on for 
international expansion, in the form of Council Republics in Hungary 
and Bavaria, as well as within the framework of the Communist Inter-
national (Comintern).
The Hungarian Social Democrats broke with the politics of 
the castle truce in the summer of 1916, and their Austrian comrades 
in the autumn of 1916, after Friedrich Adler assassinated Prime Min-
ister Karl Stürghk.
40
 The social democratic parties began to intensively 
engage in political struggle again, which also manifested itself in an 
increase in membership of their trade unions. The war’s interminability 
encouraged the display of power on the part of Austrian Social Democ-
racy; this power shift in favor of the Hungarian Social Democrats was 
far less pronounced. The growth in the socioeconomic tensions caused 
by the war called for an intermediary between the government and the 
workers. The tight labor market led in the last years of the war to the 
expressions of workplace grievances in the form of large numbers of 
walkouts and strikes. These furthered the radicalization of workers’ cul-
ture, which in turn was reflected in new battle cries, such as demands 
for peace and democracy. In order to retain their own supporters, So-
cial Democrats in both halves of the empire after 1917 needed radical 
solutions. The Party however supported the strikes only as long as that 
brought them advantage and increased their room for maneuver.
41
 In 
this can be seen Austromarxism’s “specificity” and ambivalence.
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The significant difference lay rather in the positions of the two 
parties vis-à-vis political power. The Austrian Social Democrats led a 
mass party, and starting in 1916 they were active as a strong opposi-
tional party in the reactivated Imperial Council. With their countrywide 
network of trade unions, they could use well-established intervention 
mechanisms to defuse the radicalism of labor conflicts. Especially in 
the second half of the war, there was no shortage of labor conflicts 
and rebellions across the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The fact that the 
traditional political leadership in Vienna was forced by the threat-
ened collapse of food provisioning to make concessions was a nec-
essary condition for the governmental and political integration of the 
Austrian Social Democrats. This integration of the Social Democrats, 
 already at hand before the war, was decisively propelled by the failure 
of the state supply  system. The imperial power elite increasingly treated 
the  Social Democratic Party and its trade unions as a partner, mirroring 
the situation in Great Britain, France, and Germany.
42
 Social democratic 
 politicians received positions in the state supply system that constituted 
the first governmental roles for the party in its history. The general 
 expansion of further social services compelled by the wartime condi-
tions drove the absorption and further integration of the workforce into 
state structures.
43
 These social achievements pointed the way towards 
the construction of a democratic welfare state at war’s end.
The Hungarian Social Democrats, due to the extremely limited 
property-qualified voting rights, remained in extra-parliamentary oppo-
sition until the war’s end. For that reason, despite its nationwide trade 
union network, in the case of labor conflicts it could offer no  experienced 
and state-recognized mediation potential. Hungary’s  aristocratic politi-
cal elite recognized the labor clashes of the last war years as a political 
but not a social conflict, and employed ever heavier state  repression. 
As the provisioning crisis in the Hungarian half of the empire seemed 
less serious, the traditional political leadership did not see it necessary 
to share political responsibility with the Social Democrats and thereby 
further their political integration.
Since food shortages were less severe in Hungary, the state and 
the political elite were much less in need of a social democratic interme-
diary to “tame” unsatisfied industrial workers. The great estate owners 
of the political class took a restrictive position towards labor conflicts 
until the end of the war, which closed off the possibility of democrati-
zation. The state interventions on behalf of employees after 1917 were 
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carried out separately at the level of enterprises, and mostly concerned 
only the improvement of labor conditions and provisioning, as well as 
wage increases.
Late Fall 1918 – Spring 1919: The Hopeful “Wilsonian Moment”
The downfall of the Habsburg Empire opened the way to a new interna-
tional order for Central Europe. The victor states were aiming to divide 
the centuries-old multinational realm into smaller, democratically orga-
nized national states. But as to the question of what this  Central Europe 
of small states should look like, there were in 1918  different, competing 
concepts, one “Eastern” and one “Western.” In his appeal to the self-
determination of peoples, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin proclaimed the self-de-
lineated, rather theoretically considered,  territorial sovereignty of every 
people. US President Woodrow Wilson understood under the same slo-
gan the self-government of a democratic administration.
44
 Although the 
word “democracy” appeared nowhere in his  ultimately famous Four-
teen Points, he delivered “the message of global democratization.”
45
In the last year of the war both transnational “ ideological 
 offensives”
46
 reached the crisis-wracked Habsburg realm, where they 
hastened its disintegration and offered a new orientation for the  region’s 
rebirth. Numerous obligations of modernity had piled up in complicated 
fashion in Central Europe by the end of the war. Territorial  independence 
and the sovereignty of the nation formed the uncontested main goal. A 
further amalgamation of demands for national autonomy and increased 
participation crystallized in political discourse in the late fall of 1918.
47
 
The global “Wilsonian moment”
48
 had finally reached Central Europe. 
The “messianic” expectation of understanding between peoples was at-
tached to the person of the American President. The projection screen 
“democracy” in this way underwent a new extension of meaning: de-
mocracy became identified as the path to a “just peace” based on the 
right of nations to self-determination.
“Democracy” in the year 1918 in the Danube region had 
“ suddenly” come into fashion, even become normality,
49
 and served as a 
counterproject to that of the authoritarian “hated elders,” which could be 
identified with the Habsburg Monarchy with all its weaknesses and the 
war with all its suffering. Behind this declaration stood the contemporary 
assumption that Central Europe’s social and economic  deficit stemmed 
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from a lack of sovereignty on the part of national states.  According to 
these conceptions, the emergence of new national states and their demo-
cratic self-organization would open the door for  economic catch-up on 
the ruins of the authoritarian Habsburg Monarchy.
At the beginning of November 1918, Count Mihály Károlyi, 
provisional prime minister of Hungary, as well as the Hungarian  Social 
Democrats espoused this position, as the questions of state sovereignty 
and a republic as the form of governance came to the fore.
50
 Thomas 
G. Masaryk, president of Czechoslovakia, characterized the First World 
War as a struggle between the “feudal” autocracy of the Central  Powers 
on one side and the ideas of democracy and freedom of conscience, 
borne by the Entente, on the other. Subsequently,  Czechoslovakia would 
be the “agent of the civilized and democratic West” in the East, guar-
anteeing the new order.
51
 The popularity of a putative democracy was 
also increased by the recognition that at Versailles only parliamentary 
 democracies were acceptable as participants in the negotiations.
52
 The 
new political actors hoped by means of the declaration of a democratic 
new order to gain more sympathy from the victors, and thereby also 
better peace settlement conditions. Of course a rooted, stable demo-
cratic political culture was lacking across wide social strata. Especially 
in Hungary there were hardly political forces—aside from Social De-
mocracy and some radical intellectuals—standing behind the  political 
slogan “democracy.”
Democratic Actors in Austria and Hungary
The transition from monarchical authoritarian state to liberal democracy 
in Austria and Hungary was due to war and crisis, and the social demo-
cratic parties played a significant role in it.
53
 Total war with its mass 
mobilization and industrial military production raised the value of the 
workers and their political representatives, the workers’ parties, vis-à-vis 
all war participants. The war could no longer be waged without the mass 
of workers. Those leftist parties that proved their national loyalty dur-
ing the world war could leave behind their marginal position on the po-
litical spectrum. The organizations of the workers pushed  unexpectedly 
quickly into the center of political life in the second half of the world 
war, and especially at the end of the war. In the vanquished states of the 
Central Powers, in Germany, Austria, and Hungary, the Social Demo-
crats with governmental responsibility rose to be the driving forces of 
03_Murber.indd   20 07/10/20   5:12 PM
21Conditions of Democracy in German Austria and Hungary
democratization. The end of the war brought the simultaneity of the rise 
of both democratic and anti-democratic elements; both were offspring of 
the war. This simultaneity demonstrated that the Western model of lib-
eral democracy was in no way seen as the only solution to the complex 
problems of that time. It was exactly the rise of Bolshevist, anti-demo-
cratic models as bogeyman that for the first time forged a community 
between the Western democracies. This new Western community of val-
ues identified itself as the counterpole to “world revolution,” and pre-
pared for battle. But in parts of  Central and Southern Europe, which 
had been particularly impacted by the world war and its consequences, 
another bogeyman crystallized, which mixed and conflated the radical 
leftist and social democratic visions of the future. The resulting aggres-
sive anti-Bolshevism/ anti-Marxism gave propulsion for the radical right 
wing, and smoothed the way to the undermining of the Western model 
of  democracy between the world wars.
54
At the end of the war the struggle for political power was over 
how the old political elite could hold its ground and how the new 
political elite could generate new legitimacy. Despite a spectacular 
rupture at the level of the constitution and state institutions, there 
were multiple continuities. “Old” and “new” existed side-by-side in 
the transition period. Totally new centers of power formed, such as 
the grassroots-democracy-oriented workers’ and soldiers’ councils. 
But the old bureaucracy also remained at first completely untouched. 
Another great challenge of the turbulent postwar moment was to carry 
out political and economic consolidation, intertwined with the demo-
bilization of a radicalized population.
The time had come for new actors and structures. On 
October 21, 1918 the provisional National Assembly of German Austria 
was constituted from the German-speaking representatives in the former 
Imperial Council,
55
 and decided on the formation of its own  Austrian 
state: “German Austria.” The government formed on  October 30 under 
the Social Democratic leadership of Karl Renner was made up of parlia-
mentary deputies of the old Imperial Council, and gained its legitimacy 
from neither the emperor nor elections. This continuity of personnel be-
tween old and new brought tested competencies in political negotiation 
and personal networks into the new government. Thanks to the univer-
sal male voting rights of 1907, these politicians, apart from the German 
National Party,
56
 had a considerable following.
57
 All of the parties of the 
Imperial Council took part in the grand coalition of the Social Demo-
crats, the Social Christians, and the Greater German People’s Party,
58
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and thereby gave their assent to the joint management of the crisis. The 
party leaders could thus count on being able to have a mitigating effect 
on the population by means of their party networks.
The new government and the Provisional National  Assembly 
earned symbolic legitimation by operating until November 11 
 concurrently with the old imperial regime and the Imperial Council in 
 Vienna, in parallel and without conflicts. The negotiated proclamation 
of November 11 declaring Emperor Charles’s renunciation of any role 
in government gave the new power holders a further injection of le-
gitimation.
59
 The strength and importance of Austrian social democrats 
among the various parties was evident as they laid down several con-
ditions regarding governmental participation.
60
 The bourgeois parties, 
moreover, approved of the crisis management initiated by Austromarx-
ists because they themselves lacked a sustainable crisis program.
61
In the case of Hungary, the transition of power at first appeared 
to proceed, as in Austria, on constitutionally regulated tracks. However, 
in contrast to Austria there was until the end a lack of broad politi-
cal consensus, but also of popular political participation. On  October 
24, 1918 a counter-government, the Hungarian National Council, con-
stituted itself; within a week it formed the core of the new regime. 
This National Council was assembled from a parliamentary opposi-
tion party, led by the liberal-democratic Count Károlyi. Another two 
extra-parliamentary opposition parties also took part, namely the Na-
tional Civic Radical Party, the party of the critical urban intelligentsia, 
and the Social Democrats. Because of the limitation of voting rights by 
property qualification and the lack of mass parties, the members of the 
National Council—except for the Social Democrats—had no party net-
works to fall back on. There were in Hungary before 1918 only parties 
of dignitaries, which focused their activities on the period of parliamen-
tary elections, and beyond these labor-intensive periods they carried out 
no or almost no collective political activities in the name of their parties. 
Their representatives in Parliament were in fact active as individuals, 
but the parties as umbrella organizations played only a minor role.
The war government named by King Charles IV
62
 resigned on 
October 30. In the face of unrest in Budapest, the last monarch of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire approved the appointment of Count Károlyi 
to head the government of Hungary.
His government coalition was not as broad as the one in 
 Austria and Germany. It consisted of the small liberal-democratic party 
of Károlyi, the National Civic Radical Party of Oszkár Jászi, and the 
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 Social Democratic Party. The Hungarian Christian socialist movement 
was fragmented, and it was much smaller than its Austrian equivalent. 
The moderate National Christian Socialist Party, under the leadership 
of Sándor Giesswein, supported the Hungarian National Council and 
Károlyi’s program at the beginning, but did not join the provisional 
government.
For many people Károlyi embodied the break with the past and 
the hope for a new beginning and a better future,
63
 because of his social 
program and message of peace, expounded in Parliament for months. 
Count Károlyi, as scion of a high noble family, was one of the richest 
men in the kingdom, and was the son-in-law of Count Gyula  Andrássy, 
the monarchy’s last foreign minister. Although Charles released the gov-
ernment one day later from its oath to the monarch, the royal appoint-
ment provided the Károlyi government with symbolic legitimation.
Károlyi was, at the end of October 1918—also in the eyes of 
national conservatives and liberal conservatives of the old political 
elite like Count Pál Teleky or Count István Bethlen, the future prime 
 minister—an acceptable figurehead, who seemed a suitable representa-
tive of Hungarian interests.
64
 Nevertheless, the new government exhib-
ited no wide-ranging personal continuity between old and new, as was 
the case in Austria. Except for Prime Minister Károlyi and Interior Min-
ister Count Tivadar Batthyány, the old political elite was not represented 
in the new government. Moreover, Batthyány left the cabinet already in 
December 1918, as Károlyi’s policies became “too far to the left” for 
him.
65
 The often oppressive central and decisive role of Prime Minister 
Károlyi closed off the possibility of a course correction and minimized 
political adaptability to the oppressive circumstances.
Hungary’s new beginning was thus not based in an understand-
ing between political parties, as in Austria; politics crystallized around 
the person of Károlyi. He dominated state affairs, not only because of 
his accumulation of positions,
66
 but much more due to the weakness of 
the parties. It was not that the party leadership of the Hungarian Social 
Democrats was less “clever” than that of their Austrian brothers-in-arms, 
or that they lacked political talent.
67
 The party leadership, due to its 
previous restriction to extra-parliamentary opposition, did not pos-
sess those competencies and experiences in making politics that their 
 Austrian comrades already held in autumn of 1918. They had up to the 
declaration of the Council Republic a mere four months to “learn poli-
tics.” With these limited proficiencies and so little political experience, 
they had to take on the task in March 1919 of ruling the country and 
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stopping the advance of foreign armies. The almost hopeless interna-
tional situation of Hungary simply demanded too much of them. Thus, 
they entered into an unfortunate party fusion with the Communists, and 
jointly proclaimed the Council Republic. It was a flight into the future.
68
In November 1918, the Communist parties in Austria and 
 Hungary were established. Both Social Democratic leaderships recog-
nized the threat of a “Bolshevik experiment” and, equally, that posed by 
the foundation of Communist parties. The direct sphere of activity of both 
Communist parties was, however, at first restricted to several seats on the 
workers’ councils in the capital cities and a number of street demonstra-
tions. The Hungarian Communist party pursued a consciously populist 
politics, coupled with sharp and censorious criticism of the government 
program and with it of the participation of the Social Democrats in the 
regime, and finally aimed at the complete undermining of the state’s 
power.
69
 In the face of this party the Social Democrats on March 21 saw 
themselves forced to go along with a fusion of parties and an undemo-
cratic takeover of power, to save the country, with fatal consequences.
The Implementation of Democratic Institutions
The new rulers in Austria and Hungary took different paths in 
 implementing the basic conditions for democracy. There was a basic 
 consensus that such a democracy included the separation of powers, 
institutional control by the judiciary of the democratically legitimated 
executive, and a popularly elected parliament.
70
 In the case of Ger-
man Austria, Ernst Hanisch has established that an overemphasis on 
 parliamentarism developed as a reaction to the weak position of the Par-
liament in the monarchy.
71
 The authority of the dynasty as well as its 
supporters, namely the bureaucracy and the army, passed in late autumn 
to the political  parties.
72
 Their representatives agreed that the provisional 
National Assembly should be assembled proportionally from the del-
egates chosen in the last Imperial Council elections of 1911. To forestall 
unnecessary political rivalry and tension, the balance of power between 
the parties would not be put into question before the first elections. On 
October 30, 1918, the provisional National Assembly announced that it 
alone held the highest state authority. The Austrian provisional legisla-
ture was recruited from the old Imperial Council and was endowed with 
three presidents of equal status. The provisional legislative body be-
stowed executive  powers on the provisional government (State  Council) 
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at the end of  October 1918. The creative function was given to the Na-
tional Assembly.
Democracies differentiate themselves from other political 
 systems through a high degree of opportunity for the citizens to partici-
pate in the selection of their political leaders.
73
 In both states the  general, 
secret, and direct right to vote was declared in late autumn of 1918. But 
the realization of the democratic promise proceeded differently in the two 
cases. It is instructive which institution approved these voting rights last, 
and whether the National Assembly elections actually took place. On 
12 November the provisional National Assembly of  German  Austria
74
 
 approved the law on the form of state and government of  German 
 Austria. The provisional National Assembly proclaimed in  Article 9 the 
general, secret, and direct right to vote. The same article also fixed the 
date of the election of a constituent National Assembly for January 1919. 
The elections, held with a slight delay on February 16, 1919, ratified not 
only the interim consensus politics and a certain loyalty of the majority 
of the population to the provisional government’s crisis management, but 
also conformed to the democratic expectations of the victorious powers.
By contrast, in Hungary there was far less attention paid to the 
democratic legitimation of the provisional state power. The Károlyi 
government, installed by King Charles IV on October 31, arose out of 
the National Council convened on October 24,
75
 an exclusive power 
center with no democratic legitimation. This provisional cabinet under 
the direction of the National Council vested itself in Public Law I of 
 November 22, 1918 with, in addition to executive, legislative  authority 
as well.
76
 The provisional government hesitated in setting a fixed 
 election date, thereby abandoning a timely democratic legitimation of 
its own power and cementing a makeshift solution with few democratic 
elements. The legislative authority in Hungary thus had no body elected 
by the population, but rather an executive based on self-legitimation. 
The legislative function was subordinated to the executive. The in-
tention behind this was similar to that in Austria, only in reverse. The 
new Austrian political elite expanded the authority of the legislature 
in order to counter its weak position from the period of the Monarchy. 
 Hungary went in the direction of no separation of powers. The public 
law of  November 22 also dissolved the old Parliament, elected before 
the war in 1910, which had continued to meet throughout the war. In the 
Hungarian constitutional tradition, the former (aristocratic) Parliament 
until 1918 played an important, if only symbolic, role—governmen-
tal authority always resided in the executive. The new, self-confessed 
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democratic provisional government wanted nothing to do with the old 
elite of the Monarchy that sat in Parliament. This is why the executive 
and legislative power became concentrated in the provisional govern-
ment, which dissolved the old Parliament. It was not the case that head 
of government Count Károlyi wanted to erect an authoritarian dicta-
torship in the sense of criteria defined by Juan Linz.
77
 The aim of the 
Károlyi government was to demonstrate the final break with the old sys-
tem and to  legitimize the new policy. At the end of 1918 the representa-
tives of the old elite were not pressing much for political responsibility 
in the struggle with the consequences of war.
The general and equal right to vote was proclaimed by the 
 provisional government in late autumn as an important achievement for 
democratization. Outside pressure, on the part of the victors as well 
as the transnational democratic wave, was strong enough to compel 
 democratic signals even in Budapest. However, the government’s prior-
ity was in the first place not the democratic and social reorganization 
of the country, but the assertion of the right to the entire territory of the 
former Hungarian kingdom. The new political elite could not escape its 
historical limitations. No one wanted to relinquish the national basic 
consensus, the territorial sovereignty of the Hungarian nation, in favor 
of democratic and social renewal. Because of its stubborn insistence on 
the state concept of “greater Hungary,” the new, purportedly provisional 
government robbed itself of democratic legitimation. The proclamation 
of the Council Republic finally thwarted the elections.
The Austrian Social Democrats were successful in the  immediate 
postwar years in initiating a social legislative process leading to the con-
struction of a democratic welfare state that became an example for all of 
Europe. The provisional government in Budapest, by contrast, missed 
the chance to advance the struggle against the consequences of war with 
an intensive social legislative process. It had more interest in territorial 
questions than in alleviating the misery of the population. The problems 
of the wide strata of the population, stemming from the socioeconomic 
transition from an agrarian to an industrial state and from the world war, 
were of little concern to either the old or the new political power holders. 
The provisional government indeed declared on November 11 the neces-
sity of a land reform law for the agrarian population. The actual passage 
of the “land law” (Public Law XVII) was however left until February 
16. The belated realization of this promise to the  disaffected agrarian 
population could no longer appease the pent-up and long- ignored social 
tensions.
03_Murber.indd   26 07/10/20   5:12 PM
27Conditions of Democracy in German Austria and Hungary
Conclusion
Although the interim democratic crisis management in Austria, carried 
out predominantly by Social Democrats, was due to internal and exter-
nal circumstances more successful than the Hungarian efforts at resolv-
ing the crisis with the participation of Social Democrats, political power 
in both states in general after 1920 shifted from “left to right.” Austrian 
democracy in the 1920s was able to become a symbol for the success of 
consensus-oriented crisis management in the immediate postwar years. 
The prevention of civil war was successful, but opposition to democ-
racy increased among the right. In Hungary the concept of democracy 
however experienced a profound transformation. Democracy and the 
democratic actors of the immediate postwar years became discredited in 
Hungarian national memory in the interwar period. The national right-
wing conservative regimes pinned the responsibility for the huge ter-
ritorial losses, which made up almost two-thirds of the area of greater 
Hungary, on the democratic victor states. The old aristocratic political 
elite’s own blame for the separationist tendencies of the nationalities 
and the territorial losses was thus completely ignored. The national con-
servative restoration of the undemocratic Monarchy in 1920 accused the 
actors of the first democratic experiments of bearing sole guilt for the 
country’s decimation.
As a consequence of the postwar crisis management directed 
by the Left, a longing for the “good old days” of Right-oriented hi-
erarchical order and its familiar enemy images arose. This rightward 
lurch was accompanied in both countries equally by the development 
and consolidation of long-lived stereotypes of “leftists” and Jews, who 
were accused of bearing affinities for the destructive revolutions. The 
military defeat, the social transformation accelerated by war, the un-
recognized guilt, the territorial “amputations,” and the fragile national 
identity thus proved to be heavy burdens for both Hungary and Austria 
in the interwar period.
Translated from the German by Richard S. Esbenshade
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FORUM: THE MEMORY AND LEGACY  
OF 1919 IN HUNGARY
Introduction
Judith Szapor
The centennial of the Hungarian Republic of Councils in March 2019 
has passed without much fanfare in Hungary, its commemoration 
largely overshadowed by events centered on the approaching hundredth 
anniversary of the Trianon Treaty and highlighting the significance 
of the country’s twentieth-century history as the main battlefield of 
 current memory politics. In 2018, a representative volume examining 
the  political and cultural legacy of the Hungarian Soviet Republic at 
its  centennial was published not in Hungary but in Vienna, edited by 
Austrian and Swiss historians.
1
 The volume contains contributions, in 
 German, by Hungarian historians based in Hungary and abroad, as well 
as by many young Austrian, German, and Swiss scholars. Though until 
very recently this was the only substantial volume on the  Hungarian 
Republic of Councils,
2
 the collaborative effort offers  evidence of the 
lively scholarly interest in the Hungarian revolutions, and demonstrates 
the benefits of a transnational approach to one of the most controversial 
but also iconic events of the postwar period.
A roundtable panel, held in Vancouver at the Hungarian  Studies 
Association of Canada annual meeting in June 2019, considered the 
place and legacy of the Hungarian Republic of Councils (and the 
 liberal-democratic revolution that preceded it) within twentieth-century 
Hungarian history and beyond. The editors of Hungarian Studies 
 Review then extended an invitation to specialists of twentieth-century 
Hungarian history to address some general and specific aspects of 
this legacy. Participants were asked to respond to one or more of the 
 following questions:
1. What is the political, intellectual, and cultural significance 
and legacy of the 1919 Republic of Councils in Hungary?
2. How can you characterize the participation of the  Hungarian 
cultural elite in the Hungarian Soviet Republic?
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3. What was the impact of the large-scale emigration of 
 intellectuals and artists on Hungarian and European 
 intellectual and artistic life?
4. What can you say about the role of respective political agen-
das of successive Hungarian regimes and governments in 
shaping the memory of the event?
Though arguably short-lived, the liberal-democratic Hungar-
ian People’s Republic and the 133-day Republic of Councils consti-
tute a pivotal moment in Hungarian history. The six contributions that 
 follow suggest possible new ways of thinking about this revolution-
ary  moment in Hungarian history. They are presented here in the hope 
that they will help generate scholarly conversations on a topic whose 
study has  continued to develop along ideological and political lines, 
 entrenching, rather than narrowing, the divisions among the general 
public and  historians alike.
NOTES
 1.  Christian Koller and Matthias Marschik, eds., Die Ungarische Räterepublik 
1919 [The Hungarian Republic of Councils 1919] (Vienna: Promedia, 
2018).
 2.  Since the writing of these commentaries a handful of scholarly works 
have marked the centennial in Hungary. These include Lajos Varga, 
Kényszerpályáról tévútra: Szociáldemokraták a Tanácsköztársaságban 
[From forced path to lost way: Social Democrats in the Republic of 
Councils] (Budapest: Napvilág, 2019); Viktor Szabó, A kommunizmus 
bűvöletében—A magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság propagandája [Under 
the spell of communism: The propaganda of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic] (Budapest: TIT Teleki László Ismeretterjesztő Egyesület, 
1919); Péter Csunderlik, A “vörös farsangtól” a “vörös tatárjárásig”—A 
Tanácsköztársaság a korai Horthy-korszak pamflet- és visszaemlékezés-
irodalmában [From ‘Red carnival’ to ‘Red Tatar raid’: The Republic of 
Councils in the pamphlet and memoir literature of the early Horthy era] 
(Budapest: Napvilág, 2019) and the commemorative issue of the journal 
Múltunk, 64, no. 1 (2019), http://www.multunk.hu/2019-1-szam/. 
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The Legacy of the 1918–1919 
Revolutions: A Hundred Years On,  
Still Contested
Judith Szapor
On October 31, 2019 the prime minister of Hungary unveiled a me-
morial to the “nation’s martyrs,” victims of the Red Terror during the 
1919 Republic of Councils. The memorial is adorned by symbols of 
Greater Hungary: a giant coffin and the figure of Lady Hungaria, repre-
senting the resurrection of pre-1918 Hungary, dissolved in the Trianon 
Treaty; it stands in a small square adjacent to Parliament, replacing the 
statue, removed last December, of Imre Nagy, the martyred prime min-
ister of the 1956 revolution. In his speech, László Kövér, the speaker 
of the National Assembly, characterized the 1919 Republic of Soviets 
as the culmination of over half a century of civil war, waged from the 
mid-nineteenth century between agents of secularism, internationalism, 
socialism, and modernity on one side, and champions of God, family, 
and the Hungarian nation on the other.
Apart from the vehemence of the tone, there is not much that is 
new here: these elements of the Orbán government’s view of  Hungary’s 
twentieth-century history, as well as its own role as the heir to the in-
terwar Horthy regime, have been gradually introduced to the  public in 
the last nine years. If anything was surprising at all, it was the  degree to 
which the speech followed the letter and spirit of the 1930s—it could 
have been easily lifted from an official pronouncement of the mid-
1930s. Equally striking was the anachronism of the ceremony: its  visual 
references to a historical (and historicizing) tradition of a certain kind, 
its reaching for legitimization into the 1930s and epitomized by the 
Speaker’s traditional bocskai jacket, already an anachronistic relic in 
the 1930s. One is reminded of the famous lines from Robert Musil’s The 
Man Without Qualities, depicting the final days of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, a time that seemed out of joint: “But in those days no one 
knew what it was moving towards. Nor could anyone quite distinguish 
between what was above and what below, between what was moving 
forwards and what backwards.”
1
Forum_2_Szapor.indd   38 07/10/20   2:53 PM
39Forum: The Memory and Legacy of 1919 in Hungary
The memorial to the “nation’s martyrs” itself is not new, but 
is a reconstructed replica of a statue originally erected in 1934 and 
 destroyed shortly after the end of the Second World War in 1945. More-
over, the ceremony itself mirrored the original unveiling, preserved on 
contemporary newsreel, down to the position of the gigantic national 
flags, the presence of religious dignitaries, and the traditional Hungar-
ian aristocratic costumes. It seems that when it comes to the legacy 
of Hungary’s postwar revolutions and their place in the history of the 
twentieth century, there is, indeed, not much that has moved forward. 
Aside from the right-wing government’s backward move to the rhetoric 
and symbols of the authoritarian interwar era, there has been no forward 
movement towards reaching even a modicum of national consensus, 
either among historians or the general public. And as the divide between 
ideologically and politically motivated readings of the traumatic histori-
cal events of the twentieth century becomes increasingly entrenched, so 
do the respective popular narratives, informed by politics and propa-
ganda but also by the memory of familial experiences that have become 
irreconcilable.
In the following I will offer comments on instances of memory 
politics associated with the 1918–1919 revolutions from their immediate 
aftermath to the present; they are but examples that point to continuities 
and patterns that have stood in the way of not only a scholarly consen-
sus, but also a civil public discourse around these historical events.
Two elements, namely the lumping together of the two revolu-
tions—the October 1918 liberal democratic revolution led by Mihály 
Károlyi and the March 1919 Bolshevik-inspired Republic of Councils—
and the assigning of blame to both for Trianon, were a hallmark of the 
Horthy regime from the start and have also become tropes in the current 
Hungarian government’s rhetoric. The essays of Attila Pók on historical 
cases of scapegoating
2
 and the recent, short commentaries on the mem-
ory politics around the post-World War I revolutions published in the 
liberal weekly hvg.hu by the young historian Péter Csunderlik
3
 do much 
to illuminate the process by which Károlyi turned from potential sav-
iour of Hungary’s territorial integrity to its gravedigger. The historians 
rightly note that the counter-revolutionary regime needed a scapegoat—
and lumping together the radical and the moderate left, Communists, 
Social Democrats, and even liberals, well served a regime that built its 
popular support on a rhetoric of victimhood and betrayal by the West. 
But I am also reminded of the historian György Litván exclaiming: 
they hated no one as passionately as they did Károlyi—because they 
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could never forgive him for betraying his own class. And I would add 
another psychological motive: they could never forgive him for their 
having supported him during the last months of 1918.
It is not difficult to see the similarity with today’s government’s 
rhetoric to lump together every shade of liberal thought and institution 
(including the European Union) as foreign and hostile to Hungarian na-
tional interests—a continuity that has been made manifest by the re-
moval of Károlyi’s monument from in front of Parliament, one of the 
first acts of the Fidesz government in 2010. A similar psychological 
explanation might also help explain the almost pathological zeal of the 
campaign against George Soros waged by the Orbán regime: the need 
to atone for the Fidesz leaders’ own (neo)liberal past and the support by 
the billionaire philanthropist they had enjoyed at the beginning of their 
political career.
The Orbán government is of course far from being the first in 
twentieth-century Hungarian history to distort and  exploit the memory 
of the post-World War I revolutions for political purposes. It is a legacy 
that had been at the mercy of the changing governments and regimes in 
the post-1945 era as well. After an initial period of recognition as the 
First Hungarian Republic, then a demotion (during the Stalinist period) 
as merely a bourgeois episode, in the 1970s Károlyi and the Hungarian 
October came to be accepted into the late Kádár era’s pantheon of “pro-
gressive traditions.” This was as much the result of the need to broaden 
the regime’s popular support by going beyond the ideologically confin-
ing celebration of the legacy of the Republic of Councils as, curiously, 
the work of reform, reformed, or non-Communist historians. Led by 
György Litván and Gyula Hajdú, historians published the first biogra-
phies of Károlyi, began to publish his vast correspondence, and even (if 
with minor redactions) Károlyi’s 1956 memoir, Faith Without lllusions, 
written by the disenchanted fellow traveler at the end of his long life.
4
 
(Károlyi’s “rehabilitation” proved to be the first step in a larger project 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the re-discovery of the demo-
cratic “counter-culture” of the Hungarian fin de siècle, whose political, 
literary, and artistic avant-garde served as a predecessor for the emerg-
ing democratic opposition of the soft dictatorship of the late Kádár era.)
The legacy of the post-1919 intellectual emigration had been 
shaped along an almost identical trajectory. Intellectuals and artists who 
left or escaped during or after the Republic of Councils in protest, be-
cause of their involvement, or as a result of the 1920 numerus clau-
sus legislation, had been vilified by the Horthy regime; and, with the 
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exception of those who returned after 1945 as Communists, they contin-
ued to be ostracized or were forgotten during the Stalinist period. Their 
(for the most part) symbolic return in the form of TV interviews, books 
translated and published, and artistic legacy embraced did not happen 
until the 1970s—as part of the rediscovery of the early twentieth cen-
tury’s progressive, modernist counter-culture described above. Even if 
their legacy cannot be simply erased, today their intellectual and artistic 
significance has been brought into question with government support 
and distinctions handed out (as in the interwar or, for that matter, the 
Stalinist period) largely on ideological grounds, as opposed to artistic 
or intellectual merit. And as before, such policy favors conservatism 
and lack of experimentation both in terms of politics and artistic and 
intellectual expression—so we should not be surprised by the renewed 
official celebration of the leading right-wing writers and intellectuals of 
the Horthy era and, in public projects, a reappearance of the interwar 
period’s trademark “neo-Baroque,” anti-modernist, historicizing style.
This forum discussion was prompted by the centennial of 
 Hungary’s two postwar revolutions, an anniversary that has arrived at 
the tail end of the tremendous boom of World War I studies, mono-
graphs, edited volumes, and conferences generated by the centennial 
of the First World War. Moreover, the centennial was not an ordinary 
one, in that it did not mark a single event but one that was prolonged, 
stretched into four years, and included other events of lasting and global 
significance, such as the Bolshevik revolution and, tucked on to the 
war’s end, women’s suffrage in most European and Western countries. 
(This includes Hungary, where women practiced the right to vote in 
January 1920.)
We cannot blame historians for not letting anniversaries of 
 significant historical events go without addressing—or, if one wanted 
to be cynical, milking—them. For they present unique opportunities 
not only to sell illustrated volumes on such perennial favourites in the 
history of the First World War as the great battles and the Christmas 
Truce, but also to consider them in a new light. One of the most fruitful 
scholarly discussions in twentieth-century European historiography to 
emerge in recent years was the one that presented a convincing case for 
making the beginning and end of the war more elastic, reaching back 
to 1907 and ahead to 1923, and turning the traditional narrative of the 
conflict between the two military alliances into a European civil war. 
But there is high irony in the fact that this important discussion, based 
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on a much more inclusive concept of Europe and the lived experience of 
considerably more Europeans, has never reached a popular readership.
The last few years also saw initiatives by scholarly institutions 
and universities in Europe and North America to connect these audi-
ences and engage historians and the public in discussions on the war’s 
social and emotional legacies. For with or without anniversaries, the 
general public has had an enduring fascination with the First World War. 
One of the possible reasons for that may be that the Great War had left 
a lasting mark on European societies, touched almost every family, and 
has lived on in family lore—and what made this centennial especially 
significant was the fact that we have now surpassed the “statute of limi-
tations” on participants or eye-witnesses. One of the most disheartening 
aspects of the current memory wars waged by the Hungarian govern-
ment is that this centennial passed without a chance to unearth these 
often conflicting personal and familial memories and confront them—
and, potentially, bring them together—in the public realm.
John Horne, one of the leading historians of the First World 
War and a proponent, with Robert Gerwarth, of a new chronology of the 
Great War stretching from 1907 to 1923, suggests we take a closer look 
at defeat when considering the fate of European societies in the wake of 
the First World War. As he notes, “Defeat looms large in memory, and 
thus history, because it marks rupture and renewal even more obviously 
than its inescapable twin, victory.”
5
 He cites a great number of cases 
from postwar European history—but curiously, not Hungary’s, even if 
I believe it would have fit his argument to a T—and argues that if a 
nation fails to confront and examine its defeat, it will condemn society 
to continuing trauma. No historian or, for that matter, politician would 
argue that such a task is easily accomplished. And I was never a fan of 
the adage about learning from history in order to avoid repeating it. But 
if there are any lessons to be learned from the rest of the history of the 
twentieth century, especially of the countries defeated in the First World 
War, it is that societies should avoid this task at their own peril—that is, 
if they are engaged in building a future and do not define themselves by 
their past defeats.
Historians should have a special role to play in this work 
of exploring and overcoming the traumatic past. Not that we can 
accuse them of not doing their fair share throughout the twentieth 
century, from Gyula Szekfű to Erik Molnár, in shaping the memory 
of the 1918–1919 revolutions—and, generally, supporting political 
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agendas. The liberal public, ever-diminishing liberal media, and 
small number of liberal or moderate conservative historians in Hun-
gary have every reason to be outraged by the right-wing excesses 
of the current government’s memory wars and its evocation of the 
most divisive rhetoric borrowed straight from the Horthy era. But 
they also have an obligation to offer, if perhaps not an equally and 
instantly appealing (by way of populist and nationalist rhetoric) but 
at least a professionally considered alternative, one that is based on 
an examination of historical evidence and popular memory. And, to 
close on a mildly optimistic note, there are signs  indeed that young 
Hungarian historians have taken up this call.
NOTES
 1.  Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities: A Sort of Introduction. The Like 
of It Now Happens (I), trans. Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser (London: 
Secker & Warburg, 1953), 8.
 2.  Attila Pók, “Scapegoats in Post-World War I Hungarian Political Thought,” 
Hungarian Studies 14, no. 2 (January 2001), 202–06; Attila Pók, The 
Politics of Hatred in the Middle of Europe: Scapegoating in Twentieth 
Century Hungary: History and Historiography (Szombathely: Savaria 
University Press, 2009).
 3.  Péter Csunderlik, “A történelemhamisítás emlékműve” [The monument 
to the falsification of history], HVG, October 31, 2019, https://hvg.
hu/360/201944_a_tortenelemhamisitas_emlekmuve; Péter Csunderlik, 
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Jenny Macleod (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 11.
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Violence Glorified or Denied? Collective 
Memory of the Red and White Terrors 
in Hungary, 1919–Present
Béla Bodó
In the spring and summer of 1919, contemporaries were convinced that 
they had been witnessing history in the making. The famous liberal 
 
historian Henrik Marczali made what we today would call the first “oral 
history” interview with Béla Kun, the de facto leader of the Republic of 
Councils.
1
 At the same time, but to a different end, the novelist Cécile 
Tormay was recording events as she saw them in her An Outlaw’s  Diary.
2
 
The battle over the sovereignty of interpretation (Deutungshoheit) of 
the recent past thus began even before the demise of the Republic of 
Councils at the end of July 1919. For the first several months after the 
collapse, its exiled leaders did not discuss the recent past; preoccupied 
by survival, the refugees, if they committed their thoughts to paper at 
all, focused their attention on the White Terror: on the paramilitary and 
mob violence and the political repression that followed the collapse.
The memory of the Republic of Councils, as it slowly took form 
in the winter of 1919, was thus colored from the start by (and it could 
be even argued that it was a reaction to) a later event, the White Terror. 
The exiled leaders of the Republic of Councils, such as József Pogány, 
saw the White Terror and the paramilitary groups as a tool in the hands 
of the feudal and capitalist elites to “exterminate the working class.”
3
 
Non-communist refugees, such as the moderate socialist Oszkár Jászi, 
on the other hand, believed that the White Terror was the work of newly 
mobilized social groups, such as military officers, war veterans,  enraged 
peasants, lower-ranking civil servants, and non-Jewish segments of the 
urban and petty bourgeoisie. In Jászi’s view, the elite did not create, 
but merely sought to take advantage of, the murderous rage of these 
newly mobilized social groups in order to eliminate the agents of prog-
ress in Hungary, namely the progressive (mainly foreign, i.e. Jewish or 
 German) intelligentsia. After they had done their duty, Jászi contended, 
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the more enlightened members of the political and social elite would 
push these radical groups into the background and restore the conserva-
tive liberal order.
4
The Communist exiles turned the victims of the White  Terror, 
particularly the executed leaders of the Republic of Councils, such 
as Ottó Korvin, into political martyrs.
5
 This new martyrology served 
 several purposes. First, it was meant to justify Red crimes and divert 
attention from the mistakes and omissions made by the leaders of the 
Republic of Councils and from the violent aspects of Bolshevik rule. 
Second, the narrative about the White Terror was devised to undermine 
the reputation of Admiral Miklós Horthy and his National Army and 
cast doubt on the legitimacy of the slowly consolidating counterrevolu-
tionary regime. Third, the colorful descriptions of the White Terror, the 
demonization of the enemy, and the hysteria about the counterrevolution 
and counterrevolutionaries helped to mend fences among the quarrel-
some exiles. Whereas the debate over past policies, especially in regard 
to land reform and military strategy, tended to divide the exiles, the 
shared narrative about the White Terror helped to restore a  semblance 
of unity.
6
Only slowly were the exiled Communist leaders able to achieve 
a consensus on the memory of the Republic of Councils. The new agree-
ment envisioned the recent past as a positive experience; it was a heroic, 
yet ultimately tragic, struggle on behalf of humanity to achieve eman-
cipation and obtain social justice. The Republic of Councils thus came 
to be remembered in émigré circles as the first Hungarian government 
that extended political rights to the masses, and introduced sweeping 
social reforms. The Republic of Councils, the Marxist narrative went, 
moved working-class and poor peasant families into the confiscated 
castles and large apartments of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie; it 
opened museums and libraries to the working poor, who were hungry 
for culture, and sent proletarian children on holidays. In this narrative, 
the Red Terror played only a minor role. It is not that the exiled lead-
ers of the Republic of Councils were apologetic about hostage-taking, 
confiscation of goods, mass executions, and other acts of violence. The 
radical refugees, as good students of Marx, considered violence “the 
midwife of history.” Machiavelli advised that the end always justified 
the means; for him, however, the end did not have to have a spiritual 
dimension. György Lukács and his comrades, on the other hand, con-
sidered Communism as mankind’s last home and final refuge. They did 
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not, however, just believe that any means could be used to reach this 
glorious end. Lukács and his companions were also convinced that the 
holy end sanctified the lowliest of means; it turned evil into good, and 
the readiness to use violence from a character fault into a sign of virtue.
 How the Communists and the exiled moderate socialists 
 remembered the Republic of Councils and the Red and White Terrors 
was of little concern to the large majority of Hungarians who never read 
their clandestine pamphlets and books. The incipient Horthy regime 
interpreted the recent past differently. The courts, which passed judg-
ment on some of the captured Communist leaders in December 1919, 
declared the Republic of Councils a criminal enterprise and the party 
officials and civil servants, irrespective of their ranks, as villains. The 
demonization of the Republic of Councils left no room to acknowledge 
its positive achievements; progressive social legislation passed in this 
period and the initially successful attempt to defend the country from 
invading foreign armies remained a taboo in the interwar period. In the 
conservative and Right-radical narratives, the Republic of Councils 
stood outside the flow of Hungarian history; according to the official 
narrative, the Communist victory had no roots in pre-war social and 
political problems, economic backwardness, or the mistakes and omis-
sions made by the political elites during the war.
The first memoirs and historical studies composed by 
 conservative and Right-radical authors portrayed the two revolutions 
as the product of a Judeo-Bolshevik world conspiracy.
7
 They mirrored 
the  political pamphlets written by exiled Communists in  Vienna; both 
the Left and Right-radical authors tended to exaggerate the  brutality 
of their opponents, and often published stories which were pure 
 inventions.
8
 More  restrained in this regard were the Horthy biographies, 
which first appeared on the market in the second half of the 1920s. 
 Written by Right-radical authors, the first Horthy biographies cele-
brated the admiral as an anti-Bolshevik hero, who had single-handedly 
defeated the Communist threat, ended the Red Terror, and restored both 
law and order and the country’s independence.
9
 The Horthy biogra-
phies of the 1930s and early 1940s, on the other hand, portrayed the 
Regent as a conservative statesman who hated both left- and right-wing 
radicalism equally.
10
 In this modified narrative, the Admiral not only 
 defeated  Bolshevism, but also, by first reining in and later dissolving 
the  right-wing  militias, helped to restore law and order. Both the older 
and newer Horthy biographies denied that the admiral had ordered or 
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witnessed any of the atrocities; the later works, however, claimed that 
Horthy was a  major force behind the prosecution of crimes committed 
by the officers’  detachments and the civic militias.
Simultaneously with the conservative turn in the Horthy cult, 
the members of right-wing militias began to publish their memoirs.
11
 
In their books, the ex-militiamen paid little attention to Horthy; instead 
of the political elite, the authors focused their attention on the rank and 
file of the paramilitary groups: on their struggle against Communists, 
Freemasons, and Jews; and, most importantly, on the militia uprisings 
in western Hungary in the summer and fall of 1921, which preserved 
 Hungarian rule in part of the contested region. The new fascist and 
 national socialist parties in the second half of the 1930s also traced their 
origins back to the militias’ struggle against both Bolshevism and the 
remnants of the pre-war liberal order. In the early 1940s, perhaps the 
best known national socialist academic, János Makkai, hailed the militia 
members as middle-class revolutionaries and Europe’s first fascists.
12
The demonization of the democratic and the Communist 
 experience and the denunciation of the Red Terror were not confined to 
written text: they also found expression in art, monuments, and public 
celebrations. Many war memorials made a reference to the Red Terror 
in the figure of a snake or dragon, which were commonly understood 
as the symbols of Bolshevism. During the yearly commemorations 
of the lost war, the speakers rarely neglected to condemn Bolshevik 
rule. In the interwar period, every village and town which had been 
victimized by the Red militias erected monuments to honor their dead. 
In  Budapest, plaques marked the places of Red crimes. The statues of 
the leading  intellectuals of the counterrevolution, such as Bishop Ot-
tokár Prohászka and the early modern saint János Kapisztrán, served 
the same goal. Prohászka was a patron of the student militias, the main 
forces of paramilitary violence on university campuses, and one of the 
sponsors of the numerus clausus legislation. The main force behind the 
 Kapisztrán cult was Army Bishop István Zadravecz. A counterrevo-
lutionary of the first hour, the army bishop was a close friend of the 
best known paramilitary leader, Deputy Colonel Baron Pál Prónay; he 
continued to defend the paramilitary groups, and justified extrajudicial 
executions, armed robberies, and violent attacks on Jews long after the 
main perpetrators, the members of the paramilitary groups and patriotic 
associations, had fallen out of favor with the political and social elites.
After the liberation of the country by Soviet troops from Nazi 
occupation and Arrow Cross terror in April 1945, one of the first actions 
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of the recently legalized Communist Party and its social democratic and 
peasant allies was to remove the statues and plaques, and change the 
names of the streets, which had reminded people of, and made refer-
ences to, the Red Terror. The removal of these memorials was followed 
by the destruction of the monuments to leading political and cultural 
figures, such as Bishop Prohászka, who had been idealized by the inter-
war regime, and Prime Minister István Tisza, whose murder at the end 
of October 1918 had been remembered as a prelude to the revolutions, 
chaos, and Bolshevik rule. Some of the socialist victims of the White 
Terror were reburied in public ceremonies. The second half of the 1940s 
also witnessed the erection of public memorials that served to commem-
orate the sacrifices of the victims of the White Terror.
13
 By contrast, the 
prosecution of surviving members of White paramilitary groups for the 
atrocities committed proceeded at a snail’s pace and was fraught with 
contradictions. The most infamous paramilitary leaders had either died 
before 1945, or had emigrated or went into hiding after the war. Legal 
documents, including many interwar testimonies, had been lost, and the 
court system was overburdened by more recent crimes. The new demo-
cratic regime between 1945 and 1948, and its Stalinist  successor  after 
1948, were prepared to prosecute the murderers of socialist or Com-
munist dignitaries or labor activists; they were, however, reluctant to 
provide justice to the victims of hate crimes: that is, middle-class Jews 
who had no socialist or Communist connections.
The official memory paradigm of the White Terror emerged dur-
ing the trial of Iván Héjjas (in absentia) and his men in 1947 and 1948. 
In his verdict, the President of the Court drew, for the first time, a direct 
connection between the White Terror in 1919 and Hungary’s alliance with 
the fascist powers in the late 1930s, its entry into the war on the side of its 
allies and its participation in the invasion of Soviet Union in 1941, the role 
of the political elite in the Holocaust, and the horrors of the Arrow Cross 
dictatorship in the final phase of the war. The judge’s conclusion quickly 
congealed into a historical fact and received knowledge, which was then 
repeated countless times in textbooks and at public celebrations between 
1948 and 1989.
14
 The rehabilitation of the Republic of Councils as a posi-
tive experience also began soon  after the liberation; ironically, as my study 
of parliamentary speeches  after 1945 has made clear, the main role in its re-
habilitation, just as in the destruction of “uncomfortable” monuments, was 
played by Social Democrats rather than the Communist Party. The new 
(old) consensus was that the Republic of Councils represented a positive 
experience and served as a prelude to, and model for, the new state after 
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1948. Aware of the lingering negative memory of the Red Terror, Commu-
nist leaders, however, were reluctant to call the new regime a continuation 
of the Republic of Councils. Eager to establish their nationalist credentials, 
the evolving new political elite after 1945 invested heavily in the centen-
nial celebration of the 1848 Revolution. The new narrative portrayed the 
Communist takeover in 1948 as the culmination and fulfillment of earlier 
struggles—particularly the Revolution of 1848—for national indepen-
dence, political emancipation, and social justice.
The 1956 Revolution led to a drastic shift in the composition, 
meaning, and political importance of the collective memory of the 
 Republic of Councils. The bloodshed that accompanied the Revolution 
gave the left-wing recollection of the White Terror immediacy and rel-
evance that it had not possessed since the fall of 1919. The connection 
between the White Terror, on the one hand, and the Second World War 
and Holocaust, on the other, had already been made after 1947: a new 
charge, namely that the counterrevolution of 1919 paved the way for the 
“counterrevolution of 1956,” was added. This was not an idle accusa-
tion: to prove that charge, the political police were ordered to reexamine 
the files of known and convicted counterrevolutionaries. Although, on 
the whole, the search proved to be a waste of time, in a handful of cases, 
the police and the courts were indeed able to prove the existence of such 
links. The trial in 1957 of the most important catch, the minor militia 
leader Mihály Francia Kiss, who had been on the run since 1945, gave 
the court the chance to publicize the official line about the connection 
between the two events.
15
Built to celebrate the forty- and the fifty-year anniversaries of 
the Republic of Councils, the large and intimidating statues of soldiers 
and male and female workers were meant to show strength on the side of 
the political elite and to send a message to the population about the futil-
ity of armed resistance. With the consolidation and growing popularity 
of the Kádár regime in the 1960s, however, this function gradually fell 
to the wayside. The Kádár regime, both in its totalitarian phase in the 
late 1950s and its authoritarian period after 1963, continued to regard 
the Red Terror as a positive event, and violence as a justified and neces-
sary means to defend itself against the machinations of “counterrevolu-
tionaries.” The statues erected and the street and public buildings named 
after enforcers, such as Ottó Korvin and Tibor Szamuely, testified in 
the 1960s both to the unbroken identification with the Marxist view on 
violence and to the continued paranoia about the counterrevolutionary 
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threat. The coverage of the Red and White terrors in high school and 
university textbooks also changed only slightly between 1956 and 1989. 
Yet, with the increasing popularity of the Kádár regime, the negative 
messages became supplemented by more positive narratives as well. 
The Kádár regime in the 1970s and 1980s remembered the Republic 
of Councils mainly for its military victories and its achievements in the 
social and cultural realms. The new narrative transformed the Repub-
lic of Councils into a forerunner of the socialist welfare state, and the 
Red Army from the vanguard of a world revolution into a defender of 
the nation.
The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed not only the reinterpreta-
tion but also the increasing commoditization and trivialization of the 
history of the Republic of Councils and the Red and White terrors. In 
the heyday of commemoration in the late 1960s, hundreds of poems and 
theater plays were written and performed, music was composed, and 
dozens of documentaries and adventure films were made about these 
historical events. Films such as Bors Máté (Matthew Pepper) provided 
wholesome entertainment. However, as propaganda material they were 
a poor substitute for hard-core ideological training; in any case, films 
such as Bors Máté were ill-suited to convert young men and women into 
fanatical defenders of the socialist system. The commodification and 
trivialization of the collective memory of the Republic of Councils con-
tinued in the last fifteen years of the regime’s existence.
16
 The statues 
erected to honor the memory of the leaders of the Republic of Councils, 
such as Béla Kun, and the victims of the White Terror, however, were 
of modest size; instead of emanating threats and extolling violence in 
the service of a good cause, the newer works conveyed a humanist mes-
sage about the futility of armed conflicts. It is not that old reflexes had 
completely died, however. In November 1988, on the eve of the regime 
change, the recently deposed Prime Minister, Károly Grósz, warned 
about the coming of a new “White Terror,” if the party faithful were 
foolish enough to surrender power and opt for the restoration of par-
liamentary democracy. In a sign of the changing times, even his fellow 
socialists ignored the warning. The left-wing collective memory of the 
Republic of Councils and the Red and White terrors had expired as a 
political and intellectual force even before the complete collapse of the 
authoritarian regime.
The last thirty years has witnessed a partial return to the 
 collective memory and commemorative practices of the interwar Horthy 
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regime. In the early 1990s, politicians in Parliament and opinion-mak-
ers in the media competed with one another to denounce the Republic of 
Councils as a government based on the exercise of naked power alone. 
After 1990, March 21, the day of the Communist takeover in 1919, was 
no longer celebrated as a public holiday. Memorials erected to honor the 
victims of the White Terror, unless they stood in cemeteries, were torn 
down and destroyed or transported to Memorial Park, “the museum of 
forgotten statues,” on the outskirts of Budapest. The textbooks, surpris-
ingly enough, changed only gradually: even in the late 1990s, one could 
find high school and university textbooks which, at least in regards 
to the White Terror and the positive achievement of the Republic of 
 Councils, continued to repeat almost verbatim the socialist narrative.
17
While reminders of the Republic of Councils and victims of the 
White Terror were removed from public spaces, conservative and right-
wing groups put up plaques, restored old statues, and renamed streets to 
honor the victims of the Red Terror. Intellectuals commonly identified 
with the counterrevolution, such as Dezső Szabó and Cécile Tormay, 
 acquired the status of political saints in the same circles: their books 
have been republished, dozens of streets have been named after them, 
and many plaques and statues have been erected in their honor.
18
 The 
revival of the Horthy cult in the early 1990s put the role of the admiral 
during the counterrevolution in a more positive light; the celebration of 
Horthy as a man who singlehandedly defeated Bolshevism went hand-
in-hand with the trivialization of the White Terror and the partial reha-
bilitation of its perpetrators.
19
 In the last ten years, a “war of memorials” 
sought to indict not only the leaders of the Republic of Councils, such as 
Béla Kun, but also fellow travelers, such as Mihály Károlyi; moderate 
and patriotic socialists, such as Imre Nagy; and cultural icons, such as 
the Marxist philosopher György Lukács (whose monument in the XIII 
district is being replaced by a Saint Stephen statue). The war over the in-
terpretation of key events in modern Hungarian history is not confined 
to intellectual discussions. With the rise of paramilitarism and mili-
tary violence, particularly against the Roma minority, the last twenty 
years has turned the recent revival of the cult of right-wing paramilitary 
groups and their leaders into a political and indeed a law-and-order is-
sue of the first order.
20
 The right-wing shift in Hungarian politics has led 
not only to the reassessment of the role of conservative statesman such 
as István Tisza; it has also raised the specter of the complete revision of 
 modern Hungarian history and collective memory along conservative 
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and Right-radical lines by purging them of any positive reference to 
liberal, democratic, and social democratic traditions. The intense strug-
gle over Deutungshoheit in regard to the meaning and significance of 
Hungary’s first experiment with Communism and of the Red and White 
terrors will continue to have an impact on collective identity.
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Utopias in the Hungarian  
Republic of Councils
Boldizsár Vörös
In regard to the first question (namely, the political, intellectual, and 
 cultural significance and legacy of the 1919 Hungarian Republic of 
Councils), in this brief commentary I will discuss the Republic of 
 Councils as a system that operated to foster utopias (although, accord-
ing to those shaping public opinion at the time, this was realised only 
much later), and look at it in its political and cultural context.
Both before and after the establishment of the Republic of 
Councils, political groups participating in the dictatorship published 
works on the kind of world order they intended to create in the long 
term. The Hungarian Social Democrats had published August Bebel’s 
book Woman and Socialism in several Hungarian-language editions 
prior to March 21, 1919; during the tenure of the Republic of Councils 
this work was put in print by the new, united party’s book publishing 
office. The book postulated, among other things, that the tools of pro-
duction, the means of transportation, and land would be under social 
ownership. In the ideal economic-societal system to come, the condi-
tions of life would be equal for everybody. According to Bebel, the new 
society would be built upon “international solidarity”: people of the 
world would unite and do their utmost to spread the new social system 
to every corner of the world.
1
 The most important communist notions 
about the ideal world order of the future, similar in many respects to 
those of Bebel, could already be found in Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin’s 
The Programme of the Communists (Bolsheviks), which had also been 
published several times in Hungarian by the Party of Communists in 
Hungary before the Republic of Councils came into being, while during 
the dictatorship of the proletariat it was published by one of the groups 
of the Commissariat of Public Education. Bukharin illustrated the state 
of affairs to be achieved thus: “In the end the entire world must be-
come one single workers’ factory, in which the whole of humanity will 
work for itself in the largest possible workshops with the best machin-
ery and with no employers or capitalists to realise one single, strictly 
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elaborated, calculated, and measured plan.”
2
 The leading intellectuals 
of the Republic of Councils must have drawn great inspiration not only 
from the details, but also from the whole far-reaching visions for the 
future contained in these foreign works, helping them formulate their 
own  versions of the theme.
Probably the most significant of these works was the vision out-
lined in the supplements to the Néptanítók Lapja (Journal of elementary 
teachers), in the series of lessons on universal and Hungarian history, 
published by the Commissariat of Public Education. The People’s Com-
missar of  Public Education ordered teachers to use these during their 
teaching. The teaching material said the following about the future ideal 
world order: there will be no “wealthy,” nor hungry poor, because the 
fruits of common labour will be shared equally; class division will come 
to an end. There will be no robbers, nor thieves, since if they cannot 
profit from stealing, they will not take the property of others. There will 
be no misery and sin in the world, nor will there be poor and uneducated 
people, because in the communist society every skill of every person 
will be needed. In the new social order, every child will be educated in 
the same way and turned into a cultured person in uniform schools. Up 
to now even the talentless children of the rich graduated from academic 
institutions, while the most outstanding intellectual skills were lost if a 
child had no means to study. Everyone will begin a career in accordance 
with their abilities and thus everyone will find a place suitable for them, 
where they can best use their skills for the common good of all their fel-
low men and women in the future “society.”
3
Descriptions of the ideal world order of various lengths also 
 appeared in newspaper articles, leaflets, and placards regarded as  official 
organs, and indeed in a utopian state novel published in several parts in 
Néptanítók Lapja, which portrayed a communist Hungary in the distant 
future of 2020. Based on works of this type it can be concluded that the 
opinion makers of the dictatorship had a utopian vision of the future 
and tried to mediate it with various types of material aimed at the target 
groups of their propaganda. In some illustrations of the future, some 
of the components were more detailed than others, obviously depend-
ing on which target group the authors primarily intended to address, 
and, accordingly, where their writings would be published. Hence, in 
the teaching material cited earlier, roughly half of the texts discussing 
the ideal conditions to come dealt with the education and training of the 
new generations; their purpose may have been to bring the presented 
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system closer to schoolchildren and make it more comprehensible by 
including details of learning they were personally familiar with.
The Hungarian Republic of Councils as a dictatorship of the 
proletariat was defined and presented in the works of its leading think-
ers as a political system operating temporarily in the process of building 
the ideal world order. This is clearly demonstrated by Section 1 of the 
Constitution passed in June 1919, which stipulated that “The dictator-
ship of the proletariat is merely a tool to eliminate all manner of exploi-
tation and every kind of class rule, and to prepare the classless social 
order in which the chief tool of class rule, state power, will cease to 
exist.”
4
 How long this transitional period would last was addressed by 
Karl Radek in his The Development of Socialism from Science to Real-
ity, published in Hungarian as a brochure before March 21, 1919 by the 
Party of Communists in Hungary and during the Council Republic by 
the united party: “The socialist revolution is a long process because it 
begins with the dethronement of the capitalist class and only ends with 
the complete transformation of the capitalist economy into a workers’ 
community. This process will take at least a generation in every state 
and this is the period of time necessary for the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat.”
5
 There can be little doubt that this view influenced Jenő Varga 
when he spoke of “socialist self-awareness” in the future at the Coun-
cils’ General Session in June 1919, stating that it would be realised “by 
the next generation, in the era of complete communism.”
6
The function of utopias at that time was to urge people to create 
a new world, better than the one before it, while they could also be used 
to legitimise the radical measures of those who controlled the dictator-
ship, including the use of terror. According to this logic, such means 
were necessary to create the ideal conditions aspired to. In an  article 
titled “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” published in the March 
22  issue of Vörös Újság (Red News), the leading newspaper of the 
 Republic of Councils, the author wrote, “It is necessary that the work-
ing class create order with an iron fist. But this dictatorship will only be 
a transitional period. This will be followed by a period of prosperity and 
complete freedom for everybody. However, until then we will have to 
use the tools of power.”
7
 Taking all of this into consideration, I believe 
that the study of depictions of an ideal world order that can be regarded 
as official during the tenure of the Hungarian Republic of Councils 
 contributes not only to the understanding of the ideology, propaganda, 
and political system of the dictatorship, but also to the demonstration of 
certain attributes of the utopias.
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Notes on the Centenary of the 1919 
Hungarian Republic of Councils
Éva Forgács
The Hungarian Republic of Councils, or, as it is referred to in shorthand, 
the Commune, lasted 133 days, from March 21 until August 1, 1919, and 
inspired Hungarian socialists and left-leaning artists in many ways. 
While a number of facts about the fundamentally dictatorial nature of 
the short-lived regime led by Béla Kun have retroactively come to light, 
during its existence there were, apparently, a number of artists, think-
ers, and socialist workers who sincerely believed that it was a political 
 renewal in the direction of social equality. The nationalization of some 
of the land and the cultural assets of aristocratic families—historic as 
well as Jewish—remained one of the legacies of the Commune. While 
it had a troubled history with regard to freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press, its existence was too short for the regime to become visibly 
and unequivocally dictatorial. The mixed legacy of the Commune origi-
nates precisely from its short existence: a number of the dictatorial mea-
sures were just germinating, or not yet visible, before it was crushed.
The Hungarian cultural elite mostly embraced what appeared 
to be a new era of social justice. Theaters, museums, and art schools all 
of a sudden opened to everyone, and it was an issue of good faith and 
unselfishness to engage in the activities of educating poor children and 
facilitating access to high culture for masses of people. As we know, 
however, a lot of this was illusory. Lajos Kassák, for example, con-
fesses in his autobiography that the performance of a modernist play 
by the Ma group generated inappropriate reactions in its working-class 
audience: laughter at the wrong moments, and general lack of under-
standing. This led Kassák to reconfigure his theatrical and performance 
events so they included poetry recitals and classical music performed 
on stage, rather than expressionist stage works.
1
 There was no time to 
educate a new audience that would be receptive to modernist visual 
and literary languages, and Kassák’s early return to a sort of classicism 
forecast the later dominance of Proletcult and Socialist Realism as art 
for the masses. With all the good intentions to attract new audiences to 
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philosophy, sciences, and the liberal arts as they cultivated these in the 
Galilei Circle and The Free School for Social Sciences, and with further 
principles elaborated in the more exclusive Sunday Circle,
2
 there was 
only so much they could do in 133 days.
The wave of emigration following the defeat of the Commune 
drained the Hungarian cultural scene in an unprecedented way. The list 
of later Nobel Prize-winning physicists, economists, and internationally 
successful artists and filmmakers is long and well known. A  number 
of Hungarian journals and newspapers mushroomed in Vienna, the 
free city geographically closest to Hungary, but émigrés settled in 
many  European countries as well as in the United States, Canada, and 
Australia. Admiral Miklós Horthy’s right-wing regime retaliated and 
introduced the first laws limiting the number of Jewish students in in-
stitutions of higher education, which led many young people to seek 
education abroad. One of the proud statements of Hungarian art history 
writing is that the Hungarian contingent in the Bauhaus was the larg-
est to attend the school from any single country; but if we consider the 
quota on Jews in Hungarian colleges and universities, we must see that 
migrating to Germany to study was not due to the avant-garde mentality 
of many talented young people, but rather to the restrictions they had to 
suffer at home.
The memory of the 1919 Commune has been troubled in 
 Hungary. First of all, the general view, instantly generated by the inter-
war political regime of Admiral Horthy, was that it was an eminently 
Jewish enterprise, which made it profoundly unpopular to the majority 
of the Hungarian population. Confirming this view was the marked, 
distinguished importance given to it during the post-1945 Communist 
decades. However, a number of more nuanced and thorough studies in 
art history, literary history, history, and sociology have revealed a more 
complicated and realistic image of the idealism and many positive deeds 
of the participants. Issues 93 and 94 of the Budapest-based theoretical-art 
historical journal Enigma, edited by Csilla Markója,  included excellent 
studies of the activities of artists and art writers during the Commune. 
Scholarship of the Hungarian avant-garde, especially on Kassák, both 
in Hungary and the United States, has also revealed many facts and 
objective notes on the Hungarian avant-garde’s history during the Com-
mune, and a lot of the memoirs of the participants from Kassák to Árpád 
Szélpál
3
 to Ervin Sinkó
4
 to Anna Lesznai
5
 have become  available. All 
this has, in fact, given us a fairly balanced view of the era, even if  current 
Hungarian politics ignore this chapter of  Hungarian history.
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Reflections on the 1919  
Republic of Councils
Árpád von Klimó
1) The political, intellectual, and cultural significance and legacy 
of the Republic of Councils
One hundred years later, the short-lived Republic of Councils in 
 Hungary is not celebrated and hardly remembered. It would be more 
than a stretch to try to connect the successes of today’s political opposi-
tion in the local elections (October 13, 2019), which was the first after 
almost a decade of unchallenged rule of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz 
party, to the chaotic events of 1919.
But this impossible comparison demonstrates why the memory 
of the Republic of Councils is so complicated today. The Hungarian 
experiment of 1919, somehow related to the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917, and more directly to the military and civilian protests and the 
shifts within the Hungarian Parliament and government in the fall and 
winter of 1918–19, was, for some of its protagonists, part of a series 
of world-historical events, which also made it easy for its enemies to 
 exorcise it from Hungarian national history. But it was also embed-
ded in a complex way within the Hungarian socialist labor movement, 
World War One, the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, and the revolts 
and nationalist agitations in many parts of the Hungarian Kingdom. In 
short, it is still today not easy to define clearly what the Republic of 
Councils even was, and, therefore, it is difficult to connect it to our 
time. Was it just an attempt to create a Bolshevik state in Hungary, to be 
aligned with Soviet republics in Slovakia, Ukraine, and Russia, or was it 
rather an odd coalition of some left-wing adventurers, coffeehouse lite-
rati, social reformers, many different social and cultural political move-
ments, modernist artists, and nationalist officers who tried desperately 
to defend Hungary’s borders?
No wonder that the memory of 1919 has been extremely politi-
cized and has never really been a popular lieu de mémoire in Hungary, 
in contrast to the Rákóczi rebellion, 1848, or 1956.
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2) The participation of the Hungarian cultural elite in the 
 Hungarian Soviet Republic
The three names mentioned below, Kassák, Lukács, and Lugosi—
though many other intellectuals, artists, and social reformers could 
be added—create a somewhat distorted picture of 1919. Only a small, 
mostly educated elite—some technocrats, some military specialists—
fully engaged in the Republic of Councils. It was in November 1918, 
when broader strata of the population (mostly) in Budapest, including 
many women, servants, waiters, etc. who had never been politicized 
before, went out in the streets to protest or even create new  professional 
organizations or other institutions. But only a few of these more  diverse 
actors were still engaged during the Republic of Councils, and the 
 majority of the middle classes remained absent.
If I may refer to my own family, a possible answer is  apparent. 
My grandfather István Klimó, a young painter born in 1883, had just 
 returned from a POW camp in what had become Poland. On June 12, 
1919, at the height of the Republic of Councils, his first child, my 
 father, was born to his wife, Gizella Kovács (b. 1888), a former ac-
tress. His older brother Jenő (b. 1873) was a higher civil servant of the 
State  Railroad, had a position that was necessary for the Republic of 
Councils, and tried his best to feed the family of five (Jenő’s daughter, 
 István’s wife, and my father). The youngest brother, Endre, and his wife 
had died of the Spanish flu in Vienna a few months before.
1
 It is easy 
to see that this formerly middle-class family, which did not have any 
property, had trouble surviving during these months.
While my grandmother was pregnant, her former colleague Béla 
Lugosi (b. Blaskó, 1882–1956) was very active in 1919. He was only one 
year younger than my grandfather, had also come from  Transylvania, and 
had been a member of the Hungarian National  Theater since 1902 (like 
my grandmother, who had been on the stage since 1904).  During World 
War I, Lugosi fought as an officer of a ski patrol and was wounded.
2
 In 
March and April of 1919, Lugosi founded the trade unions of film and 
theater actors. The decision to participate surely depended on myriad 
conditions, causes, and motivations. A very ambitious actor like Lugosi, 
who had also starred in films before World War I, saw it as an opportu-
nity to create something new. He was later also engaged in actors’ guilds 
in Hollywood, and protested the Horthy regime and the Holocaust.
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3) The impact of the large-scale emigration of intellectuals and art-
ists on Hungarian and European intellectual and artistic life
The exodus of thousands of intellectuals and artists from Hungary 
 after 1919 contributed to a more provincial or inward-looking interwar 
 culture in Hungary (especially with regard to the film industry), while 
the émigrés added flair to the literary and film scenes in Vienna, Berlin, 
and finally Hollywood. However, it is not that easy to measure whether 
this migration was mostly caused by the reaction against 1918–19, or 
rather based on individual decisions to seek better opportunities abroad.
4) The role of respective political agendas of successive Hungarian 
regimes and governments in shaping the memory of the event
The Horthy regime that was established after the collapse of the 1919 
Republic of Councils regarded itself as renewing the continuity of the 
Hungarian Kingdom that was overthrown by the revolution of 1918. 
It is likely that many Hungarians were hoping that the new regime 
would bring stability and economic recovery which occurred during the 
1920s. For the authoritarian system under Horthy, the demonization and 
delegitimization of 1918–19 was crucial. Consequently, the end of the 
Horthy regime and of the short-lived Arrow Cross dictatorship made 
a reevaluation of 1918–19 possible. However, the Stalinist regime un-
der Mátyás Rákosi had its problems with the Republic of Councils, not 
least because Stalin had the leader of 1919, Béla Kun, and a few other 
Hungarian Communist leaders executed, while Rákosi, ironically, had 
survived the Stalinist Purges because he was imprisoned in Hungary 
and had only emigrated to the Soviet Union in 1940!
Therefore, it was only in 1969, when the János Kádár regime 
attempted to create a new image, that the state invested a lot of money 
in the commemoration of 1919 as part of its attempt to distinguish itself 
from both the Stalinism of the 1950s and the anti-Stalinist revolution of 
1956. During the 1970s and 1980s, this led to a few national, regional, 
and local commemorations of 1919, but the decline of the Communist 
regime only accelerated the downfall of its legacy, and the memory of 
1919 was finally buried—at least until today—in the anti- Communist 
fervor of postsocialism. However, there are still some personalities, 
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like the modernist artist Lajos Kassák, the philosopher György Lukács, 
and even the Hollywood star Béla Lugosi (who invented the mod-
ern  Dracula), who participated actively in the Hungarian Bolshevik 
 laboratory of 1919, and who have become icons of Hungarian twen-
tieth-century modernity. The crushing of the Republic of Councils, the 
brutal,  often antisemitic  terror of right-wing extremists, and the propa-
ganda of a “ Judeo-Bolshevik Myth”
3
 drove many Jewish intellectuals 
and artists from the country, but this terrible exodus can hardly be added 
to the positive legacy of 1919.
When we look at the revival of anti-Bolshevik and  revisionist 
propaganda in today’s Hungary, we also should not forget that the 
historical context is completely different from the 1920s and 1930s. 
 Hungary and most of its neighbors are now members of the European 
Union and cultivate excellent diplomatic, economic, and cultural rela-
tions, which explains why the revived cult of Trianon (closely related 
to anti-Bolshevism) does not lead to an outcry in Slovakia, Romania, 
or Serbia. The neighboring countries know that the references to the 
Horthy period are mostly directed towards the Hungarian public and the 
wider Hungarian community in the region.
NOTES
 1.  In our family archive in the old apartment where Jenő lived since 1905 is 
a form that Commissar Jenő Landler signed, confirming that Jenő Klimó 
would keep his position in the Hungarian State Railway Authority (under 
the Ministry of Commerce).
 2.  See https://www.workers.org/2019/03/41345/.
 3.  See the recent book by Paul Hanebrink, A Specter Haunting Europe: The 
Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).
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The Significance and  
Legacy of 1918–19191
Steven Jobbitt
When viewed in political and transnational context, the  revolutionary 
events of 1918–1919 represent a remarkable juncture in Hungarian 
history. As an almost inevitable consequence of the destruction and 
 suffering of World War I, the Hungarian People’s Republic ushered 
in by Mihály Károlyi’s so-called Aster Revolution in late October 
1918 was a direct response to the internal contradictions of Austro- 
Hungarian capitalism and imperialism, and to the moral and political 
bankruptcy of the empire’s prewar elite and wartime leadership. In turn, 
the  short-lived Republic of Councils (often associated with the name 
of its commissar for foreign affairs, Béla Kun), emerged as the second 
socialist state in the world, and replaced the pacifist Károlyi regime 
with a more revolutionary, militarized response to Hungary’s social, 
political, and geopolitical problems. Fueled by class frustrations and a 
desire for radical change, Hungary’s postwar revolutions were part of a 
broader global swell of uprisings that included the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion in Russia in 1917,  demobilization riots in England in 1918 and 1919, 
a year of  general strikes and revolutionary upheaval throughout Europe 
and North  America in 1919, the intensification of anti-imperial national-
ist sentiment in Central Europe and the Balkans, and the explosion of 
 anticolonial movements in the Global South more generally.
Despite their obvious place in both global and national his-
tory, the significance of Hungary’s back-to-back revolutions in 1918 
and 1919 was diminished at the time by the fact that they were short-
lived. As  others have rightly pointed out, the revolutions were also 
overshadowed by a series of equally remarkable events that included 
not only the Spanish flu pandemic and widespread shortages due to 
war, but also the occupation of significant swathes of Hungarian ter-
ritory by foreign armies, a growing internal refugee crisis, and, in the 
wake of the collapse of the Kun government in early August 1919, the 
White Terror, the  emergence of the Horthy regime, and the territorial 
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dismemberment wrought by the Trianon Treaty. Viewing the events of 
1918 and 1919 from his  vantage point as a gymnasium (high school) 
teacher in Karánsebes (now Caransebeș in Romania), the Hungarian 
geographer Ferenc Fodor described a world turned upside down and 
 rendered  unfamiliar,  dangerous, and unsettling. Having visited  Budapest 
in early  January 1919, Fodor would later reflect on the “total chaos” he 
witnessed in the capital, and recognized that this would result in noth-
ing less than the complete loss of Hungary’s multi-ethnic hinterland.
2
 
For Fodor, the  revolutions at the nation’s center were in many ways 
merely the backdrop against which a more serious national crisis was 
being played out, one that would lead first to the “foreign” occupation 
of Hungary’s outlying regions, and ultimately to the disastrous trunca-
tion of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1920.
As dramatic as Fodor’s account of 1918–1919 may have been, 
his reason for visiting Budapest in early 1919 sheds important light on 
another aspect of this revolutionary period, at least as far as profes-
sionals like Fodor go. Traveling to Budapest as a young geographer 
and aspiring scholar, the conservative-nationalist Fodor was visiting the 
capital to meet with more well-established geographers, and was keen to 
present them with his first major work, a geography of the Szörénység 
 region. As Róbert Győri has illustrated in some of his recent research, 
for geographers at the nation’s center, the pace of geographical knowl-
edge production, which had been more or less business as usual during 
the war, became feverish from autumn 1918, and continued in this man-
ner during the Károlyi period. Looking in particular at the  Hungarian 
Geographical Society, Győri argues that very little changed in the pro-
fessional lives of the society’s roughly 1,600 members between the end 
of October 1918 and March 1919. Encouraged by Károlyi and the loom-
ing peace negotiations, geographers (many of them conservative nation-
alists like Fodor) were in demand, and had a high profile both politically 
and amongst the general public. Jobs and research, Győri notes, were 
only really affected once the Republic of Councils was established, but 
even then the most significant changes occurred amongst the leader-
ship, and not amongst the rank and file of Hungarian geography.
3
The speed at which the Hungarian Geographical Society 
“ recovered” after the collapse of the Republic of Councils may suggest 
that the twin revolutions had little lasting impact on the Society itself, and 
on Hungarian geography more generally. The pre-revolutionary leader-
ship was rehabilitated just days after the Kun regime fell, and in  October 
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1919 the Society established a committee to investigate the activities of 
its fellows during the revolutionary period, and to condemn those who 
may have damaged the interests and honour of Hungarian  Geography. 
Of the Society’s 1,600 members, only 10 received serious reprimands, 
and most members were quickly rehabilitated, many by 1922. Given the 
need for geographers and geography teachers in the wake of Trianon, it is 
quite likely that there was no interest in punishing even the most “guilty,” 
as their talents and scientific expertise were required to wage revisionist 
battles both at home and abroad.
4
 Though the case of the Hungarian Geo-
graphical Society is hardly representative, it suggests that the revolutions 
of 1918 and 1919 may have had a relatively insignificant impact within at 
least some professional circles during the interwar period.
Of course, as with so many historical events, the political 
memory and propagandistic legacy of the revolutions of 1918 and 
1919 are perhaps more important than their relative significance at 
the time. Prime fodder for political and ideological messaging during 
the  Horthy era, the discursive utility of these revolutions, and especially 
the  Republic of Councils, has not been lost on Viktor Orbán and his rul-
ing Fidesz party as they continue to transform the historical narrative in 
“ illiberal” Hungary.
Though it is true that the centenary of the Hungarian Republic 
of Councils was not widely commemorated in Hungary in 2019, the 
Fidesz government did of course use the opportunity to replace Imre 
Nagy’s popular statue in Martyrs’ Square with a memorial to the victims 
of the Red Terror. Never one to miss a rhetorical opportunity, Orbán 
included references to 1919 and the Republic of Councils in a number 
of different speeches leading up to the centenary. Orbán has argued, for 
example, that there have only been two “true” Hungarian revolutions: 
1848 and 1956. Drawing a direct line from these key nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century national uprisings, Orbán has argued that the changes 
that Fidesz have made since coming to power with a two-thirds major-
ity in 2010—and especially the Fundamental Laws (Alaptörvénye) that 
entered into force on January 1, 2012—represent a continuation of this 
revolutionary tradition.
5
1919, by contrast, was not a Hungarian revolution, nor was it 
an expression of Hungarians as a “freedom-loving people.” Accord-
ing to Orbán, 1919 was a subversive action launched “in the service 
of  foreign interests and foreign ambitions.”
6
 Orbán has argued that, 
like the forces of globalized capital and European Union policies that 
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supposedly threaten the nation today, Kun’s Soviet-backed revolution 
was designed and promulgated by external enemies bent on weaken-
ing the state and creating chaos. Referencing 1919 and the Republic 
of Councils directly, Orbán stated in a speech given in April 2018 that 
“Our opponents have no interest in Hungary having a strong and well-
functioning  government: they want a weak state and a weak govern-
ment, which carries out the instructions that are sent here.”
7
Of course, from Orbán’s point of view, seeds planted by foreign 
conspirators only flourish in soil made rich by traitors willing to betray 
their nation and its people. Speaking on June 19, 2018 at the inaugura-
tion of the Monument to the Victims of Soviet Occupation, Orbán noted 
that Hungarians were betrayed not only by the Soviets and the West in 
1919 and again after World War II, but also by domestic actors keen on 
restructuring the nation along foreign lines. The rise of the Hungarian 
 Soviet Republic in 1919, he concluded, “teaches us that a treacherous 
and irresponsible government can lead . . . to the loss of one’s country.” 
The memorial to the victims of Soviet oppression, therefore, “ imposes 
the obligation on us to create a Hungary in which similar events can 
never happen again . . . All unreasonable ideas, confused thoughts, 
and plans serving foreign interests must be kept outside the country’s 
borders.”
8
Overlaid with images of sinister internationalist intrigue and 
memories of chaos in the capital (and echoing the scenes depicted 
in Cécile Tormay’s An Outlaw’s Diary), the combined revolutionary 
events of 1918 and 1919 have provided Orbán with a propagandistic 
weapon which, though he may not wield it often, is nevertheless used 
with  discursive precision when he does. Like Prime Minister István 
Tisza, who is celebrated for having fought to the bitter end to protect 
his country and who was “martyred” for it, Orbán positions himself as 
a builder of fences and defender of borders against those “who want 
to take our homeland from us; [and who] want us to give it to others.” 
Speaking in April 2018 at the inauguration of the Ludovika Campus of 
the National University of Public Service, Orbán announced proudly 
that Budapest is one of the world’s safest cities, but that “one bad deci-
sion, one misguided choice would be enough to render Budapest un-
recognizable.” Conjuring up images sketched out in graphic detail by 
Tormay a  hundred years earlier of a city ruled by decadent leftists and 
overrun by a “flood” of degenerate foreigners, Orbán spoke of the need 
to defend the homeland “from the threats of immigration and the chaotic 
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situation in Europe.” Making direct reference to the military legacy of 
the restored Ludovika campus and the role it had played historically as 
a bastion of state security, Orbán reminded his audience that “Ludovika 
has always taught its students to see Hungary as an independent, free, 
and Hungarian country.” It was for this reason that these very same 
students fought against “those who besieged it in 1919 and . . . those 
who closed it down after World War II.” Restoring the building and 
 renewing the campus, he concluded, not only revives the city, but also 
revives “the old spirit” of resistance that will  protect the  nation from 
the same sort of internationalist forces that tore it apart in 1918–1919.
9
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Images of 1919: A Short Photo Essay
Leslie Waters
The 1919 May Day celebration was the Republic of Council’s largest 
public holiday. Kigyó tér (present-day Ferenciek tere), was decorated 
with an elaborate gate celebrating proletarian revolutions in Hungary, 
Germany, and Russia (fig. 1). The gate conveniently covered statues of 
Péter Pázmány and István Werböczy, two of the leading personalities of 
the Catholic Reformation in Hungary. On the opposite side of the square 
stood busts of Vladimir Lenin and Karl Liebknecht (see fig. 2). The 
two photos demonstrate the ways in which the Republic of Councils 
prioritized the creation of a pantheon of revolutionary heroes to replace 
conservative symbols.
FIG. 1. Image courtesy of Fortepan/Frigyes Schoch
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As the artists who supported the Republic of Councils at-
tempted to forge connections between their avant-garde style and revo-
lutionary politics, posters emerged as a particularly effective medium. 
Artists such as Mihály Biró, Róbert Berény, and Ödön Dankó, whose 
work can be seen in figure 3, created images that became a lasting part 
of the Republic’s legacy.
Film star Béla Lugosi (fig. 4) supported the Republic of Coun-
cils in 1919 and remained committed to workplace organizing and trade 
unionism throughout his career. He became famous internationally for 
his cinematic portrayal of Count Dracula. 
The Republic of Councils’ efforts to influence Hungarian ar-
tistic culture and alter public spaces illustrate that a revolutionary 
transformation of Hungarian aesthetics was an important part of the re-
gime’s agenda. With the collapse of the Republic of Councils, public 
art in Hungary reversed course and embraced more traditional forms of 
representation.
FIG. 2. Image courtesy of Fortepan/Frigyes Schoch
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FIG. 3 Image courtesy of Fortepan/László Péchy
FIG. 4. Courtesy of Foretpan/Noémi Saly
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After One Hundred Years:  
The “Trianon 100” Research Group 
of the Momentum Program of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Balázs Ablonczy
The Momentum [Lendület] funding scheme was initiated in 2009 by 
József Pálinkás, the President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
(HAS) at that time. The program aimed at attracting young Hungarian 
researchers who had left the country with well-endowed research fund-
ing to repatriate while enjoying competitive and solid financial support. 
To quote one of the entries on the webpage of the HAS, the project 
was conceived for the purpose of “decreasing the migration of young 
and successful researchers, securing the cultivation of talent, enhancing 
career advancement opportunities for young researchers and increasing 
the competitiveness of the network of research institutes under the aus-
pices of the HAS as well as that of universities.” The call, which was 
initially tailored to the needs of the natural sciences, went under sig-
nificant changes, enabling the participation of humanities scholars like 
Géza Pálffy (HAS Research Centre for the Humanities), Attila Bárány 
(University of Debrecen, Faculty of Humanities), and Boglárka Weisz 
(HAS Research Centre for the Humanities). At the same time, the ap-
plication for and eventual awarding of funding for the project Trianon 
100—which was, together with ten other projects, selected from a pool 
of about one hundred applicants—confers a tremendous responsibility. 
Trianon 100 was the first endowed historical project that focuses on the 
twentieth century and, as such, can be a trailblazer for other projects 
with a similar scope. The research group comprises twenty-one mem-
bers who are contracted for a variety of tasks, but only one full-time and 
one part-time position have been created so far.  Beyond these core mem-
bers, we are closely collaborating with twenty to twenty-five research-
ers; about thirty to forty other colleagues have participated in our events 
as presenters or carried out research projects for us, including scholars 
based in Hungary, Hungarian scholars from neighboring countries, and 
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international researchers, bringing the total number of collaborators to 
approximately seventy or eighty people as of now. Most of them are, 
naturally, historians, but our cooperation transcends disciplinary bound-
aries and encompasses collaboration with art historians, sociologists, 
archivists, literary historians, and geographers.
Prehistory: Research on Trianon since 1920
The perception of the Trianon Peace Treaty has always been conditioned 
by public life and memory politics that have never ceased to influence 
its historiographical depictions. Although the manner in which the treaty 
would be addressed was predetermined by the immediate sense of loss, 
the first professional attempts at a scholarly assessment were made soon 
after the treaty, in the forms of publications and editions of primary 
sources and subsequent commentaries. Such undertakings included a 
two-volume selection of primary sources (the third volume remained 
unpublished) edited by Francis Deák and Dezső Újváry,
1
 and the pub-
lication of those materials which recorded the activities of the Hungar-
ian peace delegation,
2
 as well as several books authored by statistician 
László Buday,
3
 which set the foundations for further research. Jenő Hor-
váth, a diplomatic historian,
4
 and the historian-journalist and diplomat 
 Gusztáv Gratz
5
 are exemplary in this sense, albeit deeply influenced by 
the  zeitgeist and their own biases. When considering 1945 as a caesura 
in relation to the discussions of the Trianon Peace Treaty, one should not 
necessarily attribute much significance to the alleged sensitivity of the 
question, either for the occupying powers or for the Communist Party 
that was already preparing for the Gleichschaltung of society—even if 
such sensitivity was not completely absent. One should rather focus on 
how the preparations for the second Trianon in-the-making, the Paris 
Peace Treaty, paralyzed the will of the elites and drained their energy.
After an approximately fifteen-year hiatus, the scholarly assess-
ment of the Trianon Peace Treaty finally resumed. Zsuzsa L. Nagy’s 1965 
monograph A párizsi békekonferencia és Magyarország 1918–1919  
(The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary, 1918–19)
6
 analyzed the 
debates about the “Hungarian question” within the limits of her time. 
 Although some historical works had been progressively addressing the 
new order that followed the Great War, especially in relation to the  Little 
Entente, France, or “Eastern security,” the first monograph that put the 
treaty into focus was Mária Ormos’s Padovától Trianonig (From Padua 
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to Trianon) in 1983.
7
 Relying on French diplomatic sources,  Ormos’s 
work opened up new avenues towards further research. Géza Jeszenszky 
dealt with the changes in the attitudes of the British public and opinion 
leaders in his dissertation, published in 1986 as Az elveszett presztízs 
(Lost prestige).
8
 Lajos Arday analyzed the priorities of British politics 
concerning Hungary during the peace conference in his 1990  Térkép 
csata után (Map after battle),
9
 while Ernő Raffay put the inner dimen-
sions of the collapse in the center in his 1987 Erdély 1918–1919-ben 
(Transylvania in 1918–19).
10
Large-scale primary source editions were initiated in this  period 
as well, aiming at contextualizing the Peace Treaty of Trianon in a 
broader framework of diplomatic history. Most importantly, the series 
under the leadership of Magda Ádám as editor-in-chief (Documents di-
plomatiques français sur l’histoire du bassin des Carpates 1918-1932) 
developed into a two-decades long undertaking; its volumes were also 
published in Hungarian and provide much-needed, though not fully 
 utilized, information about the period.
 11
 Miklós Lojkó’s works were 
similarly important in relation to the British context.
12
The transition of 1989 considerably broadened historical schol-
arship’s space for maneuvering; however, paradoxically, it was soon 
pushed back into a narrowly conceived professional discursive space. 
Freedom of expression, later coupled with the information-technologi-
cal revolution(s), resulted in historians’ loss of monopoly on discussions 
about Trianon. Expert views were increasingly outweighed by works 
and acts of public history and memory politics. Some representatives of 
these currents are the journal Trianoni Szemle (Trianon Review), as well 
as the adjacent Trianon Kutató Intézet (Trianon Research Institute); the 
journal Nagymagyarország (Greater Hungary); the Trianon Museum in 
Várpalota; and myriad blogs and publicly available video series. The 
state-endorsed Nemzeti Összetartozás Napja (Day of National Unity) 
was introduced in 2010 as part of this process of restructuring mem-
ory politics.
Several pieces of work stand out among the historical knowl-
edge production of the past three decades, however. Some of the most 
influential books include Ignác Romsics’s 2001 monograph about the 
Trianon Peace Treaty
13
 and Miklós Zeidler’s book appearing the same 
year about the idea of Hungarian revisionism.
14
 Zeidler also edited the 
primary source collection Trianon, published in the series Nemzet és 
emlékezet (Nation and memory),
15
 while György Litván edited sources 
06_Ablonczy.indd   77 07/10/20   5:20 PM
78 Hungarian Studies Review
about the negotiations of the four Great Powers.
16
 The 2010 work of 
the present author Trianon-legendák (Trianon legends) also bears 
mentioning.
17
 Others focused on specific aspects of the context of the 
peace treaty, thus helping to broaden the horizons of research. Géza 
Boros elaborated on the monuments commemorating Trianon;
18
 Éva 
Kovács investigated the discourses of memory;
19
 Lajos Pallos gave im-
portant insights on propaganda concerning the defense of territory;
20
 
and Gergely Romsics published about the Trianon discourses of post-
1989 Hungarian politics,
21
 just to name a few from among the rich and 
 insightful contributions.
22
When surveying international literature, it becomes imme-
diately apparent that the Hungarian peace treaty rarely features as a 
singular event. Setting aside that literature that falls beyond academic 
historiography, the Trianon Peace Treaty is usually depicted as part 
of a larger process. It has been discussed as one of those proceedings 
of the peace conference that concerned Central and Eastern Europe, 
the transformation of these regions, or as part of the grand narrative 
about the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the birth of 
the successor states.
23
 The characteristic attitude of “extra Hungariam 
non est vita” (there is no life outside Hungary) had little resonance in 
this sphere. This was reflected in the early foreign publications on the 
topic, for example the books of C. A. Macartney (Hungary and Her 
Successors, 1937)
24
 and Francis Deák (Hungary at the Paris Peace 
Conference, 1942),
25
 just to name a few. This trend largely continued 
from the 1960s to the 1970s and onwards, when the number of pub-
lications rose exponentially, as demonstrated by the works of John C. 
Swanson
26
 and Mark Cornwall.
27
 They could utilize important books, 
such as the compilation of Bela Kiraly, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders.
28
 
(Paul Gradvohl and Anikó Kovács-Bertrand also relied on these works). 
With regard to the historiographies of the successor states, two trends 
dominated. On the one hand, Trianon was often missing from the nar-
ratives of neighboring countries’ historiographies, as the fulfillment of 
national progress and the establishment of independent nation-states in 
1918 rendered a detailed analysis of the peace treaties unnecessary. On 
the other hand, when  Trianon was present, it was embedded in a narra-
tive that adopted the patterns of traditional nation-centered history (one 
of the best examples is Marián Hronský’s 2011 Trianon: Vznik hraníc 
Slovenska a problémy jeho bezpečnosti).
29
 However, a new generation 
of historians (such as Roman Holec, Miroslav Michela, László Vörös, 
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Lucian Leustean, and others) that has emerged in both Bratislava and 
Bucharest is interested in novel approaches, and thus is prone to frame 
their respective research within regional and transnational terms.
The plan
Upon winning the grant in 2016, the HAS-Momentum Trianon 100 
Research Group presented a five-year research plan. The proposal was 
built on four main pillars, taking into consideration the historiographi-
cal traditions detailed above:
1. International context: documents and interpretations
2. Hungarian society and the postwar collapse
3. The solidification of the peace system
4. The memory of Trianon in Hungarian society
A brief explanation of the pillars now follows. Perhaps the first 
point is going to be the least attractive for a broader public, as it en-
compasses not-so-spectacular sources of diplomatic history. The main 
contribution pertains to the inclusion of the perspectives of the as yet 
(in Hungary) scarcely discussed victorious great powers (Italy, Japan 
and the USA), and unexplored aspects of the involvement of neighbor-
ing countries (Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes) in the preparation of the peace treaty and in the 
peace conference itself. We plan to publish the resulting source col-
lections in the most traditional form. We are also exploring opportu-
nities for online release; however, this option seems to be less viable 
than the paper-based one. Within the same pillar, more primary sources 
will appear that have never been published, despite being closely con-
nected to the activities of the Hungarian peace delegation (memoirs, 
the  journal of the peace delegation, etc.). We will provide an analysis 
of the geographical-historical argumentation of the peace delegation 
as well. Many prestigious scholars in the field are participating in this 
part of the project: Miklós Zeidler (Eötvös Loránd University [ELTE], 
Faculty of Humanities), Tibor Glant (University of Debrecen, Faculty 
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of Humanities), Balázs Juhász (ELTE, Faculty of Humanities), Péter 
Wintermantel (independent researcher), Árpád Hornyák  (University 
of Pécs, Faculty of Humanities), Attila Simon (Fórum Intézet [Forum 
 Institute]), Béni L. Balogh (Hungarian National Archives [HNA]), and 
Róbert Győri (ELTE, Faculty of Social Sciences). As of 2019, the re-
source exploration and collection of archival sources was complete in 
all cases, and some of the envisioned works have already been pub-
lished, while others are in press.
The second pillar consists of social historical inquiries. Our re-
search focuses here on the performance of the Hungarian state during 
the years of 1918–21. We concentrate on several issues, including the 
country’s economic nosedive, the social crisis, the question of the army, 
paramilitary violence, the role of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and 
the wave of refugees. We hope to be able to go beyond the assertions 
of Istvan Mócsy published in 1983,
30
 especially in relation to the inte-
gration and composition of refugees. We will seize the opportunity to 
finally approach these issues based on relevant archival sources. Our 
intervention will clarify issues of the army and war violence (possibili-
ties for and alternatives to resistance, the army as a social entity, etc.). 
We will engage with such defining economic players, policies, and gen-
eral circumstances, amidst the turmoil of economic collapse, as the fuel 
needs of cities, food requisition and distribution by the authorities, and 
governmental regulation of prices and trade. At the policy level, we pay 
special attention to housing policies, in relation to the issue of refugees 
and broader concerns of social politics. The stabilization of the counter-
revolutionary regime was enabled in part by its competence in finding 
more fitting (at least from its point of view) solutions to these pressing 
questions, as compared to the Soviet Republic or the Károlyi regime, 
thereby succeeding in securing significant societal support. Zsombor 
Bódy (Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Humanities) leads 
the research pertaining to social issues. Tamás Révész (HAS  Research 
Centre for the Humanities) and Szabolcs Nagy (HNA Archives of 
 Veszprém County) deal with questions of the army and war violence. 
The issue of refugees is investigated by István Gergely Szűts (HNA 
Archives of Veszprém County) and by the author of this summary. We 
both benefit from the immense statistical help of Gábor Koloh (The 
Museum and Library of Hungarian Agriculture).
The third pillar serves the purposes of establishing a Central 
European context. The Hungarian peace treaty is not a self-contained 
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entity; in that sense, it is impossible to comprehend its repercussions 
without sufficient knowledge about the history of the region as a whole. 
Here we should emphasize three major points of interest. The transi-
tional states that were established in Central Europe are important more 
than just anecdotally or for filling chronological holes. Between 1918 
and 1924, numerous entities emerged that existed for only a few days, 
weeks, or months (for example, Gabriele d’Annunzio’s Fiume, the 
Banat of Leitha, and the Republic of Central Lithuania). In the territory 
of Greater Hungary, one may mention the Szekler, Banat, Eastern Slo-
vak, Spiš, Kalotaszeg, and Prekmurje republics. We investigate these 
attempts in a comparative manner, trying to establish commonalities 
and reasons for (non-)success. We are also looking into the potential in-
fluence of Wilsonian ideas and early fascism. This branch of research is 
carried out in collaboration with the newly established Central  European 
Research Institute of the National University of Public Service. We are 
interested in exploring the local and regional dimensions of imperial 
transitions through local case studies (i.e., utilizing the materials of 
smaller archives) in order to uncover the effects of imperial transitions 
on local societies. The major research questions pertain to the ways in 
which state administrations were affected by the transitions, as well as 
how public space or the school system were affected. Furthermore, we 
analyze patterns and strategies of the representatives of new state power, 
contrasting them to those of minority elites (and other groups), as well 
as the delimitation of the discursive space within which all these play-
ers navigated. The research is carried out in tandem with the European 
Research Council Consolidator Grant-funded project  NEPOSTRANS, 
under the leadership of Gábor Egry. The works about the transitions 
in Kassa/Košice, Bártfa/Bardejov, and Szatmárnémeti/Satu Mare 
have been concluded and the results are partially published, while the 
 research concerning some northern Hungarian towns— Szepes/Spiš, 
Zombor/Sombor, Gyulafehérvár/Alba Iulia, and Arad—is in  progress. 
This pillar’s participants include Attila Simon, Veronika Szeghy-Gayer 
(State Science Library of Košice), and Tamás Sárándi (Museum of 
Mureş County). We will touch upon the border issues of Hungary and 
the newly established states: how space was used (smuggling, border 
crossing, in situ demarcation of the  border), and the  destruction of eco-
nomic and social ties (or their regeneration). Among the most important 
contributors are Róbert Győri, István Gaucsík (Slovak Academy of Sci-
ences, Institute of History), and Péter Bencsik (University of Szeged, 
Faculty of Humanities).
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The fourth pillar deals with the place of Trianon in  Hungarian 
collective memory. This pillar goes furthest in terms of multi- 
disciplinarity. Literary historians and sociologists are deeply involved 
in this subproject, along with historians. This pillar is made unique by 
its time span as well as its chronological arch, ending with contem-
porary issues. Our goal is to investigate the locus of Trianon and re-
visionism in the evolution of Hungarian and foreign political thought, 
historiography, belles-lettres, and the politics of memory. Furthermore, 
we survey the historiographies of neighboring countries as well, how 
their research progressed in relation to Trianon, what other traumas they 
have had to come into terms with, how these traumas are (in)comparable 
to Trianon, and whether these attempts were successful or not. We will 
deal extensively with representations of Trianon in public spaces, and a 
survey of monuments is currently in the making. These areas of interest 
will be reflected in a large sample poll and two qualitative, focus-group-
based analyses aimed at learning about the image of Trianon in Hun-
garian society in general and its meanings for history teachers. Among 
others, art historian Flóra Mészáros (Gáspár Károli University of the 
Reformed Church, Faculty of Humanities), historian Réka Krizman-
ics (Central European University), and literary historian Júlia Vallasek 
(Babes-Bolyai University) are participating in the realization of the 
fourth pillar. Csaba Zahorán (HAS Research Centre for the Humanities) 
compares Hungarian and Romanian memory politics. Gergely Romsics 
(HAS Research Centre for the Humanities and ELTE, Faculty of Social 
Sciences) is expected to deliver a synthesis of Hungarian foreign politi-
cal thought in relation to Trianon. Balázs Bazsalya (ELTE, Faculty of 
Social Sciences) coordinates the sociological research projects that we 
have launched in coordination with the Research Institute for National 
Strategy, and the first products of this research are already completed. 
We have finished a large-sample survey of Hungarian history teachers 
that is going to be published in the spring of 2020.
Achievements
We believe that scientific performance needs to be measured not only 
by its own standards. Historical scholarship, fortunately, continues to 
speak to many people, and society reflects on its discoveries, debates, 
and recent results. This is particularly true for such important top-
ics as the Trianon Peace Treaty. Therefore, we consider it our task to 
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popularize our work in various ways. We run the website trianon100.hu, 
as well as a Facebook page that has more than four thousand followers—a 
number that is growing dynamically and is uncommonly large for a 
Hungarian research group. Our articles and interviews with members 
of the research group are published in the national press, both in print 
and electronic version. The research group collaborated with the popu-
lar history journal Rubicon on the publication of its special issue on 
Trianon in 2017, contributing over sixty pages.
31
 Our writings feature 
regularly in the journal Múlt–kor and on different online platforms.
The research group has published seven volumes at the time 
of writing, some of which have already been printed in multiple edi-
tions.
32
 By the end of 2019, the first monograph of the project came out 
as well, that of Tamás Révész about the military policies of the Hun-
garian state in 1918–19.
33
 Other works are currently at different stages 
of the editorial process and are expected to come out in 2020. These 
volumes include a contribution about Romanian, Serb, and US prepara-
tions for the peace treaty with Hungary and a collective volume based 
on the papers that were presented at our November 2018 conference on 
refugee  issues. Moreover, another collective volume is going to be pub-
lished soon with a prestigious British publisher, investigating the links 
between the  Trianon peace treaty and geography.
In the course of such a long-term research project, it is to be 
expected that new initiatives will arise along the way that will be worth 
including. In our case, these new inspirations may comprise mono-
graphs, exhibition scenarios, the development of new city walking 
tours, or a movie idea. Based on these initiatives, three other books 
have already been published in cooperation with our research group,
34
 
as well as another volume of popular history, aiming to summarize the 
research work accomplished, focusing on social and cultural history 
and microhistory.
35
 Furthermore, the members of our research group 
have published about thirty articles and book chapters in Hungarian 
and international outlets, including Történelmi Szemle, Századok, and 
international journals,
36
 while they have also presented at more than 
forty conferences in Hungary and abroad. They have published about 
forty popular history contributions, and given presentations directed 
at general audiences across Hungary and beyond (seventy to eighty 
events altogether); the total audience at these events amounted to sev-
eral thousand. From among the conferences that Trianon 100 itself has 
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organized, the one entitled Hullóidő (Falling time), concerning Szekler 
identity, stands out. This conference was co-organized with the HAS 
Centre of Social Sciences, Institute for Minority Studies, and took place 
in Budapest, on May 25, 2018. We consider our international confer-
ence Úton (On the road), focusing on issues of refugees, mobility and 
migration, similarly important. The event took place in Budapest on 
November 9–10, 2018, with Peter Gatrell (University of Manchester), 
a well-known authority on refugee history, giving the keynote speech. 
We are proud of the workshop that we organized together with Roma-
nian, Slovak, and Serb historians in September 2018, as well as an in-
ternal workshop in  Vienna in collaboration with the Ludwig Boltzmann 
Institute in December 2018. Meanwhile, the research group builds and 
shares databases on our website. We published a map-based database 
of Trianon memorials across the Carpathian Basin (http://trianon100.
hu/emlekmuvek) that will ultimately contain the descriptions and ex-
act locations of about 350 monuments in the region. We also granted 
public access to our database of Trianon refugees (http://trianon100.
hu/menekultek) in May 2019; it was visited by close to fifty thousand 
users in the first three days after launching. The database contains over 
fifteen thousand names, and its apparent success illustrates how this 
initiative is one of the many ways through which historical scholarship 
can enable the understanding of the past.
Should all our plans come to fruition, our research group’s final 
output will consist of twelve to fourteen volumes, dozens of professional 
and popular articles, presentations, and conferences by 2021. These 
results should enable us to present Hungarian society with fresh and 
valid knowledge that establishes a framework for thinking and learn-
ing about Trianon for decades to come. On the other hand, we strive 
for an “about-face” that is long overdue in our historical scholarship. 
While research into political and diplomatic history remains important, 
we wish to give a larger role to social and cultural history as well as to 
the history of mentalities. We also provide a broader, regional compara-
tive perspective, in order to have a more complex understanding of what 
happened to Hungary between 1918–24.
Translated from the Hungarian by Réka Krimanics
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FOR DISCUSSION: THE GERMAN INVASION 
OF HUNGARY IN 1944
The Allies, Secret Peace Talks, and the 
German Invasion of Hungary, 1943–1944
László Borhi
On March 19, 1944, Wehrmacht and SS divisions brought an end to the 
relative peace that had prevailed in Hungary while much of the conti-
nent experienced devastating warfare. A report prepared by American 
intelligence in October 1944, shortly after Regent Miklós Horthy was 
forced to resign, asserted that, “At the time of the German occupation 
of Hungary . . . [Hungary had] the largest [number of] and best-treated 
Jews in Axis Europe . . . The Hungarian Government did not always fol-
low suggestions from Berlin and maintained a higher degree of political 
independence than other Nazi satellites. The Horthy regime hesitated 
following the Nazi policy to its ultimate goal of deportation, starvation 
and extermination.” Prior to the German occupation, “persecuted Jews 
of neighboring Axis lands looked upon Hungary as a place of refuge.”
1
 
The Mapai secretariat in Jerusalem made the following note: “ German 
invasion: The process began of turning Hungary from a ‘paradise for 
Jews’ into a land in which the Final Solution was put into action.” 
 David Ben Gurion was concerned that the “invasion [was] a sign of 
new calamity.”
2
 “Paradise” was relative, of course. Hungary was only a 
“paradise” in comparison with other parts of German-occupied Europe, 
where the Jews were murdered on the spot en masse or were deported 
to German-run death camps. Nevertheless, young Jewish  Zionist leader 
Rafi Benshalom, who arrived in Budapest from Slovakia in January 1944, 
was shocked: “For me, in Europe of 1944, this seemed like a fantasy . . . 
Jews seeking entertainment could still visit coffee houses,  cinemas and 
theaters. While in Poland, hundreds of thousands of  Europe’s Jews were 
being annihilated and the whole world lived in fear.”
3
All this changed after the moderate Kállay cabinet resigned in 
the wake of occupation, and Horthy appointed a new pro-German ad-
ministration under Döme Sztójay. Gestapo units arrived with lists of 
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opposition and anti-German elements, who were arrested in droves. 
Many of them were sent to concentration camps, including the prime 
minister. Unintentionally, the Germans helped pave the way for the 
Communist takeover in Hungary by deporting political figures who 
could have resisted the Communists. With the active assistance of the 
new Hungarian administration and the Hungarian gendarmerie, Hitler’s 
men, including Adolf Eichmann and his cohort, deported the majority 
of the last intact Jewish community in Europe to Auschwitz where most 
of them were gassed.
When I began researching the Holocaust in Hungary many 
years ago as an undergraduate, I was interested in the imprint of the 
secret talks in the Hungarian, international, and mainly British press. 
I was shocked to find that The Times (UK) published verbatim quotes of 
top-secret Hungarian communications addressed to the British Foreign 
Office. The secret talks were hardly secret. Later I was interested in 
finding out why these talks occurred, as, at the time, I thought the argu-
ment that the Hungarians had not acted in good faith was unconvinc-
ing, on the basis of documentary sources beginning to come to light. 
Yet I had no inkling that seemingly disparate events—the secret peace 
initiatives, the Allied strategy to defeat Hitler, the German invasion of 
Hungary, and, indirectly, the Hungarian Holocaust—would all intersect.
The German invasion of Hungary did not have to happen, or at 
least not as early as it did, on March 19, 1944. Despite some reluctance 
to satisfy all the Führer’s military and economic needs in the early phase 
of the war, Horthy’s Hungary was a reliable ally. The question remains: 
why was Hungary invaded mere months before the Red Army reached 
the Hungarian borders and penetrated the Carpathians? Hitler’s order 
to implement Operation Margarethe offered two main reasons for the 
move: Hungary’s impending “treason,” and the fact that Hitler would 
not tolerate having “a million” Jews withheld from Germany’s grasp. 
The meaning of his remarks on the Jews was clear. Hitler had already 
chastised Horthy for not having dealt with the Jewish Question radically 
enough when Horthy visited the German leader in Schloss Klessheim 
in 1943. When Horthy was summoned for another visit with Hitler on 
March 16, 1944, he and his entourage were berated for their ongoing 
negotiations with the “Anglo-Saxons.” Hitler declared that he did not 
want a repetition of the Badoglio affair (Italy’s 1943 surrender to the Al-
lies), and he insisted that Germany would not tolerate one million Jews 
in the rear of its armies.
4
 What did Hitler mean by “impending treason,” 
a motive that seems to have been extremely important for  understanding 
his decision to invade?
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In order to understand this, we must go back to an all but for-
gotten, but all the more fateful, episode of the Second World War: 
 Hungary’s (and the other minor Axis states’) efforts to break with Hitler, 
which began in the summer of 1942.
5
 By then it was becoming appar-
ent in the capitals of the Axis satellite states that the Germans might 
lose the war. Hungary was the first state to explore the possibility of a 
separate  arrangement with the Western Allies, and Romania, Finland, 
and Bulgaria rapidly followed suit. As early as March 1942, Horthy 
dismissed László Bárdossy, the prime minister who had dragged the 
country into war with the Soviet Union. The Regent replaced him with 
Miklós  Kállay, a little-known figure in Hungarian politics, and charged 
him with the recovery of the country’s sovereignty. This, of course, was 
more easily said than done: first, because of the sizable pro-German 
political forces in the country; second, because of the difficulty of mak-
ing contact with Allied officials in neutral capitals; third, because of the 
fear that if the leadership in Berlin discovered the secret dealings, the 
country could be occupied by the German army; and, finally, because 
the Allies themselves were not sold on the importance of the peace ini-
tiatives emanating from Axis Europe.
Even though Franklin Roosevelt’s confidant Adolph Berle 
saw these initiatives as a chance to break the Germans’ southeastern 
flank and thereby advance the prospect of victory, he found few fol-
lowers in Allied capitals.
6
 Stalin expressed disinterest in the Finnish 
proposal to conclude a separate peace in January 1943, and Roosevelt 
and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill accepted the formula of 
unconditional surrender, which, as they were aware, was inimical to the 
surrender of Hitler’s allies.
7
 The chief motivation behind unconditional 
surrender may have been to reassure Stalin that there would be no deal 
at the Soviet Union’s expense. In addition, Axis efforts may have been 
seen as a German ploy to split the Allies.
Nevertheless, a steady flow of individuals, diplomats, and vari-
ous other officials and private personalities travelled to neutral capi-
tals to find contacts among mainly, although not exclusively, Western 
representatives. The first Hungarian to be taken seriously was Albert 
Szent-Györgyi, the winner of the 1937 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, who, 
like a sizeable segment of the Hungarian middle class, had a pro-British 
outlook. His putatively secret mission did not go unnoticed in Berlin. 
In fact, the Germans, including Hitler himself, received accurate up-
dates on the secret talks concerning a separate peace a separate peace, 
including the ones American and Hungarian representatives conducted 
in Turkey in late 1943 and early 1944.
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In fact, the Hungarian peace attempts were initially driven by a 
desire to avoid a second Trianon, that is, having to return to the pre-1938 
borders.
8
 At the same time, even well-informed diplomats harbored illu-
sions regarding British and American policies, and were convinced, at 
least through much of 1943, that Anglo-American troops would occupy 
the Danubian basin. These were not entirely unfounded: it seemed logi-
cal that after their victory in North Africa, the Allied landing would take 
place in Italy or the Balkans, which would then lead them to Budapest 
and Vienna. It was also hoped, with no basis whatsoever, that the West 
would view Hungary as a bastion against Bolshevism and perhaps even 
a potential participant in a post-war anti-Soviet crusade. National myth 
played a role here: Hungarians (like Slovaks and Poles) recalled their 
role as defenders of Christianity against the Ottoman Turks, and now, it 
seemed, a similar role against godless Bolsheviks awaited them.
Evidence suggests that by March 1943, the British discovered 
that the Hungarian initiative could be exploited to aid the Allied war 
effort. In a memorandum to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 
which was actively involved in the implementation of US policy in Axis 
 Europe, the Special Operations Executive explained that “His Majesty’s 
Government” no longer feared Hungary’s occupation by the Germans, 
which would be a “positive” outcome because it would increase the 
burden on the German army. The advantage could be even greater if the 
turmoil could be timed to coincide with an Allied landing in Europe.
9
 
Eventually, this position would guide Allied policies regarding the Axis 
satellites. Allen Dulles, the OSS representative in Switzerland at the 
forefront of talks to extract the satellites from the war when the time 
was ripe, was well aware of the Kállay administration’s dilemma: if it 
acted too early, before the Allies were in a position to help, the Germans 
would invade; but if it acted too late, it would face another devastat-
ing peace agreement. The State Department urged caution: a precipitate 
turn of events in Hungary could lead to “the destruction of those ele-
ments,” which might be of more use to the “United Nations” when there 
was hope that a political volte-face could be successfully executed.
10
 
Negotiations were conducted in this spirit. An experienced Hungarian 
diplomat, György Barcza, held secret talks with a British intelligence 
representative in Geneva, Frederick Vanden Heuvel. Vanden Heuvel 
told him that his government did not expect the Hungarian government 
to do anything that would lead to German occupation, and in light of 
the serious consequences, he could not imagine Hungary breaking with 
the Axis.
11
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Due to these talks, Hungary’s image in London changed for 
the better. The Foreign Office, recognizing that Germany would lose 
the war, noted that the Hungarians had reduced their contributions to the 
Axis war effort to a “suicidal” level.
12
 Hans Bernard Gisevius, an OSS 
agent working in the German Foreign Office, reported that Hitler was 
mad at the Hungarians for trying to deceive him, and hoped to get rid of 
the prime minister and the “traitors.” In September, László Veress con-
cluded a preliminary armistice agreement on behalf of the Hungarian 
Foreign Ministry with the British consul-general in Istanbul Knatchbull-
Hugessen, which, as the British agreed, would not be published until 
the British invaded Hungary (in which case the Hungarians agreed to 
surrender). An Anglo-American invasion of the Danubian  basin would 
never materialize, and the British were aware that they could provide no 
assistance to the Hungarians.
13
 During the Quebec meeting of President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, it was agreed that the second 
front would be opened in Normandy, and there would be no operations 
in the Balkans, nor would the offensive on the Italian peninsula reach 
Central Europe. As plans to defeat Germany crystallized, the message to 
would-be Hungarian peace makers began to change.  Allen Dulles told 
Barcza that Hungary had to follow the Italian example and shoulder the 
consequences. If the Hungarians failed to recognize the consequences 
of the situation created as a result of Italy’s capitulation, it would mean 
they had renewed their alliance with Germany and would therefore 
be subject to the same treatment as the Germans. Thus,  Hungary had 
to make the necessary moves to distance itself, “even at the risk of a 
 German invasion.”
14
In the same spirit, the deputy chief of the British staff was inter-
ested in the intensification of the crisis created by the Italian  defection. 
A memorandum to Chief of Staff Alan Brooke stated that a Hungar-
ian capitulation would cause great political and military  turmoil in 
 Germany, and if Romania followed suit, Germany would face a  critical 
situation that could be resolved only by the occupation of  Hungary. 
If the  Germans took the risk of moving troops from other theaters to 
 Hungary, Germany’s weakening in other theaters would be to “our ad-
vantage.” The sooner the Hungarians acted, the better.
15
 Apparently the 
plan was put into effect. In September, the Political Warfare Executive 
reported that, at present, the Secret Intelligence Service assets in Bern 
were working to extract Hungary from the war. The aim was “to dis-
credit the Hungarian government in the eyes of the Germans,” which 
would lead to Hungary’s occupation by the Germans.
16
 Lewis Namier 
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expressed the Jewish Agency’s grave concerns to the Foreign Office 
regarding this policy. A break with the Germans, he argued, would jeop-
ardize the lives of 800,000 Jews who lived in relative safety in Hungary. 
 Germany would not tolerate Hungary’s defection, and would respond to 
such a move with invasion and the extermination of the last surviving 
Jewish community in Europe. The only hope for Hungary’s Jews, he 
opined, was that the Hungarians did nothing until it was probable that 
the  Germans would not be able to react.
Hungary, while still actively contributing to the German war 
 effort—particularly in Ukraine, where the Hungarian army was tasked 
with carrying out the duties associated with military occupation—stepped 
up its efforts to find a way out of the war while getting something in re-
turn, although the prize was getting increasingly smaller. Hungary’s am-
bassador in Stockholm, Antal Ullein-Reviczky, told R. Taylor Cole, the 
OSS representative in Sweden, that his government was well aware that 
Hungary had to do whatever the Allies demanded. This would greatly 
accelerate events leading to surrender without the term unconditional 
surrender ever being mentioned in Budapest.
17
 Internal correspondence 
reveals that the terms had yet to be decided, but the Hungarians were 
left in the dark about this fact. On December 18, the regent’s son Miklós 
Horthy Jr.’s message was delivered to Allen Dulles: to wit, if the Allies 
expected Hungary to capitulate, he would ensure that it happened.
18
Facing military complications in Italy, Churchill wrote to 
 Roosevelt calling attention to the potential “landslide” (i.e.,  defection) of 
Hungary and Romania and the need to take advantage of it.
19
 Sometime 
in the next few weeks, the decision was made to “detach the  satellites.” 
According to a memorandum signed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) Admiral William Leahy, the strategic objectives of the 
 Allies would be promoted by the defection of Hungary and Romania 
from the war, even if such a move resulted in the German occupation 
of these countries.
20
 Strategic decisions during the war were made by 
the president, but in all other matters, the JCS’s directives determined 
 policy; in other words, both the OSS and the State Department were 
subordinated to military policy. Only a day after the Leahy memoran-
dum was signed, William Donovan informed Dulles of the now-official 
policy. Regarding the ambivalent directions to the Hungarians, he wrote, 
“for your personal information” the JCS have approved the immediate 
detachment of Hungary and the other Axis satellites. “Adolf and his 
boys” were informed, and the JCS directives were to guide Dulles’s 
steps. The purpose of this policy was revealed in a memorandum found 
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in the W. Averell Harriman papers, according to which an invasion of 
the satellite states would spread the Germans thin in the western theater 
of war at the time the second front was opened.
21
 A newspaper clipping 
from the Soviet Army’s journal, Krasnaia Zvezda, reveals that Moscow 
was aware of this policy. Krasnaia Zvezda argued that German victories 
over its unfortunate ally only made the German position more difficult, 
as the diversion of troops to the satellites made their already weak posi-
tion in the west even weaker. This would make it easier to strike a blow 
at the Germans from the west.
22
In the meantime, secret talks between a representative of the 
Hungarian government and the OSS were taking place in Ankara. These 
centered on two main issues: the terms of Hungary’s capitulation; and 
a “high-powered” American military mission to be sent to Hungary, 
headed by a robust, intelligent “American specimen,” as Dulles put it.
23
According to an OSS report, by early 1943, Hungary had re-
nounced all “political and territorial” demands and was willing to fur-
nish the Allies with intelligence related to German troop movements.
24
 
In return, the Hungarians wanted to be treated as a “liberated” country 
and receive recognition for the Hungarian contribution to Allied victory. 
The Hungarians understood that they were going to conclude an armi-
stice agreement, and this was related to the American military mission 
discussed in the Ankara negotiations. An OSS memorandum stated that 
the purpose of the talks was to give Hungary an “eleventh-hour” oppor-
tunity to distance itself from the Axis by voluntarily cooperating with 
the Allies—without, however, jeopardizing relations with the Germans. 
All forms of cooperation excluding military assistance, of course, were 
to be discussed.
25
 In the meantime, the Americans learned that Germany 
was aware of the secret negotiations conducted with the Hungarians 
through Fritz Kolbe, a US agent in the German Foreign Ministry.
26
 
 Nevertheless, the talks continued.
The Allied offensive to get the Hungarians to finally act 
 decisively and break with the Nazis intensified. On December 11, 1943, 
immediately after the Tehran Conference of the Big Three ended, US 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a warning to the German satel-
lites that because of their “reckless” participation in the war, they would 
share the consequences of Germany’s defeat. On March 16, 1944, the 
day Horthy received Hitler’s “invitation” for a visit, Hull declared that 
in order to preserve their independence and territorial integrity, the sat-
ellites had to break with Hitler. The longer they procrastinated, the more 
serious the consequences would be.
27
 Frances Deak, who claimed to be 
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negotiating on behalf of the “US High Command,” told the Hungarian 
envoy in Lisbon Andor Wodianer that unconditional surrender was a 
flexible formula, but if the Hungarians acted too late, his “American 
friends would not be in a position to help.”
28
 On the one hand, in  Ankara, 
the Hungarians were told that Washington expected the  Hungarians to 
accept unconditional surrender, otherwise the talks would be broken off 
and “hostilities” would begin.
29
 On the other hand, the Hungarians made 
it known that immediate surrender would allow pro-Nazi elements in 
the country to seize power, but at the same time, they reiterated that US 
troops would meet no resistance and asked for an American officer to 
personally bring the terms of surrender to Budapest.
30
The OSS’s Operation Sparrow flew into Hungary on March 16, 
1944, the day the regent of Hungary attended a meeting with Hitler 
where he was told that Hungary would be occupied due to its impend-
ing treason. Ferenc Szombathelyi, the head of Hungarian intelligence, 
claimed that Florimond Duke, who headed the US military mission, 
handed him the American terms of surrender. Duke, however, asserted 
that his mission had no political purpose and was supposed to negoti-
ate Hungary’s contribution to the Allied war effort. Which account is 
correct has yet to be determined.
31
 But be that as it may, the German 
invasion of March 19, 1944 may have been triggered, at least in part, 
by the Führer’s conviction that he was about to lose a crucial ally.
32
 In 
this sense, the Allied ploy to spread the Germans thin succeeded—for a 
while. They expected the Germans to send ten to fifteen divisions, and 
they eventually sent ten. When Lipót Baranyai, the former president 
of the Hungarian National Bank, who had also acted as a vehicle for 
peace feelers, reminded Allen Dulles of the potential consequences of 
a German occupation, he allegedly replied, “We are up to our elbows 
in blood, a few hundred thousand lives here or there will not matter.”
33
D-Day was perhaps the most important single operation in the 
drive to win the war. Had it failed, the consequences would have been 
unfathomable. Difficult moral choices had to be made. Lewis Namier’s 
dark prediction came true. Already on March 13, 1944, Goebbels noted 
in his diary the Führer’s statement that after the invasion, he would go 
after the Hungarian Jews. The country’s darkest political forces were 
propelled into power, and the elderly and inept regent gave them a free 
hand to deport Hungary’s Jewish population in collaboration with the 
SS and Gestapo elements that came on the heels of the Wehrmacht to 
finish off the Holocaust. The Gestapo also unintentionally helped Stalin 
by arresting and partially deporting many political elements that could 
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have stood in the way of the country’s Sovietization, which was already 
in full swing a little over a year after the March 19 invasion. The fate of 
the Jews caused few headaches in the capital cities of the Allies.
Some of Prime Minister Kállay’s contemporaries placed the 
blame for the failure of Hungary’s defection policy on his alleged weak-
ness, irresolution, and timidity. Diplomat György Barcza, for instance, 
bitterly noted in his memoirs that Kállay wanted to delay as long as pos-
sible but failed to realize that he could run out of time. This wound up 
being both a personal and national tragedy.
34
 But Barcza thought very 
differently about Kállay’s strategy during the secret talks in 1943. In 
May 1943, he wrote that those who wanted Hungary to make the move 
to break with Hitler immediately “have no idea of the consequences of 
such a move.” The Germans would invade, and they would arrest and 
perhaps execute the democratic opposition and would kill tens, perhaps 
even hundreds of thousands of Jews.
35
 He was mistaken on one point. 
The Germans actually needed the collaboration of Hungarian Nazis, 
who could hardly wait for the demise of the “liberal” old regime un-
der Miklós Kállay, the man they accused of protecting the Jews. We 
now know that the premier negotiated in good faith, and was eventually 
ready to accept unconditional surrender. For the Allies, the secret peace 
talks were important only so long as they encouraged the Germans to 
invade Hungary and thereby spread them thin in the western theater of 
war. As noted in a paper prepared by the OSS in the wake of the tragedy 
of the Hungarian Jews, “the fate of these millions of Jews [in German-
occupied Europe] had elicited slight notice from the world, which was 
more interested in the larger issues of the war.”
36
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An Attempt to Moralize Realpolitik: 
Reflections on László Borhi’s Article
Ferenc Laczó
László Borhi’s article “The Allies, Secret Peace Talks, and the German 
Invasion of Hungary, 1943–1944” explores the role of secret peace talks 
between the Western Allies (the United States and the United Kingdom) 
and Hungary as one of the potential causes behind the German invasion 
of the latter country on March 19, 1944. Borhi’s arguments—which 
have been rather widely appreciated as well as repeatedly critiqued in 
the Hungarian-language media in the first half of 2019, including by the 
author of these lines—thus focus on a single factor in what is a larger 
and more complex story.
While the connections between such secret talks—which, as 
Borhi rightly notes, were not all that secret to the Germans—and the 
decision to launch Operation Margarethe is certainly worth studying 
further, and the author does present some interesting evidence in this 
regard, he would have been well-advised to analyze Nazi Germany’s 
decision-making process more directly and in a more encompassing 
way. I claim that only such a broader analysis could have allowed him 
to make a convincing case about the reasons behind the March 1944 in-
vasion of Hungary, an invasion of a fellow Axis state that had manifold 
and devastating consequences.
Additional factors behind Nazi Germany’s decision—the 
rapidly evolving situation on the Eastern Front, with the Red Army 
 approaching the borders of Hungary; anti-Semitic obsessions as a factor 
in German calculations; broader regional issues such as, perhaps most 
importantly, Germany’s future possibilities to cooperate with and mobi-
lize the resources of Romania; the recent “defection” of Italy as an in-
tervening influence on German thinking, etc.—are all alluded to but not 
considered in depth. In other words, the article studies Allied– Hungarian 
negotiations and the former’s admittedly self-interested encouragement 
of Hungarian political illusions without aiming to establish the relative 
weight of this one factor as compared to several others.
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A key conclusion of Borhi’s article seems to be that “the 
German invasion of March 19, 1944 may have been triggered, at least 
in part, by the Führer’s conviction that he was about to lose a crucial 
ally” (p. 96). As compared to some of Borhi’s previously published 
assertions, this is not a particularly strong claim, nor does it offer a 
truly original insight. Borhi announces that “I had no inkling that seem-
ingly disparate events—the secret peace initiatives, the Allied strategy 
to defeat Hitler, the German invasion of Hungary, and, indirectly, the 
Hungarian  Holocaust—would all intersect” (p. 90). However, such con-
nections have been studied by scholars before, not least by the recently 
deceased Randolph Braham, the former doyen of Holocaust historiog-
raphy, on whose theses concerning Hungary’s counter-productive nego-
tiations with the Allies Borhi actually appears to draw. Unfortunately, 
Borhi’s article does not discuss its exact relation to the existing second-
ary literature and, therefore, does not sufficiently explain what is novel 
about his findings.
According to my assessment, there are two issues that seem to 
distinguish Borhi’s depiction from earlier professional ones: his refo-
cusing the discussion on the Western Allies, and the moralizing impetus 
behind his arguments. Let me address both in turn.
It is indeed conspicuous how little the article analyses various 
Hungarian actors. The author briefly sketches the immense odds behind 
Hungarian attempts at a separate peace: “first, because of the sizable 
pro-German political forces in the country; second, because of the dif-
ficulty of making contact with Allied officials in neutral capitals; third, 
because of the fear that if the leadership in Berlin discovered the  secret 
dealings, the country could be occupied by the German army; and, 
 finally, because the Allies themselves were not sold on the importance 
of the peace initiatives emanating from Axis Europe” (p. 91).
I consider all these to be highly relevant observations. I also 
wonder whether more could not have been said about those who were 
nonetheless in favor of secret negotiations. Could we perhaps say that 
such people were—despite all their agreeable intentions and desirable 
goals—recklessly chasing dangerous illusions, and ultimately helped 
bring about the invasion of their country, with all its tragic and disas-
trous consequences?
While relevant Hungarian actors lack sharper contours on the 
pages of the article, Borhi makes rather strong claims regarding the 
 Allies. For instance, he states that “Eventually, this position [to view 
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the German invasion of Hungary as a positive outcome and to try to 
time it to coincide with the Allied landing in Western Europe – FL] 
would guide Allied policies regarding the Axis satellites” (p. 92). It is 
clear that such a position, which aimed to provoke conflict between two 
Axis enemies, was based on rational premises.
At the same time, Borhi’s generalization that such a calculation 
indeed guided Allied policies requires more elaborate and substantial 
proof. How precisely did the Allies aim to encourage such an invasion, 
and what was the actual impact of their actions? Borhi touches on these 
questions and seems to suggest that the Allies exerted a large and per-
haps even decisive impact. However, this is not conclusively proven, 
and in fact sounds unlikely.
Borhi’s refocusing on the Western Allies—i.e., away from 
 Hungary’s ultimately counterproductive attempt to exit the war—holds 
the promise of an important addition to the scholarly literature. This re-
focusing, however, is executed in a rather problematic manner, as Borhi 
employs strangely moralizing language.
I am not convinced by the analytical value or even simple rele-
vance of the conceptual opposition the article suggests between Hungar-
ian negotiators’ “good faith” and the Allies’ (implied, rather than stated) 
bad faith or, let us say, scheming. (I should clarify that  Borhi’s current 
English-language article admittedly does not really use such loaded 
 labels, but his argument suggests such a moral critique, especially 
through references to the threatened but neglected Jews of Hungary. Bo-
rhi has also articulated such a moral critique in his earlier publications, 
most notably in his widely read and debated article that was published 
on Index.hu on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the invasion.
1
) It remains 
unclear to me what qualifies as “good faith” to the author and why; 
furthermore, we do not find out how he has established the difference 
between good faith, on the one hand, and scheming, on the other.
It seems to me that such a moralizing opposition is ultimately 
misleading, and even inappropriate. What I gather from the evidence is 
that the representatives of both Hungary and the Western Allies aimed 
to realize their respective national interests at a time of the greatest con-
flagration in world history. A crucial difference between them was that, 
whereas the Hungarian politicians and diplomats who wanted to exit 
the war and their country’s Nazi alliance had a very hard time figuring 
out how to achieve their central goal (and, as we know, they gravely 
failed in the end), helping to provoke a conflict between two of their 
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enemies seemed like a plausible strategy to the Western Allies, not least 
because of the rather short-sighted Hungarian willingness to negotiate 
with them. Moreover, such a potential conflict between Axis powers 
indeed appeared to be in their interest.
It is another matter that such Hungarian representatives, who 
were in an extremely difficult situation internationally and were prob-
ably short-sighted as well, were also in a vulnerable position in their 
own country, as pro-German forces remained dominant. Due to the lat-
ter factor—and contrary to the admittedly amoral hopes the Allies might 
have harbored—the German invasion starting on March 19, 1944 did 
not result in any major conflict, nor did the overall German war effort 
suffer. I would therefore be tempted to talk of a rational, if provocative 
Allied miscalculation regarding Hungary.
An issue Borhi’s article leaves unaddressed concerns the 
 political and military context of the so-called secret talks. The situation 
at the time was clearly asymmetrical. Even though in the very first para-
graph of the article we read about “relative peace” in Hungary, Hungary 
was in fact an aggressor in World War Two; the “best-treated” Jews in 
the region were heavily discriminated against, and tens of thousands 
of them had already been murdered by 1943–44. As one of the aggres-
sors facing imminent invasion by the Red Army and another defeat, 
 Hungary was not exactly in a position to negotiate as an equal.
By 1943–44, segments of the country’s elite were trying to 
reach out to their counterparts on the enemy side to ask for their benevo-
lence and acquire some—unlikely—benefits. We might have a certain 
amount of sympathy for the ambitions of such members of Hungary’s 
political elite (I certainly do), but we should also acknowledge that they 
took risks when they were highly unlikely to succeed. And that unlikeli-
hood was not due primarily to the Western Allies’ rational, if provoca-
tive scheming, but much more simply to the actual balance of forces in 
 Central and Eastern Europe at the time.
Borhi’s article is not focused on trying to account for the causes 
of the Holocaust in Hungary, nor does he discuss its main phase in the 
spring and summer of 1944. At the same time, the article does sug-
gest rather direct connections between the German invasion of Hun-
gary and the brutal destruction of Hungarian Jews, as well as, and more 
 unusually, the country’s subsequent Sovietization.
The former connection amounts to an especially moot ques-
tion, since what I called above the rational Allied miscalculation clearly 
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 acquires a strongly unfavorable moral dimension if we directly con-
nect an (however partially) Allied-provoked German invasion to the 
genocide of local Jews. I would therefore like to briefly note here that 
the German invasion may have been, for lack of a more appropriate 
adjective, a necessary precondition, but it was not a sufficient precondi-
tion for the massive and utterly brutal extension of the Holocaust to the 
majority of Hungary’s Jews in 1944. Scholars of the subject agree that 
only the proactive and highly efficient cooperation of Hungarian state 
institutions with their occupying Nazi German ally could have led to the 
deportation and murder of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews in 
such a short period near the end of the war in Europe.
This in turn raises an intriguing problem of historical  judgement. 
Prior to 1944, various concerned observers in Allied countries predicted 
that a German occupation of Hungary would lead to such a human-
caused catastrophe, and Borhi’s article offers relevant quotes in this re-
gard; it did, but not exactly for the reasons such observers feared. What 
they should have feared as much as German Nazi plans to destroy the 
last, and despite significant losses, still largely intact Jewish commu-
nity of Central and Eastern Europe was the power and fanaticism of 
 Hungarian génocidaires. In other words, there were indeed people of 
good faith in Hungary in 1943–44, if perhaps too few and too naïve. 
More decisively for the genocide in 1944, however, there were also too 
many others with the worst intentions towards their discriminated fel-
low citizens, and they were clearly not directly triggered by the Western 
Allies but by a Nazi invasion they, in fact, viewed as an opportunity to 
carry out genocide.
In sum, László Borhi’s article deals with an important and con-
troversial subject. It presents some suggestive evidence, but frames its 
subject rather narrowly. Most importantly, the author could have pro-
vided a broader and more convincing analysis of the main reasons be-
hind Germany’s decision to invade Hungary in March 1944. This would 
have been necessary to establish the relative weight of secret talks in this 
decision and what specific impact the practices of the Western Allies 
had on Hungary and the war in Europe as a whole. Moreover, the article 
could have adopted a less moralizing tone, and tested more precise—not 
to mention appropriate—analytical categories than “good faith.”
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 1.  László Borhi, “A szövetségesek provokálták ki a német megszállást, 
nem törődve a magyar zsidókkal” [The Allies provoked the German 
occupation, without consideration for the Hungarian Jews], Index.
hu, March 18, 2019. https://index.hu/techtud/tortenelem/2019/03/18/
nemet_megszallas_1944_angolszasz_felelosseg_borhi_laszlo/.
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Paul Robert Magocsi. Historical Atlas of Central Europe. Third 
 revised and expanded edition. Toronto, Buffalo, and London: 
 University of  Toronto Press, 2018. 224 pages, 61 main maps and 40 
smaller maps, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-1-4875-2331-2
This is the rare case of a book that has been reviewed almost one  hundred 
times before, if we include the eighty reviews of the first  edition of 1993 
and the fifteen reviews of the second edition of 2001, which introduced 
twenty new maps, partly because of political changes during the 1990s. 
It was also a different kind of atlas, because in contrast to the first edi-
tion, now the maps were produced digitally, which allowed for easier 
revision for the third edition that we review here. (Readers should con-
sider buying the electronic version, with added features, which is avail-
able at the same price as the paperback!)
The “Historical Atlas of Central Europe” has been a major 
Canadian-US research project for more than a quarter century. The book 
has even changed its name, after many Central Europeans found the 
designation “East Central Europe” in the first edition somehow offen-
sive; but more importantly because the territory covered by the atlas is 
“Central Europe” “in purely geographical terms” (xiii). It could easily 
be argued that such purity can be contested, because geographers are 
part of the ongoing struggle to define what “Europe” is and where the 
“center” of the continent lies.
1
 The same problem, from the standpoint 
of constructivist approaches, arises regarding “ethnic groups.” In the 
atlas there are maps and statistics (Map 30, p. 97; Map 55, p. 189) that 
show and list the main “ethnolinguistic groups” that represent more 
than fifty percent of a population marked in bold font, and other such 
groups with colors that cover certain areas; this could also be seen as a 
simplification of a very complex reality. However, we would not have 
the atlas if it would have been created by constructivist historians. And 
that would be a great problem, because the Historical Atlas of  Central 
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Europe is not only a very useful tool for research and (most of all) 
teaching, but also a very beautiful, very well-edited publication. And it 
is a very  direct way to tell the history of this part of the continent with 
the help of short descriptions (mostly not longer than one to two pages), 
geographical maps, and statistics in sixty-one chapters. The third edi-
tion also adds new materials, mostly because of political changes in 
the Balkans, where Montenegro and Kosovo have appeared, although 
the renaming of Macedonia as “North Macedonia” came too late to be 
included in the maps. This shows how important the atlas is, because it 
documents all these changes and makes them easily visible. The text of 
the second edition has been revised, and, what is more important, the 
statistical data in the tables has been corrected and updated; finally, the 
bibliography has been extended. The quality of the photographic rep-
resentation of the maps is also much better than in the second edition.
The narrative the maps and statistics tell begins with  geography 
in the stricter sense of the word, looking at the geographical parts of the 
area with the main mountains and plains, rivers and seashores (Map 1, 
p. 3). Two smaller maps look at rainfall (Map 1a, p. 4) and “vegetation 
and land use” (Map 1b, p. 4), and a short text describes the climate 
of the three main zones (Northern, Alpine, Balkans). Chapter 2 starts 
the historical narrative, beginning with the fifth century, when Central 
Europe was divided into a “civilized” Roman Empire and an “uncivi-
lized” world beyond its borders (5). The end of antiquity had a major 
impact on Central Europe, because it was a time of large movements 
of various peoples, illustrated in Map 2 (p. 5). Chapters 3 through 13 
deal with the medieval period, providing maps of various kingdoms and 
empires, but also provide looks into the economy (chapter 11), cities 
(chapter 12) and the church administration (chapter 13). Chapters 14 
through 22 focus on the sixteenth to
 
eighteenth centuries, and chapters 
23 through 36 on the “long nineteenth century.” Chapter 38 and 39 are 
dedicated to the dramatic five years after World War I, 1918-23, that 
completely changed the political borders and state system of Central 
Europe. Chapters 39 through 48 describe the major changes in specific 
sub-regions, from Poland and Lithuania (ch. 38) to Bulgaria and Greece 
(ch. 48), during the twentieth century. The following five chapters, 
49–53, are about the catastrophic two decades between 1930 and the 
late 1940s, when Central Europe was the theater of another World War, 
the  Holocaust, and major population “movements,” very often bru-
tally enforced. The last eight chapters are more mixed; they look into 
population (ch. 54) and “ ethnolinguistic distribution” (ch. 55); post-war 
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industrial  development (ch. 56); Communism in 1980 and post-commu-
nism after 1989 (ch. 56, 61); and the Catholic and Orthodox churches 
(ch. 59, 60). I have  summarized the structure of the Atlas here because it 
shows the main themes and directions of the volume. The reader will get 
quick and very reliable information about the major political, economic 
and  demographic developments of Central Europe from the end of the 
 Roman Empire until today.
In addition to the maps and the short chapter texts there is 
an  extremely useful index of place names. The editor decided to use 
 today’s place names as well as the relatively few English names that 
are available (like Belgrade, Warsaw, or Vienna), but all the different 
historical names or the names in other languages are listed in the index, 
making it extremely helpful.
I did not expect that I would be one of the reviewers who could 
help Paul Robert Magocsi to further improve his maps by finding 
 mistakes, because I do not have the eye for such details, but I found 
one: the diocese of “Perugia” on Map 59 (The Latin (Roman) Catholic 
Church in the twentieth century) is misspelled as “Perugio.” But this is a 
very small mistake that can easily be overlooked in such a major accom-
plishment for all who are interested in the history and present situation 
of (not only Central) Europe today!
Árpád von Klimó
The Catholic University of America
NOTE
 1.  See the discussion in James Koranyi and Bernhard Struck, “Space: 
Empires, Nations, Borders” in The Routledge History of East Central 
Europe since 1700, ed. Irina Livezeanu and Árpád von Klimó (Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge, 2017), 27–78.
Norman Stone. Hungary: A Short History. London: Profile Books, 
2019. 245 pages. ISBN 978-1-7881-6050-9
This was supposed to be a book review. But the fact that the author of 
the book, the British historian Norman Stone (March 8, 1941 – June 19, 
2019) passed away shortly after its appearance does in some way  connect 
this last work with the life of the scholar. What is also extraordinary 
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about this book is the fact that it is the very last book of a historian who 
had never written a book on Hungary before, although he did study 
Hungarian, and visited archives there already in 1962, surely one of 
the very first Western scholars to work in the country only a few years 
 after the 1956 revolution and just months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
This tells us something about the author. Norman Stone was an unusual, 
and surely more adventurous historian compared to his colleagues. In 
Czechoslovakia—or to be more precise, in Bratislava—he was even 
 arrested and imprisoned for a couple of months for trying to smuggle a 
Hungarian dissident out of the bloc. After writing his dissertation about 
the Eastern Front of World War I—a topic almost completely neglected 
by British, French, or German research at that time, mostly because 
of lack of command of Eastern European languages—Stone unfortu-
nately (from the perspective of Hungarian Studies!) turned to other top-
ics and other parts of the world. His career continued in three phases, 
first in Cambridge (1967–84), then in Oxford (1984–97), and finally, 
again quite unusually, at Bilkent University in Ankara (1997–2017). 
Stone spent the last years of his life in Budapest, somehow bridging the 
distance between England and Turkey. His historiography, as demon-
strated in his Europe Transformed, 1878–1919 (1983) and The Atlantic 
and Its Enemies: A Personal History of the Cold War (2010),
1
 tended 
to be extremely well-written, funny, thought-provoking, and broad in 
scope, though not without an eye for telling details; and it always found 
a large audience, which also had to do with Stone’s journalistic talent. 
He was called a “maverick”; he had many personal problems and his 
conservatism was loathed by many academics in Oxford and in other 
places, which explains why he fled to Turkey, where he was allowed 
to smoke and did not have to bow to absurd political correctness. His 
defenses of Margaret Thatcher and Turkey (he did not qualify the mas-
sacres of Armenians as “genocide”), and, in this book, his praise for 
Viktor Orbán, will not please many liberals and leftists. But those who 
would avoid him for these reasons would miss one of the best-written 
books on Hungarian history in the English language, that is partly very 
funny and full of insightful  anecdotes and stories. And Stone is very 
honest when he mentions his own flaws and the limits of his knowl-
edge. The best things about  Hungary: A Short History, however, are the 
broad, European perspective and the distance with which he looks at 
the history of the small country in the center of the continent. Special-
ists of Hungarian history will not find many new ideas, but the book is 
not written for them, although it is mostly accurate and reliable—if we 
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overlook Stone’s tendency to leave out the more problematic aspects 
of the Fidesz regime of the last decade. But apart from that, Stone does 
not fail to criticize the stupidity of Hungarian nationalism and the often 
short-sightedness of her elites in often tragic historical situations, which 
they made worse by their own stubbornness.
The story begins with the consequences of Mohács, when 
“Hungary fell to foreigners” in 1526 (2), explaining, in the next 
 chapters, why it took more than three hundred years for the country to 
 recover from the setback and enjoy a European modernization, looking 
to  Britain for a liberal model. This long period is covered in the first 
four chapters, and was marked by the struggle against the Habsburgs 
for self-determination, which ended in national independence in 1918, 
but also in absolute disaster. Under Regent Miklós Horthy, whose lack 
of intelligence Stone emphasizes, the country became more and more 
 dependent on  Germany, driven by the desire to revise the 1920 Treaty of 
Trianon, which ended in an even greater catastrophe with the Holocaust 
(1944/45) and the complete breakdown in 1945 of “Hitler’s Last Ally” 
(149). Chapter 6 describes the brutal Communist takeover, and  chapter 
7 the horrors and ludicrous paradoxes created by Stalinism. Stone’s 
 assessment of János Kádár (ch. 8) is balanced, and it shows how this 
historian has a great idea of the tragedies of human lives,  recounting 
the miserable youth of János Csermanek (Kádár’s name when he was 
born in the then-(Austro-)Hungarian port city of Fiume, now Rijeka, 
 Croatia). The final chapter is a very condensed, and somewhat open-
ended, history of Hungary since 1980, which ends with a paragraph 
that  speaks about “a moment of hope”—obviously in comparison to 
Hungarian history since the sixteenth century!—and the sentence “A 
shadowy version of the old Habsburg unity is coming about, and Hun-
garians learn” (245). Stone seems to indicate that since the end of state 
socialism in 1989 the European Union made mistakes and “misman-
aged” the transition, but that the disappearance of borders dividing Hun-
gary from other former parts of St. Stephen’s realm will bring some 
advantages in the long run. This is a great book, and it is fun to reading 
even if one does not share the author’s political leanings. When reading 
it, we should mourn a great historian, who we might wish had turned to 
 writing Hungarian history earlier on.
Árpád von Klimó
The Catholic University of America
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NOTE
 1.  Norman Stone, Europe Transformed, 1878–1919 (Glasgow: Fontana Press, 
1983); Norman Stone, The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A Personal History of 
the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
John Zametica. Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the  Balkans 
and the Start of World War One. London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 2017. 
766 pages. ISBN 978-0-8568-3513-1
The application to the graduate school where I ended up doing my Ph.D. 
in modern European history required all candidates to write an essay on 
the following question: which work of historical significance do you 
wish you had written, and why? This was quite annoying to your  typical 
college student, since none of the other graduate programs required 
such additional labor. In hindsight, however, the exercise was brilliant, 
as it made one think deeply about what makes for good history and 
how historians enrich, and complicate, our understanding of the past. If 
I were writing that essay today, I might choose John Zametica’s book 
Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of 
World War One.
I say that with two major caveats. First, I disagree  ardently with the 
author’s overarching argument that the multinational Austro-Hungarian 
Empire—the “sick man on the Danube,” as the  prologue is entitled—was 
“an anomaly condemned to death by the progress of history” (4). Zamet-
ica’s work unfolds as unabashedly determinist in its view that the nation-
state was not only ascendant in the nineteenth century, but that national 
interests make any kind of supranational  governing system, including 
today’s European Union, a largely futile undertaking.  Overlooking or 
willfully ignoring decades of research that has demolished the notion 
of a decrepit and doomed dual monarchy (and several pages of the pro-
logue are devoted to the “shambles of the [dualist] system” created by 
the 1867 Compromise), Zametica comes off as such an extreme evan-
gelist for national identity and sovereignty that he specifies the  ethnic 
origins of Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić (actually a Cincar whose 
real surname was Pasku) and cites a Serbian general’s  satisfaction at 
learning that the June 11, 1903 conspirators who murdered Serbian King 
Alexander and his dreadful wife Draga Mašin were not Serbs per se, but 
rather “Cincars, Bulgars, Czechs, Vlachs and Jews” (9, 197).
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While such ethnic precision points to the awe-inspiring 
 meticulousness that pervades this work and about which I will write 
more, the above example is also indicative of its second significant 
flaw: Zametica’s bulky, 643-page tome (not including seventy-five 
pages of detailed endnotes and a useful bibliography) tips heavily 
 towards  exculpating Serbs from any kind of activities that might have 
antagonized Austria-Hungary in the period before the First World War. 
The historiography on the war’s origins sorely needed a corrective to 
the abundant literature, capped in 2012 by Christopher Clark’s more 
broadly conceived study The Sleepwalkers,
1
 that makes Serbia out to 
be the south Slavic nemesis par excellence, whose irredentist preten-
sions and propaganda explain, if not excuse, Habsburg leaders’ decisive 
choice of war against the small Serbian thorn in its side in the immediate 
 aftermath of the Sarajevo assassination. Yet rather than nudging the nee-
dle  toward a more balanced accounting of Austro-Hungarian  insecurity 
and Serb nationalist agitation, Zametica practically leaves the latter 
out of the big picture altogether. So, for example, we learn that Croa-
tia rather than Serbia was the hotbed for south Slavic nationalism, and 
that Ilija Garašanin’s famous Načertanije (outline) for “Great  Serbia” 
was originally penned by a Polish exile, revised by a Czech, and in any 
case had little influence on Serbian foreign policy, making it “a clas-
sic example of a historiographical straw man argument” (190). In both 
instances, the author’s highly detailed clarifications are essential con-
tributions to the scholarly literature. Yet one reads this book  wondering 
whether all the so-called Serbian nationalism ever even existed outside 
the  imaginations of Habsburg officialdom and careless historians.
Another case in point concerns the influence on young 
 Bosnians of Serb nationalist Bogdan Žerajić’s suicide after attempting 
to  assassinate Bosnian Governor-General Marijan Varešanin in Sarajevo 
in June 1910, despite Gavrilo Princip and friends’ Yugoslavist rather 
than Serb nationalist ideological orientation (which Zametica proves 
conclusively and crucially, considering how many scholars unthinkingly 
 label the Bosnian assassin a “Serbian nationalist”). Yet here too there is 
no mention of how the Serbian press heroized Žerajić, including in the 
 August 5, 1910 issue of Politika. Similarly, one finishes this book  feeling 
that Austro-Hungarian leaders in July 1914 were scrambling to find any 
evidence whatsoever of the anti-Habsburg propaganda alleged in their 
ultimatum to Serbia; or that Serbs respectfully stopped celebrating the 
national holiday Vidovdan the moment they heard about the  Sarajevo 
assassination. Instead, Zametica painstakingly documents the relentless 
efforts of official Serbia to live peacefully with the vast empire to its 
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north—even after the regime annexed what he attests are the irrefutably 
Serb lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina—and in the days following the 
 Archduke’s murder.
Yet document it does, and therein lies the main reason that any 
historian of the origins of World War I should take this book seriously. 
If the author’s presentation is one-sided, the case he makes for Serbia 
is firmly grounded in a close reading of primary sources, their context, 
and all the major literature in every relevant language. Whether  Zametica 
is explaining why Franz Ferdinand—a “die-hard  paleoconservative” 
(635)—was not the peace-loving and reform-minded Successor he is 
 often made out to be (the Archduke’s alleged Trialism, which still crops 
up in serious literature, is decisively and, one hopes, lastingly under-
mined here); showing how the 1903 regicide was not the turning point 
in Serbian foreign policy away from Austria-Hungary and toward Russia 
(in fact, he shows how, right up to the July Crisis in 1914, Russia was 
never a dependable ally and support for Serbia); or dissecting the  hidden 
aggression behind the June 1914 Matscheko Memorandum, which most 
scholars interpret as being devoid of war planning against Serbia, his 
cascade of revisionist arguments are intricately sourced and fastidiously 
reasoned.
Indeed, this book is as much a polemic with other historians as it 
is a narrative of the origins of World War I in the Balkans. On numerous 
occasions, Zametica feistily takes scholars to task— Christopher Clark, 
Luigi Albertini, and Sean McMeekin earn particular  opprobrium—for 
uncritically accepting and enthusiastically furthering such “fantastic 
hogwash” (401), “false constructs” (456), “misleading legends” (482), 
and other “myths” (634), as the appearance of a telegram from  Russia 
fortifying Serbian leaders on the deadline of the ultimatum (July 25), or 
the role of the Black Hand in the Sarajevo assassination.
Regarding the latter, Zametica’s erudition is awesome, the pace 
and detail of the narrative exciting (he exactingly corrects both the 
 order of the cars in the imperial procession and of the assassins  lining 
the  Appel Quay), and no scholar will ever again be able to write on 
the political murder without first reading him. For what Zametica has 
 essentially done is not to prove conclusively what individual or organi-
zation was behind the Sarajevo assassination (confoundingly,  definitive 
documentation is just not there), but to reason his way through the maze 
of original sources and testimonies (including an impressively close 
reading of the assassins’ trial transcript) to show the origins and weak-
nesses of the near century-long obsession with Apis’s “terrorist” Black 
Hand Society. In a chapter wittily entitled “Black Hand—Red Herring,” 
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Zametica contextualizes Apis’s actions within the domestic political 
crisis in Serbia in order to undermine the Black Hand leader’s own 
confession (at the 1917 Salonika show trial) to having organized the 
Sarajevo conspiracy. Rather, he argues, the loose cannon Major  Vojislav 
Tankosić, who was named in the ultimatum and whose  personality is 
given great attention in this work, handed over the weapons to Princip 
and friends on his own initiative. Apis, concludes the author, actually 
tried to stop the assassination (both through the Serbian ambassador 
to Vienna and directly with the assassins in Sarajevo) once he learned 
about his freewheeling subordinate’s precipitous action in support of 
the young Bosnians (who, again contrary to many standard histori-
cal accounts, initiated the  conspiracy on their own rather than  being 
“ recruited” by the Black Hand).
It may be easy to criticize Zametica for the broad, pre-determined 
brushstrokes that encompass his arguments and for what he leaves out in 
terms of Serbian nationalist activities. But dismissing his work outright, 
say because of the author’s unseemly support for Radovan Karadžić dur-
ing the Yugoslav secessionary wars and at the Bosnian Serb  leader’s trial 
in the Hague Tribunal, would be an easy way for scholars to  continue 
avoiding some of the fictional hand-me-downs about this critical era that 
are rooted in the work of the likes of Luigi Albertini and Stanoje Stano-
jevic on the Sarajevo assassination, and which Zametica has finally 
rooted out. It’s one thing to write “a rip-roaring good [his]story” (396), 
but it’s quite another to do so based on the primary sources rather than 
relying on dated secondary literature that often played fast and loose 
with such critical facts as the ideology of the Sarajevo assassins and 
an alleged last-minute Russian telegram bolstering Belgrade before the 
ultimatum expired. Zametica’s blatant biases aside, Folly and Malice 
is a breathtaking display of how expert historical sleuthing works, and 
how easily even the most respected academics incorporate and transmit 
“false constructs” in the process of writing their complicated works.
Paul Miller-Melamed
McDaniel College
NOTE
 1.  Christopher Clark, Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 
(London: Allen Lane, 2012).
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Borislav Chernev. Twilight of Empire: The Brest-Litovsk Confer-
ence and the Remaking of East-Central Europe, 1917–1918. Toronto: 
 University of Toronto Press, 2017. 301 pages. ISBN 978-1-4875-2449-4
On March 3, 1918, the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia signed the 
second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (the first Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had 
been concluded between the Central Powers and Ukraine on  February 
9, 1918). According to the terms of the second treaty,  Russia (or, more 
 accurately, the “old empire”) ceded 780,000 square  kilometres of 
 territory and roughly fifty-six million people. Russian losses amounted 
to “twenty-seven percent of the former empire’s arable land, twenty-six 
percent of its railways, thirty-three percent of its textile industry, 
seventy-three percent of its iron and steel production, eighty-nine 
 percent of its coal deposits, and ninety percent of its sugar production.” 
From the point of view of many observers, the conditions imposed by 
the treaty were unnecessarily harsh, and marked an “imperial collapse 
on [a] scale [that] was almost wholly unprecedented” (214).
As Borislav Chernev notes in his recent book  commemorating 
the centenary of the Brest-Litovsk Conference, “few treaties in the 
 history of international relations have been vilified as much as the 
 second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk” (213). Given the magnitude of what 
Russia appeared to lose and what the Central Powers temporarily 
gained, it is of course understandable that many scholars have zeroed 
in on the supposedly draconian nature of the treaty, or that they have 
treated the Brest-Litovsk Conference as a massive and misguided dip-
lomatic  failure on the part of the inexperienced Bolsheviks. Though 
there is undoubtedly some truth to these claims, Chernev nevertheless 
argues that such black-and-white assessments of Brest-Litovsk conceal 
the  complexity and nuanced history behind the conference and the two 
 treaties that resulted from it. Drawing on a rich body of primary sources 
from archives in multiple countries, Chernev’s well-researched and 
provocative study challenges readers to think about the history of the 
 Brest-Litovsk  Conference in new ways, not only with regard to who 
may have won or lost, but also in terms of the role the conference played 
in shaping Europe—and especially East Central Europe—in the early 
twentieth century.
For students of World War I who have viewed the conflict 
and its aftermath primarily from a Western-centric perspective, the 
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 biggest  surprise will no doubt come in the opening chapters of the 
book. Though the armistice of November 11, 1918 and the Paris Peace 
Talks that  followed may have marked a distinct end to the war on the 
 Western Front, Chernev points out that, in East Central Europe, peace 
talks began already in  December 1917, with hostilities extending well 
into 1923. In terms of the peace talks themselves, it was at the Brest-
Litovsk Conference, and not the Paris Peace Conference, that the notion 
of open negotiations was first introduced, largely because of the Bol-
shevik  desire to use the conference as a platform for the articulation and 
dissemination of revolutionary propaganda. Perhaps more surprisingly, 
it was at Brest-Litovsk, and not Paris, that the concept of national self- 
determination made its debut as part of peace negotiations. Introduced 
on the first day of the peace conference by Adolf Ioffe, chairman of the 
Russian delegation, the concept of national self-determination was an-
nounced as the cornerstone of Bolshevik peace conditions. Based upon 
ideas first espoused by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in a pamphlet published in 
1915, the so-called Ioffe Program prompted Western liberal-democratic 
leaders to articulate similar policies, and predated not only Woodrow 
Wilson’s announcement of his Fourteen Points by a few weeks, but also 
David Lloyd George’s commitment to a postwar peace settlement “based 
on the right to self-determination or the consent of the governed” (48).
The Bolshevik insistence on a peace plan based on the  principle 
of national self-determination proved popular—or at least potentially 
useful—to multiple parties taking part in the Brest-Litovsk peace 
 negotiations. For the Bolsheviks, national self-determination was first 
and foremost an ideological commitment, one that ran parallel with the 
Marxist call for “the suppression of the ruling classes by the proletariat 
at home and abroad as a prelude to permanent revolutions” (49). As 
Chernev points out, however, Bolshevik support of self-determination 
for “suppressed” nations was also a key aspect of their foreign policy, 
and was deployed tactically, if also sincerely, as a means of transform-
ing inherited imperial structures along communist lines. The Cen-
tral Powers, by comparison, also latched on to the notion of national 
self-determination, and were determined to use it to their advantage 
over the course of the negotiations. Austria-Hungary and Germany, 
for example, posed as “liberators and protectors of small nations in the 
East” (67), and in this way attempted to justify the occupation of east-
ern territories. Bulgaria, in turn, found the concept useful as a means 
of formulating foreign policy goals. Mobilizing the idea of national 
self- determination in their ultimately failed quest to secure regional 
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 hegemony in the Balkans, the Bulgarian delegation sought “interna-
tional recognition for the annexation of newly-conquered territories,” 
arguing that the expansion of the state would liberate ethnic Bulgarians 
living outside the country, thus achieving national unification.
As the Bolsheviks themselves recognized, support for national 
self-determination could, and likely would, fuel movements for inde-
pendence and decolonization, and would thus hasten the collapse of 
empires, including the Russian Empire that they had just inherited. 
Ukraine is perhaps a good case in point. Highlighting the ways in which 
 Ukrainian delegates appealed to the Brest-Litovsk system as a means of 
pursuing their own domestic goals, Chernev argues that there was a clear 
connection between the peace process in 1917–1918 and the origins of 
modern Ukrainian statehood as an anti-colonial project. Given the impe-
rial war aims of Germany and Austria-Hungary, it is perhaps ironic that 
the signing of the peace treaty with the Central Powers in February 1918 
laid both the ideological and practical groundwork for  Ukrainization. 
Having been assured the right to national self- determination, the brief 
period of nation-building that followed the signing of the treaty in fact 
anticipated “certain elements” of the indigenization [korenizatsiia] 
 policy that would later be implemented in Ukraine by Soviet authorities 
in the interwar period (121).
 For the Central Powers, the Brest-Litovsk peace  negotiations 
presented significant opportunities for the continuation and even 
 temporary fulfilment of imperial goals. The rise of nationalist fervour 
throughout the region, however, coupled with the growing frustration of 
the masses at home (especially over food shortages), only contributed 
to growing discontent and radicalization. Chernev argues that, as the 
talks dragged on, the Central Powers were motivated increasingly by 
fear of revolution, particularly in Austria-Hungary. Though the  October 
 Revolution arguably had “little immediate effect on the workers of 
Habsburg East Central Europe,” the deteriorating food situation, which 
had politicized the masses and had been provoking protests since the 
middle of the war, created conditions within which the Brest-Litovsk 
conference “captured the popular imagination” (84). This growing 
sense of fear was only heightened in mid-January 1918 as strikes broke 
out in Austria, and spread to Hungary and Germany. Beginning at the 
Daimler Motor Works in Wiener Neustadt on January 14 after officials 
announced that flour rations would be cut in half, the number of protest-
ers grew quickly and strikes flared up in other towns and cities, with 
workers and strikers demanding bread and peace. As Chernev suggests, 
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the Great January Strike was “the opening act of the Central European 
revolutions of 1918–1919” (119).
While there is much to like about this book, Hungarian special-
ists will find little regarding the Hungarian perspective on Brest-Litovsk, 
save for a few brief and isolated statements regarding Hungarian re-
sponses to diplomatic developments during the conference. The reader 
learns, for example, that the Hungarian prime minister, Sándor Wekerle, 
was very uncomfortable with Austria-Hungary’s rather favourable re-
sponse to Ioffe’s notion of national self-determination, and in particu-
lar with the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister’s claims that aspects of 
the Ioffe Program could in principle serve as the basis of “a general 
and just peace” (51). From Wekerle’s perspective, Austria-Hungary’s 
admittedly opportunistic accommodation of Bolshevik principles re-
garding self-determination and minority rights “had the potential to un-
dermine Magyar dominance in the Kingdom of Hungary” (55). This 
is an  important point that would be worth pursuing more fully, though 
Chernev fails to develop it any further. Likewise, he indicates that 
the January strikes in 1918 also spilled over into Hungary as early as 
 January 18, when streetcar workers walked off the job in Budapest. As 
in Austria, these strikes grew in size very quickly, and spread to other 
 cities like Nagykanizsa and Szeged (110). Unfortunately, by limiting 
his analysis to one page, and by drawing on only a few non-Hungarian 
primary sources and József Galántai’s otherwise dated Hungary in the 
First World War,
1
 the reader is left wondering not only about the impact 
that these strikes had in Hungary, and how they may have differed from 
those in Austria and Germany, but also about the role they may have 
played as precursors to the Hungarian revolutions of 1918 and 1919.
Of course, given the already impressive linguistic and geo-
graphic scope of the book, it is both understandable and perhaps also 
forgivable that Chernev has given the Hungarian side of the story short 
shrift. That being said, he does drop a bomb of sorts near the very end 
of the final chapter, one that makes up for earlier oversights. Reflecting 
on the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk from “the perspective of Imperial 
collapse and decolonization,” Chernev argues that it has less in com-
mon with Versailles (the treaty to which it is typically compared), and 
more in common with Trianon, which the victorious powers “imposed 
on Hungary” in 1920. Though often regarded simply as a nation-state in 
and of itself, Chernev suggests that, like the Russian Empire, Hungary 
was in many ways also a colonial power, albeit a junior one within the 
much bigger Habsburg Empire.
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As provocative—and I think necessary—as Chernev’s 
 comparison between the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Trianon might 
be, I doubt the book will find its way into many university-level courses 
that focus specifically on Hungarian history. But it can and should find 
a home on the shelves of students and scholars interested not only in 
the history of World War I and the peace negotiations and treaties that 
followed, but also in the history of East Central Europe and the early 
years of the Soviet Union more generally. Chernev’s masterful study 
will also appeal to readers who revel in the detail-oriented analyses of 
diplomatic history, or who appreciate the intricacies and complexities of 
international relations. Beautifully written and skilfully edited,  Twilight 
of  Empire is a valuable and entertaining history, and if nothing else, pro-
vides clear and often dramatic insight into the meeting of “two vastly 
different worlds,” one bent on shaping the future along revolutionary 
lines, and the other content with preserving the imperial status quo, and 
containing the Bolshevik threat.
Steven Jobbitt
Lakehead University
NOTE
 1.  József Galántai, Hungary in the First World War (Budapest: Akadémiai, 
1989).
Zsolt Nagy. Great Expectations and Interwar Realities:  Hungarian 
 Cultural Diplomacy, 1918-1941. Budapest and New York: Central 
 European University Press, 2017. 341 pages. ISBN: 978-9-6338-6194-3
With the country lacking the possibility of a nationally driven foreign 
policy during the years of Austro-Hungarian dualism, cultural diplo-
macy was a pursuit that Hungarian politicians could engage in only with 
the creation of an independent state in 1918. After the turmoil of the 
immediate post-war years, punctuated by the demise of the short-lived 
democratic-liberal Hungarian republic born on November 16, 1918 and 
the rise and fall of the Soviet Republic of Councils in the spring and 
summer of 1919, Hungary turned into a conservative authoritarian re-
gime under the leadership of Regent Miklós Horthy for the rest of the 
interwar period. It is therefore the cultural diplomacy of this regime that 
Review_1.indd   120 07/10/20   4:50 PM
121Book Reviews
Zsolt Nagy’s book examines, by focusing on state agencies, cultural 
institutions, scholarly publications, tourism, radio, and newsreels as in-
struments for creating a specific image of Hungary for audiences abroad.
The core chapters of the book are framed by the perspective 
of the transition from a rather ineffective wartime propaganda, whose 
reach was limited, to a more coordinated peacetime cultural diplomacy 
supervised by the government and various national institutions during 
the interwar years. After uncoordinated attempts during the early 1920s 
by a variety of right-wing groups at persuading the Allies of the  injustice 
of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, it was mostly after 1927 that cul-
tural diplomacy gained more traction in Hungary’s foreign policy. The 
 institutions in charge of this effort were the Ministry of Foreign  Affairs 
and the Ministry of Religion and Public Education.  Subordinated to the 
broad goals of revisionism and improving Hungary’s  image abroad, 
Hungarian cultural diplomacy of the late 1920s and 1930s tried to 
change negative Western European perceptions of Hungary. It  attempted 
this by emphasizing the country’s belonging to the sphere of Western 
civilization and modernity, which—in the interpretation of its propo-
nents—entitled Hungarians to claim cultural  superiority over their 
southeastern neighbors. The architects of this new strategy were Count 
Kuno Klebelsberg, the Minister of Religion and Public Education in 
the István Bethlen government between 1922 and 1931 and, to a lesser 
extent, Miklós Kozma, the first head of Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI 
–  Hungarian Telegraphic Office), whose reach as cultural propagandist 
also extended to a variety of other media such as radio and newsreels.
However, there was often disagreement about what kind of 
 image of Hungarianness to highlight for the consumption of foreign au-
diences. Ever since the rise of Hungarian nationalism in the nineteenth 
century, Magyars oscillated between adopting Western and  Oriental 
identities. The split consciousness that the continuous movement be-
tween the two caused in Hungarians’ self-image was well  encapsulated 
by Endre Ady’s metaphor of komp-ország (ferry-land) that he coined at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. During the interwar period, how-
ever, rejecting both the internationalist image proposed in 1918–19 by 
liberals and communists and the oriental fantasies of extreme right-wing 
groups, conservative nationalist governments chose to emphasize in-
stead the Western and Christian character of Hungary. Instantiated by 
the promotion of the image and cult of St. Stephen, the first Christian 
king of Hungary, over that of Árpád, the pagan chieftain who led the 
Magyar tribes to Pannonia, this self-image connected Hungary both to 
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European civilization and a transnational Catholic ecumene. By virtue 
of the battles that the medieval kingdom of Hungary fought against 
the Ottomans, this connection was further cemented in the portrayal of 
Hungary as scutus Christi (the shield of Christianity), a trope that came 
to be frequently used in debates about the Hungarian national character 
that took center stage during the interwar period.
As the chief architect of Hungary’s cultural diplomacy, 
 Klebelsberg warned against relying on past achievements; he wanted 
the country to enter the future on new terms based “on the rejuvena-
tion and reconstruction of the country’s cultural life,” which would 
allow “Hungary to join European cultural life” (94). Therefore the 
ambitious cultural reconstruction program that he set out for Hungary 
included not just the expansion of public education domestically and 
the borrowing of foreign models for the rebuilding of the country’s 
 scientific infrastructure, but also the establishment of several outposts 
of  Hungarian culture abroad. Following in the footsteps of some older 
Hungarian cultural  institutions established in Vienna and Rome prior to 
the war, he developed a new network of Collegium Hungaricum insti-
tutes in Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, together with a “Hungarian-French 
University Information Institute in Paris, and five lectureships at insti-
tutions of higher education in Germany, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and 
Poland” (117). A lesser-known outpost of Hungarian culture abroad, 
discussed in detail by Nagy, is the Hungarian Reference Library in New 
York City, opened in 1937 with materials purchased indirectly by the 
Hungarian government from the widow of Károly (Charles) Feleky, an 
American-Hungarian collector of English-language books, journals, 
and news clippings about Hungary. The activities of these institutions 
were supported from home not just financially but also through a wide 
array of foreign-language publications aiming to acquaint foreign audi-
ences with Hungarian culture, science, and literature, among which the 
Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie and the Hungarian Quarterly stood out.
Propaganda in the service of tourism was also soon enrolled 
to help with these efforts. With the foreign orientation of its tourism 
development, Hungary differed from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, 
where the focus of the state fell on developing domestic tourism. Based 
on a wide array of archival evidence, Nagy convincingly explores the 
variety of connections and interactions between different government 
organizations, Hungarian embassies abroad, and municipal and civic 
tourist organizations at home, whose ultimate aim was to attract more 
foreign tourists to Hungary. In parallel, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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also made it one of its priorities to sponsor foreign journalists and pub-
lic figures to write and speak favorably about Hungary, a practice in 
which the country competed with the Little Entente powers. The 1930s 
 indeed turned into a golden age of Hungarian tourism, with Budapest 
and Lake Balaton being visited by many Germans, Austrians, English-
men, Frenchmen, and Americans, along with travelers from the neigh-
boring countries. Conflict over the meaning of Hungarianness resulted 
in tourism promoters presenting an image of Hungary which included 
the modern architecture, spa culture, and cosmopolitan nightlife of 
 Budapest, together with romantic and folkloristic highlights such as the 
wilderness of the Hungarian puszta (plain) and the matyó costumes of 
Mezőkövesd—a composite image which continued to place the country 
in an ambivalent Western/Eastern position.
In the last chapter of the book, Nagy analyzes the role that radio 
programming and Kulturfilme (culture shorts) had in Hungary’s over-
all cultural diplomacy efforts. Once turned operational, radio broadcasts 
were used by the government both as an effective outreach tool to Hun-
garian speakers living in the neighboring countries and as a medium en-
abling it to promote Hungarian culture abroad. Economic considerations 
were also important, since radio programming enabled the government to 
collect a license fee from listeners. Rather than giving in to pressure from 
extreme right-wing groups to broadcast exclusively in Hungarian, and in 
line with Klebelsberg’s efforts to Europeanize Hungarian culture, radio 
broadcasting was multi-lingual, including numerous programs in Eng-
lish, French, German, and Italian, as well as music ranging from magyar 
nóta (Hungarian folk songs) to American jazz. The author’s discussion 
of the infrastructural development of radio broadcasting, with a veritable 
race developing between Hungary and its neighbors for the greatest pos-
sible power and reach of their respective radio stations, provides another 
interesting comparative insight. The production of Hungarian newsreels 
and Kulturfilme was also an endeavor that encountered fierce competi-
tion on the international market for such fare from the Little Entente 
countries. Although Hungarian propagandistic shorts like Hungária 
(produced in 1928 and remade in 1934) were successful both at home 
and abroad, they had to compete against similar products such as the 
Czech Saint Wenceslas and the Romanian Romania Today—Picturesque 
Romania, which lessened their overall impact on foreign audiences.
The book breaks new ground by providing thematic, compara-
tive, and analytical insights into the way interwar Hungarian cultural 
propaganda was developed at the intersection of governmental and 
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private interests. With its wide and informed coverage of the history of 
Hungarian cultural diplomacy during the interwar years, Nagy’s work 
can be usefully read along such publications as Andrea Orzoff’s Bat-
tle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948 
(2009),
1
 which discusses parallel propagandistic image-making efforts 
in interwar Czechoslovakia. In contrast to Czechoslovakia, whose pro-
paganda campaigns were largely effective, Hungary’s efforts—based 
as they were on the promotion of the country’s cultural superiority and 
the need for the revision of its borders—ultimately foundered, due not 
just to the country’s siding with Germany in WWII, but also to a sense 
of cultural arrogance that could not accept Hungary’s status as a minor 
power and acknowledge interwar realities.
Alexander Vari
Marywood University
NOTE
 1.  Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in 
Europe, 1914–1948 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Frey, David. Jews, Nazis, and the Cinema of Hungary: The Tragedy 
of Success, 1929–44. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018. 462 
pages. ISBN 978-1-7807-6451-1
The late (Jewish) American-Hungarian Andy Vajna, known for  producing 
the Rambo films, among many others, was in 2011  installed by the then-
new Fidesz government as “film czar,” and established the  Hungarian 
National Film Fund. In late 2018, he came under fierce  attack in the 
pages of the regime-true paper Magyar Idők for his “ un-Hungarian” 
choices of director and screenwriter for a historical epic about János 
Hunyadi, hero of the 1453 defense of Belgrade (the project was sus-
pended after Vajna’s sudden death a few months later). Around the time 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was being savaged by Jewish communi-
ties and their allies at home and abroad for the 2014 erection in central 
Budapest of the Memorial for Victims of the German Occupation, which 
was seen as a nationalist distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, 
the Vajna-controlled fund rescued the production of the universally ac-
claimed, Oscar-winning Auschwitz drama Saul fia (Son of Saul).
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David Frey’s award-winning study
1
 of the Hungarian film 
 industry from the advent of sound film to the German occupation 
 concludes with a blistering critique of Orbán’s revival of a “concep-
tualization of national identity based on cultural, and even racial, 
 distinction” (397). He does not mention Vajna—who, as fate would 
have it, was born the year Frey’s account ends—but the contradic-
tions of the  Hollywood producer imported to nationalize Hungarian 
film,  denounced by his  patron’s allies for crimes against Hungarian 
memory, after having  either defied the prime minister’s anti-Semitism 
or  protected his flank in a crisis, generating an international triumph 
for the state, seem to  perfectly reprise and reflect the continuous and 
convoluted political and economic struggles thoroughly detailed in this 
excellent volume.
As his title indicates, Frey sees both the determinant condi-
tions and the internal nature of Hungarian film in this period as riven 
with paradoxes. The industry operated on a capitalist basis, while sub-
ject to state domination; the 1932 film Repülő arany (Flying gold), for 
example, was an “attempt to leverage international backing to forge a 
Hungarian cosmopolitanism . . . [which] functioned as national” (52). 
Hungarian film thereafter took advantage of “international film nation-
alism” (53), in the form of émigrés returning from Nazifying Germany, 
while the construction of “a ‘Christian national’ Hungarian film indus-
try” depended on “Hungarian ‘film Jews’” (13). These ambiguities left 
“Hungarian bureaucrats, from censors to diplomats . . . tantalized and 
confused” (74). Ironically, however, “it was also these internal contra-
dictions and imbalances that prevented the Hungarian motion picture 
industry from ruining itself” (11). By the end of the decade, when a 
would-be Gleichschaltung was on the table, it was sabotaged at every 
turn by conflict and competition between different interests (produc-
ers, distributors, exhibitors), institutions and agencies, and political 
orientations.
The narrative begins with a brief description of the 1912–18 
“first golden age of Hungarian film” (29), which produced such later 
international luminaries as Alexander [Sándor] Korda, Michael Curtiz, 
and Béla Lugosi, and ended with Hungary as the third-greatest film 
power, behind the US and Denmark, in terms of numbers of films pro-
duced. But the brutality of the counterrevolution, and the early Horthy 
regime’s heavy-handedness, left the industry in ruins within a decade. 
The arrival of sound film at the end of the 1920s constituted a challenge, 
especially to a linguistically isolated, relatively poor country, but also 
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an opportunity. At a moment when defining national identity became 
paramount, especially in the new states of East Central Europe, “sound 
nationalized film.” (35). While the interwar state was historically condi-
tioned to want to dominate culture, the memory of the nationalizations 
during the reviled 1919 Council Republic, as well as continuing eco-
nomic crisis, prevented it from playing a major role in film financing. 
Combined with the capital-intensive nature of film production, espe-
cially in the sound era, and the particular nature of Hungarian devel-
opment, this meant that “Jewish capital” predominated. The influx of 
exiles from Berlin (site of the European vanguard until the end of the 
Weimar Republic); the  possession of relevant skills, education, and ap-
titudes conducive to  success in a thoroughly modern arena; and their 
local and international connections meant that Jews (or, “Jews”—Frey 
makes clear his view of the term as ascriptive) dominated the creative 
side as well.
The power and popularity of the “Hollywood model” 
 offered great success to its imitators and developers in Hungary, but 
also “a clear concept of nation, envisaging the liberal cosmopolitan, 
consumption-oriented middle class of Budapest as the symbol of 
 modern Hungary” (91). Inevitably, however, this “urbanist” ideal was 
contested, as “discussions of ‘national film’ and a healthy ‘national film 
culture’ became surrogates for the basic question of ‘What is Hungar-
ian?’” (76). The mogul István Gerő, head of what was known as the 
“Gerő trust,” a movie theater conglomerate which soon moved into film 
production, became the target of attacks on what nationalists such as 
the Turul Society saw as a “Jewish conspiracy” (112). The so-called 
“Jewish Question,” which by the late 1930s became an obsession across 
the Hungarian intelligentsia, was “not always linked to the Jewishness 
of those who made the films” but to “cosmopolitan, middle-class, and 
 urban Hungary and its mass culture” (183). This was compounded 
by the growing influence of Germany—a desperately desired mar-
ket for  Hungarian film—and its attempts to impose its “Aryan para-
graph” (146). The government’s  response was the creation of the Film 
 Chamber, “a component of a  corporatist wave” (194) meant to subject 
the industry to the perceived national will; but it was continually foiled 
by “jurisdictional questions” (193) and “conflicts of interest” (203).
The passage of the First Jewish Law in 1938 was followed by the 
1939 “production crisis” which, Frey argues, though not unconnected, 
(also) “came down to matters of risk, entrepreneurship, and interwar 
Hungary’s tormented relationship with the capitalist system” (208). The 
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outcome was a “hybrid system . . . partially sat[ing] rightist desires for 
centralization, increased government direction, and minimized risk,” 
but also “reintegrat[ing] Jewish capital and talent” (210). As might be 
expected, this led to the well-known “strawman” practice, of Christian 
fronts for Jewish talent and capital, and an order “fraught with con-
tradictory bureaucratic, financial, and moral imperatives” (211). At the 
same time, the 1938 and 1940 Vienna Awards, and the Transcarpathian 
and especially Yugoslav territories annexed in 1939 and 1941, coupled 
with the destruction, disabling, or absorption by Nazi aggression of 
much of  European film production capacity, opened up unprecedented 
opportunities for Hungarian film: “Hungarian Garbos and Gables were 
the means by which their nation would re-establish its pre-1918 cul-
tural, political, and economic authority in Central Europe and the Bal-
kans” (274). These dreams were fulfilled to a surprising degree through 
the course of the war, but were ultimately foiled by Germany’s ma-
nipulations to prevent any challenge to its dominance in the Nazi “New 
 Order.” In the final analysis, “political squabbles, contrary political and 
economic imperatives, talent shortages, cultural inertia, and interna-
tional pressures . . . stymied the establishment’s attempts to unite behind 
any lucid concept of a Christian national film system” (336).
Based on exhaustive and wide-ranging research carried out 
for his 2003 dissertation and since in numerous archives in Hungary, 
 Germany, and the US, covering and illuminating a veritable alphabet 
soup of governmental, quasi-governmental, and private agencies and 
institutions, this work fills a significant lacuna in Hungarian film  studies 
in English, which have mostly focused on the postwar period, and, to 
the extent this era is covered at all, on individual films and directors.
2
 
Its transnational perspective—not just during the war, but from the 
start, with the “transnational origins” (46) of Hungarian film—is most 
welcome, in the context of still largely national film studies. Also ap-
preciated is its relentless excavation of the conflicted, contested, multi-
sided nature of national identity and the struggles around it, which 
belies the traditional picture of uniform and “totalitarian” forces of anti- 
Semitism and German-occupied Europe. It also introduces the reader 
to  fascinating, largely unknown aspects of Hungarian film history, such 
as the “lynchpin” (274) role of Yugoslavia post-1936 in the expansion 
of the industry; the role of the “narrow” (16 mm) film trade, for alter-
native genres and venues, and mightily struggled over both domesti-
cally and vis-à-vis Germany; and the wartime crisis of raw film stock 
 supply, dominated by Germany and used as a cudgel against Hungarian 
 production, leading to forced economizing and loss of quality.
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A couple quibbles, in no way meant to diminish Frey’s achieve-
ment: I find unfortunate his uncritical use of the term “backwardness,” 
as in “an intermixing of government, business, and culture unique to 
the smaller and less democratic European states” (36). Alongside the 
almost uniformly positive portrayal of the role of Hollywood, and of 
those  acting according to purely capitalist or market dictates, as ques-
tioned only by narrow-minded nationalists, this seems to privilege a 
Western and liberal orientation. (Here it should be noted that plenty of 
“Jewish” cosmopolitan “urbanists” in interwar Hungary were critical of 
capitalism, liberalism, and the West.) And while Frey introduces “popu-
lism” as “encompassing an enormous spectrum of thought” (89), and as 
“simultaneously conservative, revolutionary, and divided, with strong 
left and right-wing components” (125n68), as his narrative and the 
spread of Right-radical ideology proceed, the use of the term becomes 
(e.g., at 338 and 364) increasingly constricted, as practically a surrogate 
for  anti-Semitic proponents of a “changing of the guard.” While it is 
true that the interwar Hungarian populist movement had an increasingly 
problematic stance on the “Jewish Question,” and several individu-
als drifted close to or into the Arrow Cross orbit (while others were or 
became Communists), the movement had significant roots in agrarian 
socialism and stood (mostly) steadfastly opposed to the neo-feudal aris-
tocratic order. Several populist writers in fact signed onto the intellectu-
als’ protest letter against the First Jewish Law, or otherwise opposed the 
wartime regime. Thus the “failure of populism” was not just bureau-
cratic, or a conflict between ideological and commercial imperatives: 
it was political—as Frey actually shows in his fascinating analyses of 
several wartime films, in which “dangerous” class critiques were forc-
ibly transferred by the powers that be into racial ones (A harmincadik 
[The thirtieth]; Dr. Kovács István [Dr. István Kovács]);  or shelved alto-
gether (Szerető fia, Péter [Your loving son, Peter]). (I would have loved 
to see such incisive analyses of some of the prewar films.) Finally, while 
the book is well written, I found numerous typos, missing or misplaced 
hyphens, and other minor technical issues.
I will close with another aside: the prominent actor Antal 
Páger appears here as the exemplar of artistic anti-Semitism, labeled as 
“fascist-leaning” (347) and “the ubiquitous face of Hungarian rightist 
populism” (359), and said to have been enlisted to “prepare an industry 
blacklist”—all no doubt true. What Frey doesn’t mention is that, after 
fleeing to Austria, France, and finally South America at the end of the 
war, Páger was rehabilitated and returned to Hungary in August 1956, 
on a special plane chartered by the Communist government. He then 
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went on to star in the most remarkable Holocaust film of the pre-1989 
era, Zoltán Fábri’s 1966 Utószezon (Late season).
3
 Perhaps his story 
indicates a way forward?
Richard S. Esbenshade
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
NOTES
 1.  Frey’s book was awarded the Hungarian Studies Association Book Prize 
in 2019.
 2.  But see also, appearing roughly simultaneously, Gábor Gergely, Hungarian 
Film, 1929-1947: National Identity, Anti-Semitism, and Popular Cinema 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018).
 3.  See Máté Zombory, András Lénárt, and Anna Lujza Szász, “Elfeledett 
szembenézés: Holokauszt és emlékezés Fábri Zoltán Utószezon c. 
filmjében” [Forgotten reckoning: Holocaust and memory in Zoltán Fábri’s 
film Late season], BUKSZ 25, no. 3 (2013), 245–56.
Árpád von Klimó. Remembering Cold Days: The 1942 Massacre of Novi 
Sad, Hungarian Politics, and Society, 1942–1989. Pittsburgh:  University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2018. 268 pages. ISBN 978-0-8229-6545-9
In January 1942, Hungarian occupying forces conducted a series of 
raids against Serbian partisans in the occupied territory of Vojvodina, 
which Hungary had reannexed during the invasion of Yugoslavia sev-
eral months before. The most eventful of these raids occurred in the city 
of Novi Sad, where over the course of three days Hungarian soldiers and 
gendarmes executed more than a thousand civilians, most of whom had 
no connection to the partisans. Witnesses both in the city and in neigh-
boring Croatia (where the executions could be seen from the southern 
bank of the Danube) brought immediate attention to the atrocities, and 
it became one of the most high-profile crimes of the Second World War. 
The Novi Sad massacre and its long afterlife as a site of memory is the 
subject of Árpád von Klimó’s latest monograph.
The first section of the book chronicles the raids and their 
 immediate aftermath. Klimó describes how military leaders in Novi 
Sad  summoned tens of thousands of people to appear before ad-hoc 
 verification committees, over the protests of civilian authorities, who 
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argued that the actions would destabilize the city. The action quickly 
devolved into “the random killing of innocent civilians,” with Jews 
making up a disproportionate number of the victims (27). This has 
led scholars to suggest that Novi Sad be considered a precursor to the 
Holocaust in Hungary in 1944. Klimó argues that Serbian–Hungarian 
territorial rivalry over the city, as well as the growing belief among 
members of Hungarian society that persecuting Jews furthered social 
justice and aimed to rectify “the unequal distribution of wealth” in the 
country, were important contributing factors to the atrocities in Novi 
Sad (38). However, he contends that the desire on the part of Hungarian 
officers to contribute to Hitler’s vision of a “New Europe” by copying 
 German occupational strategies was the main reason for the massacre 
(41). Klimó’s detailed description of the historical event brings in new 
 scholarship on borderlands, wartime atrocities, and perpetrator moti-
vations that  contextualize the Novi Sad massacre within the broader 
 European  historiography of the Second World War. From a meta 
 perspective, it also serves as his own contribution to the memory of the 
massacre.
The first section concludes with two chapters describing  various 
responses to the Novi Sad massacres. These included a somewhat half-
hearted attempt to hold officers responsible for the raid during the war, 
mass reprisals against ethnic Hungarians by Tito’s partisans, and a 
 series of postwar trials in both Hungary and Yugoslavia. Klimó argues 
that the postwar trials had revenge as their main motivator, part of the 
continent-wide phenomenon of the “politics of retribution” explored by 
István Deák, Jan Gross, and Tony Judt, among others. The postwar pe-
riod also saw a distortion of the memory of the crime, as many commen-
tators, especially those aligned with the Hungarian Communist Party, 
attempted to exonerate the “Hungarian people” from any responsibility 
for war crimes, attributing them solely to class enemies or the country’s 
German minority (92).
In the second part of the book, Klimó explores Novi Sad as a 
“site of memory” by tracing the development of popular memory of the 
massacre through the post-World War II decades. He begins with the 
Stalinist period in Hungary, where he argues that the “future-oriented 
Stalinist discourse” had little place for remembrance of the massacre, 
or the war in general (109). It was not until the 1960s that the Novi 
Sad massacre became widely discussed, due largely to the success of 
the novel Cold Days and its subsequent film version, which was one 
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of the first explorations of personal responsibility for crimes commit-
ted in the name of the “institutional structures” of the state (142). By 
dramatizing the event, author Tibor Cseres and director András Kovács 
transformed Novi Sad into a “symbol of Hungarian guilt” and gave a 
lasting descriptor—the Cold Days—to the 1942 massacre (156).
Remembering Cold Days concludes with a look at how memory 
of the Novi Sad massacre intersected with larger trends in historical 
memory in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War. Klimó 
suggests that “radical shifts in Hungarians’ understanding of their past 
and in remembering the victims of mass violence” might be considered 
one of the domestic catalysts for regime change (153). While Novi Sad 
was one of the first instances of mass violence that was widely dis-
cussed, this process broadened in the 1980s to include remembrance of 
the Second World War in Hungary more generally. Klimó also touches 
upon contested interpretations of the Novi Sad massacre and the post-
war reprisals in Yugoslavia, and the 2011 trial of Sándor Képiró for his 
role as an officer during the raids, which brought a renewed focus to the 
Cold Days in the twenty-first century.
Remembering Cold Days moves forward the historiography 
of a number of fields, including the history of World War II violence, 
postwar trials, the cultural history of postwar Hungary, domestic and 
international politics of memory, and 1989 regime change. It also ef-
fectively demonstrates the many ways in which collective memory 
manifests—politically, juridically, artistically, historically—and weaves 
these strands together into a compelling narrative. Klimó’s work of-
fers plenty of avenues for future research: the specifically Jewish as-
pects of the memory of Novi Sad, the postwar massacres of Hungarians 
and Germans in Vojvodina, and the distinct role of the Cold Days in 
the much broader memory wars during the breakup of Yugoslavia all 
deserve deeper investigation than this one monograph can provide. In 
particular, Klimó’s contention that changes in historical memory in 
Hungary helped motivate regime change has implications for Central 
and Eastern European historiography more broadly, and will hopefully 
lead other scholars to take up similar case studies in order to determine 
whether this was a regional or even continent-wide phenomenon in the 
leadup to 1989.
Leslie Waters
The University of Texas at El Paso
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Zsuzsa Gille. Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud. The Politics of 
 Materiality in the European Union. Bloomington: Indiana  University 
Press, 2016. 164 pages. ISBN 978-0-2530-1946-2
When in 2017, after the publication of this volume, an openly discussed 
double standard for food quality within the European Union shook the 
public in East Central Europe, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
declared at the extraordinary Consumer Summit of the Visegrád Four 
countries in Bratislava, “Central Europeans are treated as second-class 
citizens when it comes to the quality of food products.” The scandal 
came in more than handy for his populist-nationalist Fidesz party. 
While official rhetoric typically alludes to the threat of immigrants to 
Hungarian cultural identity and sovereignty, this outcry confirmed an-
other dominant narrative of the relationship with the European Union, 
whereby Hungary is subject to inequality and exploitation. In this ac-
count, mainly western European multinational companies use the 
eastern market to sell goods of inferior quality, exemplifying the devel-
opmental chasm between East and West, despite Hungary being a full 
member of the single market. Hungarian-American sociologist Zsuzsa 
Gille, in her study Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud: The Politics of 
Materiality in the European Union, connects her analysis brilliantly 
with the above-mentioned discourse, and shows that nothing less than 
national identity is complicating the relationship between the nation 
state and the supranational European Union. She argues that practices of 
production and consumption which became increasingly governed by 
new regulative EU standards began to negatively affect public opinion 
on the  question of Hungary’s EU membership.
With the Hungarian paprika ban in 2004, the foie gras boycott 
in 2008, and finally the red mud spill in 2010, Gille introduces three dis-
tinct scandals that shaped how ordinary Hungarians view the  European 
Union’s impact on their daily lives. Each of the incidents discussed 
touches upon domestic economic practices and notions of national iden-
tity, and, as Gille intends, will provide the reader with an alternative 
 understanding of the relationship between them. By grasping the politi-
cal in seemingly apolitical practices, Gille attempts to conceptualise a 
“new modality of power” (4) from the context of the local, shedding 
new light on globalisation as an external force.
The bulk of the book is devoted to three concrete case studies, 
starting with the first to take place, the paprika ban in the autumn of 
2004. Anyone who has ever been to Hungary, and even those who have 
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not, may well know that paprika powder is a basic ingredient of Hun-
garian cuisine. When it was found that the concentration of aflatoxin 
B1, a carcinogenic mycotoxin, in some paprika powder products far 
exceeded allowed EU levels, the elementary spice in domestic cook-
ing practices disappeared overnight from the shelves, becoming un-
available to Hungarian consumers for several days. Gille shows how 
Hungary’s accession to the single market led to paprika powder being 
diluted with cheap imports from Spain and Brazil. Hungary assumed 
that paprika from these markets would be protected by EU regulations, 
but instead discovered that tests at ports of entry and in Spain were not 
carried out at all. It is therefore an example of how confusion about 
competencies of supranational and national authorities can lead to the 
entry of contaminated paprika into the single market and then Hungary. 
Gille demonstrates in this chapter how EU membership also amounted 
to deregulation and selective regulation in Hungary.
In the subsequent chapter she moves on to highly specialised 
foie gras production, a product which Hungary succeeded in retaining 
and even increasing its market share of. Gille describes how in 2006 the 
Austrian animal rights organisation Vier Pfoten (Four Paws) charged 
the Hungarian foie gras industry with operating unethically. After the 
paprika fiasco, this was the second such scandal to shake the Hungar-
ian public. Gille succeeds brilliantly in creating a balanced analysis of 
different players in the conflict, including the Hungarian poultry in-
dustry, small-scale farmers, workers, and Four Paws, as well as sub-
stantial  German economic interests in the form of the German poultry 
giant  Wiesenhof. Various inconsistencies within the Austrian-led ani-
mal rights campaign resulted in defensive reactions from the Hungar-
ian public, which saw national traditions that had been practiced for 
 centuries—and therefore national identity itself—at stake. Official nar-
ratives responding to this controversy expressed a general sense of vic-
timhood in relation to the powerful supranational organisation.
The third case study, on the red mud catastrophe in 2010, differs 
insofar as it is not centred on food production but on the waste prod-
uct of a highly alkaline by-product of aluminium production. When the 
largest pond, Number 10, burst its banks, it covered the small town of 
Devecser in western Hungary in red mud, not only making major parts 
of the area inhabitable but taking the lives of ten inhabitants. During 
the investigation of this environmental and human disaster, it became 
obvious that a major factor was the EU’s waste code, which did not 
categorise red mud as hazardous, as it had been previously considered 
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according to the Basel Convention. Gille points to the imbalances in the 
regulation processes whereby marketisation and democratisation had 
to be accomplished by the time of EU accession, while environmental 
regulations were given a period of up to 15 years to align. In addition 
to other factors, Gille also detects controversial privatisation strategies 
among the causes of the catastrophe.
The last, methodologically rich chapter, “Neoliberalism, 
 Molecularization, and the Shift to Governance,” further elaborates the 
relationship between small and big in the context of nation states and 
 supranational organisations. Here she is especially interested in ques-
tions of agency, and in how supranational governing practices are 
 fulfilling their criteria of transparency and democracy.
While Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud is meticulously 
 researched and convincingly argued, one would have liked to know 
more about the potential benefits of EU membership, how EU funds are 
being used and who specifically is profiting from them. Other than as 
potential beneficiaries, the role of the party in power, Fidesz, remains 
underexposed in the analysis. It would have enriched the scope of the 
book to look deeper into contradictions between the party’s rhetoric and 
its political practices.
Beyond that, the methodologically profound study gives a 
highly original interpretation of the rise of EU scepticism in the region 
and specifically in Hungary. Fidesz’s critique of immigration policies 
and the allegedly illegitimate influence of internationally operating 
NGOs is connected with a particular form of national identity which 
has been shaken by the three cases Gille describes in her book. To a 
major extent these cases explain why Orbán is able to build his political 
success partly by criticizing the European Union, from which Hungary 
as well as a tightly connected political elite is profiting.
Ultimately, its main merit lies in deepening the understanding 
of the real issues at stake between the European Union and the Hungar-
ian population, without looking through the lenses of Fidesz’s perfor-
mative rhetorical practices. Gille rather explains why Fidesz’s anti-EU 
campaigns, including questions of unequal food quality and the chal-
lenge of migration, fall on a hotbed of popular perceptions shaped by 
mechanisms for coping with new standards and regulations which came 
along with EU membership.
In this context, Gille identifies a weakness in liberal politicians 
in addressing inequalities between Western Europe and Hungary within 
the frame of the supranational European Union. Therefore, her aim is 
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nothing less than to provide sociologically informed “alternative inter-
pretations of [the inequalities’] origins, not in order to strengthen the 
right wing but to combat it” (135). It can only be wished that Gille’s 
book will be read not only by people interested in the small nation of 
Hungary. Above all it should be read by those concerned about the 
increasingly tense relationship between East Central Europe and the 
 European Union, and who wish to increase their understanding beyond 
well-known patterns of interpretation.
Annina Gagyiova
Charles University Prague
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ÁRPÁD VON KLIMÓ teaches European History as Ordinary Professor 
at The Catholic University of America. He is the author of Remember-
ing Cold Days: The 1942 Massacre of Novi Sad and Hungarian Politics 
and Society, 1942-1989 (Pittsburgh University Press, 2018) and Hungary 
since 1945 (Routledge, 2018). He also co-edited the Routledge History 
of East Central Europe since 1700 (2017), and is an editor of the Hun-
garian Studies Review. He is currently working on a project on global 
anticommunism in the early 1970s, focusing on the followers of Cardi-
nal Mindszenty.
FERENC LACZÓ is an assistant professor with tenure (Universitair 
 Docent 1) at Maastricht University, where he teaches European history 
with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe. He is the author of three 
books, including Hungarian Jews in the Age of Genocide: An Intellec-
tual History, 1929–1948 (Brill, 2016). He is the co-editor, with Luka 
Lisjak  Gabrijelcic, of The Legacy of Division: East and West after 
1989 (CEU Press–Eurozine, 2020) and, with Wlodzimierz Borodziej 
and Joachim von Puttkamer, of The Routledge History Handbook of 
Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 3: Intellectual 
10_Contributors.indd   137 07/10/20   4:47 PM
138 Hungarian Studies Review
Horizons (Routledge, 2020). Beyond in English and his native Hungar-
ian, his writings have appeared in Czech, Danish, German, Hebrew, 
Italian, Polish, Slovene, and Turkish translation.
IBOLYA MURBER is Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University 
(ELTE). She earned her Ph.D. from ELTE in 2005, and completed her 
habilitation at ELTE in 2013. Between 2001 and 2004 she served as an 
archivist at the Hungarian National Archives in Budapest, and between 
2007 and 2016 was a faculty member at the University of West Hungary 
in Sopron. She has been a visiting professor at the University of Vienna 
and Saarland University, and in 2019–20 held an OeAD Richard Plaschka 
Fellowship in Vienna. Her research focuses on twentieth-century his-
tory, and is centered primarily on diplomacy and international relations, 
Central European migration, and Austro-Hungarian relations.
JUDITH SZAPOR is Associate Professor at the Department of History 
and Classical Studies, McGill University, Montreal. She has written on 
intellectual, women’s, and student movements, Jewish assimilation, and 
the intellectual migration in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centu-
ries in Hungary and Central Europe. Her second monograph, Hungarian 
Women’s Activism in the Wake of the First World War: From Rights to 
Revanche (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018) was published in paperback in 
2019. She was a senior fellow at the Wiesenthal Institute for Holocaust 
Research in Vienna in 2018, and at the Institute for Advance Study of 
Central European University in Budapest in 2020. Her current, SSHRC-
funded research project explores the impact of Hungary’s notorious 
1920 numerus clausus law on Hungarian Jewish women and families.
BOLDIZSÁR VÖRÖS studied history and Hungarian literature and 
linguistics at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. He is a senior re-
search fellow at the Institute of History of the Research Centre for the 
Humanities, Budapest. His research fields are Hungarian cultural his-
tory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with special regard to 
political propaganda (for example, analyses of monuments, newsreels, 
feasts, burials, newspapers, curricula, literary pieces, and naming, as 
well as the investigation of peculiar phenomena such as rumours and 
jokes related to political and social changes). In addition to his books, 
including “A múltat végképp eltörölni”? Történelmi személyiségek a 
magyarországi szociáldemokrata és kommunista propagandában 1890-
1919 (“To finally wipe away the past?” Historical personalities in Social 
10_Contributors.indd   138 07/10/20   4:47 PM
139Our Contributors
Democratic and Communist propaganda in Hungary, 1890–1919) (MTA 
Történettudományi Intézete, 2004), he is author of a number of articles 
and papers.
LESLIE WATERS is Assistant Professor of History at the University 
of Texas at El Paso. She received her PhD in history from UCLA in 
2012, and is a former Fulbright and Mellon fellow. Her research fo-
cuses on the ways in which border changes affect broader society, 
including migration, ethnic cleansing, and identity politics. Her first 
book, Borders on the Move: Territorial Change and Ethnic Cleansing 
in the Hungarian-Slovak Borderlands, 1938–1948 is forthcoming from 
University of Rochester Press. Dr. Waters is a member of the Hungar-
ian Studies Association and Slovak Studies Association executive com-
mittees. She teaches courses on modern Europe, Central and Eastern 
Europe, and comparative borderlands.
10_Contributors.indd   139 07/10/20   4:47 PM
10_Contributors.indd   140 07/10/20   4:47 PM
Call for Submissions
The editors of Hungarian Studies Review are seeking proposals and submissions for the 
following types of manuscripts:
• Articles: 5000–7000 words (plus notes) based on original research and analysis. 
Submissions will be subject to peer review.
• Thematic Article Cluster: 2–4 articles (5000–7000 words per article plus notes) and an 
introduction (800–1000 words) on a theme. Proposals should be sent to the managing 
editor prior to submission. Subject to peer and editorial review.
• Roundtables: A cluster of 5–7 statements (800–1000 words per text with very limited 
notes plus a short introductory essay) that reflect conversations and debates about a topic 
or theme that have come primarily from an in-person or virtual roundtable. Proposals 
should be sent to the managing editor prior to submission. Subject to editorial input and 
review.
• Forums: A cluster of 4–6 essays (1500–2500 words with limited notes) and an 
introduction (800–1000 words) on an issue related to a historical or contemporary debate, 
controversy, or question pertinent to Hungarian studies. Proposals should be sent to the 
managing editor prior to submission. Subject to editorial input and review. 
• Book reviews*: Reviews of 1000–1500 words that provide a description of the contents 
as well as provide a critique of a book. Submissions will be subject to editorial review.
• Review essays*: Longer reviews of several works on a given topic, conceived as several 
linked book reviews. Submissions will be subject to editorial review.
• Primary Source Translation and Commentary: Translated Hungarian sources (in whole 
or in part) accompanied by an introduction/commentary. Proposals should be submitted 
to the managing editor prior to submission. Subject to editorial review and copyright 
restrictions.
• Reports on New Media and Digital Content: Overviews and analyses of online material 
and resources including digital collections, databases, websites, and webinars. Proposals 
should be submitted to the managing editor prior to submission. Subject to editorial 
review and copyright restrictions.
The editors of HSR also welcome submissions beyond those outlined above, including project 
and conference reports, polemical scholarly debates, pedagogical discussions, and photo essays 
(subject to permissions). We also welcome proposals for special thematic issues.
The journal provides copy-editing assistance to contributors, though we will return submissions 
to authors prior to consideration for publication if significant revisions are necessary. 
*The editors are prepared to secure review copies of books.
Please consult the most recent version of the Chicago Manual of Style for details on how to 
format your submission. HSR uses endnotes for articles and essays, and in-text parenthetical 
references for book reviews.  
Send all submissions and proposals to our managing editor, Steven Jobbitt: sjobbitt@
lakeheadu.ca.
Send all suggestions for books to review to our book review editor, Richard Esbenshade: 
rsesbenshade@gmail.com

